A. Interpretation – Democracy assistance should be focused on aid that directly supports democracy – anything else makes the topic unmanageable

Burnell, Professor of Politics at the University of Warwick, 2K

(Peter, Democracy Assistance: International Co-operation for Democratization, page 11-13, accessed 3-19-12 at Google Books) PM

Democracy Assistance and …* commissions, might qualify as well.

B. Violation – Governance aid isn’t democracy assistance---adding it explodes the topic

Burnell, Professor of Politics at the University of Warwick, 2K

(Peter, Democracy Assistance: International Co-operation for Democratization, page 18-19, accessed 3-19-12 at Google Books) PM

In principle democracy assistance … Assistance Committee's terms.

C. Vote negative

1. Predictable limits – they allow for anything that affects democracy to be topical. Containing the topic to things that directly influence democracy is key to any predictability

Burnell, Professor of Politics at the University of Warwick, 2K

(Peter, Democracy Assistance: International Co-operation for Democratization, page 18-19, accessed 3-19-12 at Google Books) PM

All things considered, it … such as these.

2. Ground – governance avoids links based off the plan’s support for democracy, and we lose solvency arguments – governance is so broad they can claim to solve any alt causes

3. Extra T – even if some parts of governance are topical, they can claim advantages based off untopical parts – gives them unique advantages and explodes the research burden – independent voting issue

D. Voter for fairness and education. Use competing interpretations – reasonability is arbitrary and causes judge intervention

1. Bureaucracy kills solvency

Carothers, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 9

(Thomas, “Revitalizing U.S. Democracy Assistance,”

carnegieendowment.org/files/revitalizing_democracy_assistance.pdf, accessed 3-15-12, CMM)

USAID’s basic operating procedures—a term used here as shorthand for the rules, regulations, and procedures that underpin the agency’s programming—are a major cause of the lamentable patterns of inflexibility, cumbersomeness, lack of innovation, and mechanical application that hobble much of its democracy and governance work. These basic operating procedures are a study in dysfunctional bureaucratization. Some career professionals at the agency liken them to an enormous accumulation of barnacles on the hull of a ship. They are attached one by one over the years by Congress or the agency itself in response to some particular incident or concern, but then they are never removed or rationalized over time, and the accumulated mass threatens to eventually sink the ship.

These basic operating procedures are much more intrusive and constraining than just “normal” government bureaucracy. They reflect years of trying to spend billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars on assistance programs carried out in difficult foreign contexts under the constant fear that even a scrap of evidence that any money has been misspent will trigger howls of righteous protest in Congress. Over time this pressure produces an institutional culture of paralyzing risk avoidance, leading to ponderous controls and deadening requirements, as well as the pervasive mistrust noted above between the agency and the recipients of its funding.

The highly problematic nature of USAID’s basic operating procedures manifests itself at every stage of programming. The work involved in preparing requests for proposals or requests for assistance and then negotiating and finalizing contracts or grants is extremely burdensome.

It greatly slows the development of new programs, encourages the use of cookie-cutter approaches that have already paved a path through the procurement jungle, and limits the number and range of organizations that compete for and take part in the assistance programs.

The procedures relating to the implementation of programs are similarly troublesome. USAID’s implementing partners reserve some of their harshest criticism for this part of the assistance process. They describe the role of USAID officers overseeing their programs as often being petty, unhelpful micromanagement in service of a thicket of regulatory and procedural complexities that make even simple actions, like hiring a short-term consultant or arranging a training seminar, slow and difficult. They lament that basic elements of the implementation process make it a struggle to be nimble, to innovate as learning occurs, or to adapt easily when basic circumstances change.

2. USAID encourages quantifiable results over qualitative ones

Carothers, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 9

(Thomas, "Revitalizing U.S. Democracy Assistance,” http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/revitalizing_democracy_assistance.pdf, pg23-4, accessed 9-3-11, CMM)

The “performance management plans” that USAID requires for its programs compound the headaches of implementation. These systems set up performance indicators that implementing organizations are supposed to meet across the life of a project. Spurred by the passage of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, which required federal agencies to develop and report on quantifiable performance indicators, USAID began in the mid-1990s saddling its programs with quantifiable and often mechanistic and reductionistic indicators. These indicators primarily count outputs (such as the number of people trained) rather than assessing outcomes (like how much knowledge a training program transmits and how recipients put that knowledge to use). Such indicators create special problems for democracy and governance programs. Counting outputs in a vaccination or a schoolbook project may be somewhat meaningful; doing so in political programs is usually much less so. Defining the goals of a political party assistance program, for example, or a legislative strengthening program, or other similar political programs in simple quantifiable terms usually does considerable damage to the actual nature of the challenges and objectives involved.

