Neg: Weber State OG

Round #5 Tournament: Shirley

Vs Team: Southern Cal MP

Judge: Jim Schultz

Off Case Args:

Uncle Ted K (on wiki)

Aid Tradeoff DA

“Should” PIC w/ USAID Bad Net Benny

Case Args:

Democracy Assistance Bad

Block Strategy:

2NC

            Case

            K

1NR

            CP

2nr Strategy:

K

Neg: Weber State OG

Round #4  Shirley

Vs West Georgia DF

Judge: Scott Odekirk

Off Case Args:

Zupancic/Forget K

Kazinski

Block Strategy:

2NC—Kazinski

Alternative sparks up a revolution into the woods (makes world = woods)

1NR—Forget K

Forgetting allows you to restart—need to embrace amnesia so that the oppressed can forget about violence and move on

2nr Strategy:

Forget K—metafram

Neg:Weber OG

Round # 2 Tournament:Shirley

Vs Team: Wichita State BM

Judge: Jason STanley

Off Case Args:

Orientalism

Case Args:

Elections are orientalist

Indo-Pak is racist

Evidence indicts

Prolife K

Block Strategy:

2nc: K (added fw)

1nr: case

2nr Strategy:

Went for K and link read on case

Use the button to Add an Entry.

Use the second box for cites formatted with wiki syntax or plain text, such as that exported from Verbatim 4.

Extra Topicality 1NC

Interpretation – topical affirmatives may only gain advantages off the enactment of a policy by the USFG increasing its democracy assistance to one of the topic countries.

Definitions:

a.      Increase is a transitive verb that means to make greater

Merriam-Webster Dictionary No Date

Intransitive verb

1: to become progressively greater (as in size, amount, number, or intensity)

2: to multiply by the production of young

transitive verb

1 : to make greater :

b.      Democracy Assistance is only aid that seeks to directly foster democracy.

Lappin in 2011

(Richard, Ph.D. candidate at the Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies at the University of Leuven in Belgium. Richard has participated in over a dozen democracy assistance missions with the UN, EU, OSCE and Carter Center and has recently completed assignments in Sierra Leon,  Lebanon and Romania. Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Belgrade, “What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance”, Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, 2010, Volume 4, Issue 1, http://www.cejiss.org/issue/2010-volume-4-issue-1/lappin, Jikeda)

Finally, on the positive side, there is the distinct instrument of democracy assistance. Democracy assistance differs from all other forms of democracy promotion in several important ways. First, it is distinct from military action insofar that it does not 'enforce’ democracy, and from international interim administration insofar that it does not 'manage’ democracy. Second, democracy assistance is directed primarily amid exclusively at fostering democracy, as opposed to classical development aid in which democracy is usually only a secondary concern. Third, democracy assistance is distinct from positive political conditionality insofar that it encompasses direct amid active measures, rather than passive tools. Democracy assistance can be further differentiated from political conditionality insofar that it is neither a reward nor a punishment, neither a carrot nor a stick, but rather a ‘booster' to internal groups already working towards democratisation. Democracy assistance is not concerned with 'exporting democracy’ (Schraeder 2002) or 'spreading democracy’ (Hobsbawm 2004) irrespective of the readiness of a given country rather, democracy assistance explicitly recognises that ‘the primary motive force for democratisation is and must be internal to the country in question' (Burnell 2000c: 9), amid that the exclusive intention is ‘to help domestic actors achieve what they have already decided they want for themselves' (Carothers 2007b: 22). Democracy assistance is therefore a very precise instrument within a broader democracy promotion paradigm.

Violation: The plan gains advantages off the removal of religious based restrictions – these are neither an increase nor democracy assistance

Extra: They can add any “without X” statement to the plan text and gain offense off it – i.e. the IRF adv – unpredictable and delimits the topic – IV

F/X: they can take infinite steps in order to solve the plan

Counterplan 1NC

The President of the United States should issue a mandate complete with a signing statement declaring the United States federal governments’ intention to incorporate International Religious Freedom into the National Security Strategy.  The President of the United States should openly announce his support for all political parties in Egypt.