Faced with strenuous pushback from partner organizations unhappy about the application of such indicators to democracy and governance programs, USAID pulled back at least partially in the late 1990s and early years of this decade, permitting the use of more nuanced, qualitative performance monitoring indicators. Unfortunately, however, the establishment in 2006 of the “F Process” (the setting up of a centralized budget tracking system for all U.S. foreign assistance, overseen by a director of foreign assistance at the State Department), set the situation back considerably. The F Process imposes a strictly defined set of quantifiable standardized indicators on all assistance programs, embodying the most simplistic forms of output counting. Although USAID is allowed to use its own customized indicators for its democracy and governance programs, it can do so only as a supplement to the standardized F process indicators. The problem thus remains of simplistic, mechanistic indicators encouraging program implementation that is driven by the imperative of “meeting the numbers” rather than doing what is necessary to produce meaningful results.3

3. Leakage of funds from government aid kills effectiveness

Desai, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for Development at the Brookings Institution, and Kharas, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, Global Economy and Development, Development Assistance and Governance Initiative at the Brookings Institution, 10

(Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for Development at the Brookings Institution, and Homi, “DEMOCRATIZING FOREIGN AID: ONLINE PHILANTHROPY AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE,” 42 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 1111, Summer, www.iilj.org/research/documents/FDC.Desai-Kharas.pdf, accessed 3-16-12, CMM)

Official aid is perceived to have low transaction costs because it operates at large scale. But official aid travels a long route, with costs at each stage. The first stage is the cost of tax collection when money is transferred from individuals to the treasury. In this stage, costs consist of the direct administrative costs of tax collection as well as deadweight losses from taxation. These costs can be substantial. n24

In the second stage, official donor agencies transfer funds to recipient country governments to support specific development projects and programs. The administrative costs of these agencies have averaged between 4 to 5 percent, according to statistics reported by the OECD Development Assistance Committee. n25

The third stage involves costs associated with transferring the money from the recipient government to final beneficiaries through project implementation. Administrative costs of the project, corruption, and other leakages mean that only about half the funds actually reach their stated end purpose. n26  [*1127]  In all, transaction costs on official aid could amount to 60 percent or more.

Private aid, particularly internet-based, offers a more direct connection between donors and recipients and potentially reduces transaction costs. At both GlobalGiving or Kiva, the flow of funds route is short: money goes from an individual to the online platform, where it is pooled and transferred to a financial or project intermediary in a recipient country, which then disburses to the final beneficiaries. The long route of passing through government bureaucracies is avoided.

Solvency

. The NTC fails and the plan causes backlash

Friedman, Stratfor, 10-25-11

(George, “Libya and Iraq: The Price of Success,” http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20111024-libya-and-iraq-price-success?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20111025&utm_term=gweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=9c0eae906a284cd1b3f49f8f6f845909, accessed 10-26-11, CMM)

The National Transitional … but insufficient to intimidate them.

4. It’s too early to give aid – the government must consolidate support first

Garrigues, Research Fellow at the Barcelona Center for International Affairs, 11

(Juan, December 2011, “Libya 2012, an inclusive affair,” online: www.cidob.org/en/content/download/30181/360036/file/NOTES+43_GARRIGUES_ANG.pdf, accessed 2-22-12, CMM)

Libya has always … under civilian control.

Oil

No impact to oil shocks – they have minimal effects, the economy is resilient

Auerswald, assistant professor and director of the Center for Science and Technology Policy at the School of Public Policy, George Mason University, 7

(Philip, June 2007, “The Irrelevance of the Middle East,” The American Interest, http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=269, accessed 1-12-12, CMM)

Finally, what of the oft-mentioned … macroeconomic impact has been negligible.

No impact – oil is only a small part of economies and expanded demand offsets negative effects

Rasmussen, Senior Economist, Middle East and Central Asia Department, IMF, and Roitman, Economist IMF, 11

(Tobias, and Agustin, 8-25-2011, “Oil shocks around the world: are they really that bad?” http://voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/6905, accessed 1-21-12, CMM)

To put these numbers in perspective, …relatively mild and occur with a lag.

Econ decline doesn’t cause war – the recent recession proves.

Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, 9

(Thomas P.M., contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire magazine, 8-24-09, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/4213/the-new-rules-security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis, accessed 12-20-11, CMM)

When the global financial crisis … international liberal trade order.

US control of Libyan oil risks confrontation with China

Roberts, former assistant secretary to US Treasury, Panama City, 11

(Paul Craig, 4-26-11, interview, “'United States Risks War With China and Russia,' Says Former Asst. Secretrary of Treasury,” http://panafricannews.blogspot.com/2011/04/states-risks-war-with-china-and-russia.html, accessed 2-20-12, CMM)

While revolts in Tunisia and Egypt … and we're risking a major war.

That goes nuclear
 Glaser, GW University Political Science Professor, 11
(Charles, HARLES GLASER is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University., "Will China's Rise Lead to War? ", Foreign Affairs, Mar/April 2011, Vol. 90, Issue 2, factiva, accessed 11-9-11, CMM)

The prospects for avoiding intense … U.S.-Chinese relations.

Terrorism

No risk of nuclear terrorism

A. No organizational capacity

van den Bergh, Eramus University IR Professor, Hague Social Studies Institute, Harvard Harkness Fellow, Neterlands Association for International Affairs Chairman, Dutch Ministries Foreign Affairs and Defense IR Advisory Council Member, May 2009

[Godfried van Benthem, "The Taming of the Great Nuclear Powers," http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23152]

Recently, a new fear has …, relatively autonomous “cells.” 

B. Probability of success is so low that there is also no motive

DeGroot, St. Andrews University History Professor, November 2009

[Gerard, "Dismissing Doomsday," http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_11/BookReview, 11/9]

Mueller sees nuclear weapons as a …information for bomb-making.

No loose nukes

Zenko, Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Cohen, Fellow at the Century Foundation, 12

(Micah, and Michael, “Clear and Present Safety: The United States Is More Secure Than Washington Thinks,”

Foreign Affairs. New York: Mar/Apr 2012. Vol. 91, Iss. 2; pg. 79, 15 pgs, accessed 3-2-12, CMM)

Overblown fears of a nuclear Iran … the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons."

Terrorism risk is low – Al Qaeda’s on the ropes

Fishman, counterterrorism research fellow at the New America Foundation, and Mudd, senior global advisor at Oxford Analytica, 2-24-12

(Brian, fellow with the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, where he previously served as director of research and Phil, previously served as deputy director of the CIA's Counterterrorist Center and deputy director of the FBI's National Security Branch, “Al Qaeda on the Ropes,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/23/al_qaeda_on_the_ropes?page=full, accessed 2-24-12, CMM)

On Feb. 10, 2012, the emir of al … as the Philippines' archipelago.

Libyan instability is key to high oil prices – that prevents Russian economic decline.

Doff, Moscow News Staff Writer, 11

(Natasha, 12-19-11, “What price stability?,” http://themoscownews.com/business/20111219/189302724.html, accessed 2-17-12, CMM)

Still hooked

Despite efforts to diversify, Russia’s … Colin Smith, of VTB Capital.

Economic decline causes instability in Russia – that causes extinction

Filger, founder of GlobalEconomicCrisis.com, 9

(Sheldon, 5-10-09, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheldon-filger/russian-economy-faces-dis_b_201147.html, accessed 5-9-11, CMM)

In Russia, historically, economic … is its least dangerous consequence.

Dependency causes kiss of death.

Rakner et al, Chr. Michelsen Institute, 7 

(Lise, Chr. Michelsen Institute is an independent, non-profit research institution and an international centre in policy-oriented and applied development research, Alina Menocal, Overseas Development Institute, and Verena Fritz, Overseas Development Institute= ODI is the UK’s leading independent think tank on international develop- ment and humanitarian issues, August, "Democratisation's Third Wave and the Challenges of Democratic Deepening: Assessing International Democracy Assistance and Lessons Learned,” page 48, www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/201.pdf, accessed 9-2-11, CMM)

Achieving a balance between … policies and institutions.

India solves better than the US –

1. Soft power – India is liked better throughout the region and doesn’t carry the same political baggage as the US which means they’d be more likely to accept the aid – that’s Fontaine.
2. Better model – India’s democratic model is much closer to countries in the region than Western models. That means India solves better.

Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 7

 (Larry, Times of India, 12-13-2007, "India, Take the Lead," http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2007-12-13/edit-page/27969898_1_global-power-democracy-soft-power, accessed 10-21-11, CMM)

Of course the United States … commercial and strategic ends.