Revising the NSS is critical to making religious freedom more than an ideal we can choose to endorse – it inscribes it in every U.S. democracy and military mission.

Samuels 10-29-10

(Stephanie. Christian Post Correspondent.

Religious Freedom plays a key role in democracy building and needs to be included in the U.S. national security policy, security experts say. Related  William Inboden, a scholar of the Strauss Center for International Security and Law, stressed on Thursday that the absence of freedoms to believe in and worship in the religion of choice in various regions is often a tell-tale sign that there are looming national security issues.  While speaking at the Georgetown University, he called attention to Afghanistan and the strife that has been growing there since before the 9/11 attacks. By not addressing freedom issues of women and the religious minority within its borders, Inboden said America “missed the opportunity to connect the dots” between religious freedom and terror.  Inboden says America is missing another opportunity to declare religious freedom’s importance in its national security policy. The 2010 National Security Strategy, detailing America’s plans to combat national security threats, does not mention religious freedom.  In a section entitled, “Values,” the document states, “The United States supports the expansion of democracy and human rights abroad because governments that up hold these values are more just, peaceful and legitimate.” The document does mention the freedom to worship, but doesn’t integrate the subject of religious freedom into the definition of a democracy and human rights abroad.  Paulette Otis, professor of Security Studies at the Marines Corps University, downplayed its absence saying that America’s “actions speak louder than words.” She said Americans don’t have religion’s role in American democracy pinned down and figured out.  “Every few years another problem comes up. We have it public, we have it in the press, we have it the courts, we argue about it, we fight about it, but we do not commit acts of genocide, we don’t have violence in the street and we do not commit genocide on another population in our midst,” said Otis.  America’s ability to have religious divides and solve them in non-violent ways speaks volumes to foreign countries, she added, and is a far more effective teaching tool for religious freedoms than a clause in the National Security Strategy.  However, Inboden contends that those documents are a blueprint for military officials on the ground, working with foreign allies.  “These documents are important and [the fact] that there’s an omission … speaks volumes,” Inboden said.  In his 2009 speech in Cairo, Egypt, President Barack Obama acknowledged the importance of the right for all to freely worship in any faith to the middle east.  “I saw … firsthand as a child in Indonesia, where devout Christians worshiped freely in an overwhelmingly Muslim country. That is the spirit we need today. People in every country should be free to choose and live their faith based upon the persuasion of the mind and the heart and the souls,” Obama said.  But Eric Patterson, of the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs, noted, “Cairo was just a speech. That’s all it was; a beautiful moment. We haven’t seen a lot of implementation.”  “The National Security Strategy has the force of law behind it,” he stressed.  Rashad Hussain, Obama's special envoy to the Organization of the Islamic Conference, explained that he is fulfilling the vision of the president's Cairo speech by addressing issues such as employment, healthcare and education that the administration believes are fueling security threats. He also said that Obama and his administration support "the protection of religious freedom and the promotion of religious tolerance."  But Patterson contends that many in Obama’s administration seem to have a material view on tackling national security and insists that the free exchange of voices from religion are essential to democracy.  Georgetown University’s Berkley Center hosts an ongoing symposium on topics of religion and global issues. Thursday’s keynote discussion of Religious Freedom and National Security Policy was its eighth discussion.

The affirmative is not solvent – a. structural issues within current IRFA guarantees short-term failure –  b. policies that threaten credibility elsewhere that only the CP solves.