3. Expertise – India is the world’s largest democracy and been empirically successful promotion democracy throughout Asia. That proves solvency.

BAJPAI, professor in the Politics and International Relations of South Asia, Oxford University, 10

(KANTI, 9-16-10, Internationale Politik (IP) is Germany’s oldest foreign policy journal, “New Dehli’s Democracy Offensive,” http://www.ip-global.org/2010/09/16/new-dehli%E2%80%99s-democracy-offensive/, accessed 10-22-11, CMM)

This friendly debate between …a change in its thinking.

India solves democratic transitions

Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 7

 (Larry, Times of India, 12-13-2007, "India, Take the Lead," http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2007-12-13/edit-page/27969898_1_global-power-democracy-soft-power, accessed 10-21-11, CMM)

India does not need a … could be supported to host such visits.

AT: US Key

1. Prefer our evidence – literature overinflates US importance because of methodological flaws

McFaul et al, Stanford professor, 8

(Michael, worked for the U.S. National Security Council as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director of Russian and Eurasian Affairs, Amichai Magen & Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, “Evaluating International Influences on Democratic Transitions: Concept Paper,” http://iis-db.stanford.edu/res/2278/Evaluating_International_Influences_-_Transitions_-_Concept_Paper.pdf, pgs7-8, accessed 10-22-11, CMM)

A second shortcoming stems … with domestic processes.

1)      The plan isn’t implemented effectively and implementation matters – don’t be afraid to vote on presumption.

Bicchi, Department of International Relations, London Schools of Economics and Political Science, London, UK, 10

(Frederica, “Dilemmas of implementation: EU democracy assistance in the Mediterranean,” Democratization

Vol. 17, No. 5, October 2010, 976–996, Ebsco, accessed 3-15-12, CMM)

There is a broad literature … sense to evaluate the potential impact of the policy.

Bureaucracy discourages local connections – consensus goes neg

Carothers, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 9

(Thomas, "Revitalizing U.S. Democracy Assistance,” http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/revitalizing_democracy_assistance.pdf, pg17-8, accessed 9-3-11, CMM)

At the same time, however, it is /… partnerships.

ME War Defense

1. Middle East conflict won’t spillover or escalate

Cook and Takeyh, CFR Middle Eastern Studies senior fellow, 6-28-07

[Ray, and Steven A., Douglas Dillon fellow, "Why the Iraq war won't engulf the Mideast," http://www.cfr.org/publication/13702/]

Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, …the entire Middle East.

No escalation – empirics prove cooperation is more likely
Fettweis, Asst Prof Poli Sci – Tulane, Asst Prof National Security Affairs – US Naval War College, ‘7
 (Christopher, “On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq,” Survival, Vol. 49, Iss. 4, December, p. 91-93, ebsco, accessed 9-28-11, CMM) 

Regional chaos

Without the US presence, a second … than outright warfare.

Oil Defense

Econ resilient to oil shocks

Karabell, President of River Twice Research and River Twice Capital. A regular commentator on CNBC and columnist for Time, 3-9-11

(Zachary, The Daily Beast, “Don't Freak About Oil Prices!,” http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2011-03-09/oil-price-increases-are-irrelevant-to-the-recovery/?om_rid=C46Z-8&om_mid=_BNeTvaB8Zk5KFe, accessed 3-22-11, CMM)

Finally, financial markets have … have ever less chance of obtaining.

No oil prices spikes – supply disruptions are short-lived empirically

Gholz, assistant professor of public affairs at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, and Press, associate professor of government at Dartmouth University, 7

(Eugene and Daryl G., 4-5-07, "Energy Alarmism: The Myths That Make Americans Worry about Oil”, p11, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=8161, accessed 9-8-11, CMM)

In the five major oil supply…major consumers to smooth risks.73

A) Magnitude – US Russian relations are key to prevent nuclear war – that’s the only scenario for nuclear extinction.

Bostrom, Oxford philosophy faculty, 2

[Nick, “Existential Risks Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards,” Published in the Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, March, http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html]

A much greater existential … potential permanently.

Repeal will pass – Obama’s pushing

ICTSD, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, 3-21-12

(Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest • Volume 16 • Number 11, “US Lawmakers Begin Debate on Russia Trade Restrictions,” http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/128997/, accessed 3-24-12, CM)

The highly-anticipated debate …“within a couple of months.”

Economic benefits

Sanati, CNN Money contributor, 3-19-12

(Cyrus, “The biggest winners of a new Russia trade deal,” http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/03/19/russia-trade/?section=money_topstories&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+rss%2Fmoney_topstories+%28Top+Stories%29, accessed 3-27-12, CMM)

The Senate is expected to …rules. Only time will tell.

Compromise is likely

Brown, president of the National Chicken Council, a nonprofit U.S. trade association,

3-28-12

(Mike, “Ditching Jackson-Vanik Will Benefit Chicken,” http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/ditching-jackson-vanik-will-benefit-chicken/455603.html, accessed 3-28-12, CMM)

If there is one thing the that U.S. … economy over an outdated law.

Passage is likely – trade is bipart

Drinker Biddle, 3-8-12

(Drinker Biddle Customs & International Trade Practice Group, “United States: Bipartisanship Necessary To Move Narrow Trade And Customs Agenda In Congress: 2012 Legislative Outlook,

In January, the 2nd Session … agreement and legislative action.

Debate is coming

ICTSD, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, 2-29-12

(Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest • Volume 16 • Number 8 • 29th February 2012, “Russia Trade Debate Prepares to Kick Off in Washington,” http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/126847/, accessed 3-6-12, CMM)

US-Russia trade ties are …rights enforcement] in the WTO.”

Coming next month

Barkley, WSJ, 2-17-12

(Tom, “Tensions With Russia Loom Over Trade Debate,” http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2012/02/17/tensions-with-russia-loom-over-trade-debate/, accessed 2-18-12, CMM)

Baucus is expected to … businesses, ranchers and farmers.”

Debate coming by in the Spring

Washington Post, 2-23-12

(“Baucus meets Medvedev ahead of Russia trade debate,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/baucus-meets-medvedev-ahead-of-russia-trade-debate/2012/02/22/gIQAeM2EVR_story.html, accessed 2-23-12, CMM)

Sen. Max Baucus (D-Mont.) is on … is not resolved, according to Baucus.

Obama will water it down

Butler, AP, 3-27-12

(Desmond, “US trade upgrade may worsen relations with Russia,” http://www.ocala.com/article/20120327/APW/1203270577?template=printart, accessed 3-27-12, CMM)

Prospects were uncertain … are on a U.S. blacklist.

Washington Post, 2-23-12

(“Baucus meets Medvedev ahead of Russia trade debate,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/baucus-meets-medvedev-ahead-of-russia-trade-debate/2012/02/22/gIQAeM2EVR_story.html, accessed 2-23-12, CMM)

These Republicans — including Rep. … in other areas of bilateral cooperation.

Kerry blocks

WSJ, 2-14-12

(“Our Friends the Russians,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203646004577215363604491448.html?mod=googlenews_wsj, accessed 2-24-12, CMM)

A Russian government … calendar fills up with items like the Haiti

Reforestation Act.

PNTR is at the top of the agenda and it fits Obama’s economic focus

Andrei, The Voice of Russia, 2-22-12

(Ilyashenko, “US-Russia: trading in controlled access zone,” http://english.ruvr.ru/2012_02_21/66597681/, accessed 2-22-12, CMM)

On the other hand, this Amendment … two months, says the Wall Street Journal.

Sargent, Washington Post, 2-21-12

(Greg, “Will improving economy boost Obama’s leverage over GOP?,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/post/will-improving-economy-boost-obamas-leverage-over-gop/2012/02/21/gIQAta4URR_blog.html, accessed 2-24-12, CMM)

Will Obama’s victory on the … in his favor even if he doesn’t get his way.

Corporate tax

It will be put off until the end of the year

McKinnon, WSJ, 3-8-12

(John, “_ Business Roundtable Suggests a Full Tax Overhaul,” http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2012/03/08/business-roundtable-suggests-a-full-tax-overhaul/, accessed 3-8-12, CMM)

_Business Roundtable officials … before the election.

Wins don’t overwhelm the link 

Porter, Slant staff writer, 2009

[Ethan, 9-22, "Obama’s political capital problem," http://trueslant.com/ethanporter/2009/09/22/obamas-political-capital-problem/, 9/25]

I had assumed that, following health care’s passage, the rest of the progressive agenda would be turned into law rather quickly. Health care, then climate change, then the completion of Iraq withdrawal and the rollback of the Bush tax cuts. But it all hinged on health care. Call it the progressive domino theory. I’m pretty sure the Administration subscribed to it.  Yet if the substance of the first domino doesn’t fall for several years, then the president might be in trouble. For politicians, creating entitlement programs has immense political benefits–namely, such programs disburse resources to voters. (The political value of entitlement programs in part explains why Bush couldn’t privatize social security.) But if there’s a significant lag between the passage of a law and the disbursement of resources, then all we’ll be left hearing about is the cost of a bill, the resultant increase to the deficit, etc.  Meanwhile, Obama’s political capital will already have been spent. And that’s not the kind of thing that’s easy to get back.

2. Can only get wins on the economy – not foreign policy. 

Conroy, Real Clear Politics White House Writer, 2010,

(Scott, 11-16, “Needing a Big Win, Obama Turns to Taxes & START”, Real Clear Politics, PAS) http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2010/11/16/seeking_a_big_win_obama_turns_to_tax_cuts_and_start__107967.html 11-16-10

According to Bruce Buchanan, a …aren't concerned with tactics or one-upmanship."

3. Political capital is not renewable – missteps like the plan will undermine Obama

Ryan, 2009 – Former Director of the Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies

(Selwyn, “Obama and Political Capital,” 1/18/2009, www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article_opinion?id=161426968)

Obama will, however, begin his … face inscribed with the plaintive words, "I Trust You."

Political capital theory is true – it has been common since FDR

Beckmann, UC-Irvine political science professor, & Kumar, Indian Institute of Technology economics professor, 11

[Matthew N., & Vimal, Presidential Studies Quarterly, 41: 488-503, September 2011, “Opportunism in Polarization: Presidential Success in Senate Key Votes, 1953-2008”, p. 491-2, Wiley, accessed 2-5-12, AFB]

Returning to our model and …. Let us explain.

Political capital improves president’s ability to win agenda – studies prove

Beckmann, UC-Irvine political science professor, & Kumar, Indian Institute of Technology economics professor, 11

[Matthew N., & Vimal, Presidential Studies Quarterly, 41: 488-503, September 2011, “Opportunism in Polarization: Presidential Success in Senate Key Votes, 1953-2008”, p. 492, Wiley, accessed 2-5-12, AFB]

Below we illustrate this … policy-making influence.

Aff overgeneralizes – despite partisanship and ideology, laws do still pass, and that is where political capital is key

Beckmann, UC-Irvine political science professor, & Kumar, Indian Institute of Technology economics professor, 11

[Matthew N., & Vimal, Presidential Studies Quarterly, 41: 488-503, September 2011, “Opportunism in Polarization: Presidential Success in Senate Key Votes, 1953-2008”, p. 488-9, Wiley, accessed 2-5-12, AFB]

That Congress has experienced …roll-call votes from 1953 to 2008.1

Plan is unpopular – there’s no support for increasing spending in Libya

Lee, Asia Times, 7-19-11

(Peter, “Another take on Libya hubris for China,” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MG19Ad01.html, accessed 8-1-11, CMM)

It is a rather amusing … frozen assets is widespread.

Aid to Libya would trigger massive debate over resources, War Powers, and the debt ceiling – and the fights about the plan gut solvency

Emery, Boston Globe Political Intelligence writer, 8-23-11

[Theo, Boston Globe, “Congress could resist additional aid to Libya”, http://www.boston.com/Boston/politicalintelligence/2011/08/congress-could-resist-additional-aid-libya/DMmIHbENjJ0A6QBAednf0M/index.html, accessed 9-14-11, AFB]

Foreign policy experts say the … we going to build in any one time?”

PNTR is hugely symbolic and is key to relations

Lewis, Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 8

(Finlay, 8-10-08, “Russia Longs to Graduate At the Top of Trade Class” http://www.ncsj.org/AuxPages/081009CQ_Jackson-Vanik.shtml, accessed 2-23-12, CMM)

President Obama has repeatedly … U.S.-Russia relationship,” he said

Even if we don’t solve all relations – there’s a tangible benefit to avoiding a stall

Allison, Director of Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Assistant Secretary of Defense in the first Clinton Administration, and Blackwill, Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, 11

(Graham and Robert D., Deputy national security adviser for strategic planning under President George W. Bush, presidential envoy to Iraq and was the administration’s coordinator for U.S. policies regarding Afghanistan and Iran, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard University, “Russia and U.S. National Interests: Why Should Americans Care?,” A Report of the Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interest, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Russia-and-US-NI_final-web.pdf, accessed 2-23-12, CMM)

Just as the United States … of democratic change in Russia