Farr  1AC AUTHOR 2011

visiting associate professor of religion and international affairs at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. He is a senior fellow at Georgetown's Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, where he directs the Religious Freedom Project and the program on Religion and US Foreign Policy. He also directs the Task Force on International Religious Freedom for the Witherspoon Institute in Princeton, N.J. He is a member of the Board of Advisors of the John Templeton Foundation, “Where lies wisdom, where folly?”, February 14, http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/02/14/where-lies-wisdom-where-folly/

After reading the Pew Report, however, one is entitled to conclude that the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) and the policy it mandated have had little impact on levels of religious freedom in the world. While the IRFA’s relative ineffectiveness can be attributed to all three administrations under which it has operated, the Obama administration has thus far proven especially negligent. It has not allocated resources or sustained attention to either the humanitarian or the national security dimensions of the problem. Most recently, the slaughter of Catholics at worship in Baghdad and the continued flight of Iraq’s dwindling Christian population; the murder of Egyptian Copts at church in Alexandria; a Pakistani Christian mother’s death sentence for insulting the prophet Muhammed; the murder of a Muslim governor for defending the Christian mother; Afghan criminal prosecutions against Muslim reformers on charges of blasphemy; past and prospective stonings in Iran; the destruction of Indonesian churches by mobs reacting to a court’s failure to execute a Christian judged guilty of blasphemy; a massive roundup of Iranian Christians—such outrages have been met by little more than rhetorical condemnations at the State Department (and in some cases, not even that).

I

CP moderates the brotherhood WITHOUT giving the US leverage – 1AC moderation evidence only says support is needed but ALSO says MB will backlash to perceived U.S. meddling

Duss 1AC CARD 2011

(Matthew, Policy Analyst and Director of Middle East Progress – Center for American Progress and MA in Middle East Studies – University of Washington, “Are We Serious About A Democratic Egypt?”, ThinkProgress Security, 2-4, http://thinkprogress.org/security/2011/02/04/176481/are-we-serious-about-a-democratic-egypt/)

I agree that U.S. has an interest in helping the Egyptians create a “real democracy,” which is more than just elections but a working, durable set of institutions and procedures. It seems obvious, however, that stating at the outset of such a process that one of our goals is to prevent a particular disfavored group from winning political power is a great way not to achieve that.  While it’s true that Hamas considers itself the Palestinian wing of the Muslim Brotherhood (this is how it defined itself in the 1970′s when Israel quietly supported it, in an attempt to draw support away from the secular nationalist Fatah) it’s lazy at this point to simply conflate the two movements, as their separate experiences and evolution over the last three decades have diverged significantly. (Conor Friedersdorf took a deeper look at this yesterday.)  As for whether Gaza today provides a good example of what Egypt would look like under the Muslim Brotherhood, I suppose if the U.S. immediately responded to a Brotherhood electoral victory by refusing to deal with the new government, then supported a failed coup attempt, and then placed the entire country under a blockade while periodically invading and bombing it, then yes, Egypt under the Muslim Brotherhood might come to look like Gaza under Hamas.  I think a better example of how the Muslim Brotherhood might govern, as I noted previously, can be found in Iraq, where Sunni and Shia Islamist parties dominate. The new Iraq still has enormous problems, but as far as I can tell, its various Islamist governors and parliamentarians clamoring for the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate isn’t one.  In a new Foreign Affairs piece analyzing the evolution of the Brotherhood, Emory University’s Carrie Rosefsky Wickham writes:      Those who emphasize the risk of “Islamic tyranny” aptly note that the Muslim Brotherhood originated as an anti-system group dedicated to the establishment of sharia rule; committed acts of violence against its opponents in the pre-1952 era; and continues to use anti-Western, anti-Zionist, and anti-Semitic rhetoric. But portraying the Brotherhood as eager and able to seize power and impose its version of sharia on an unwilling citizenry is a caricature that exaggerates certain features of the Brotherhood while ignoring others, and underestimates the extent to which the group has changed over time.   Wickham concludes, “The Brotherhood has demonstrated that it is capable of evolving over time, and the best way to strengthen its democratic commitments is to include it in the political process, making sure there are checks and balances in place to ensure that no group can monopolize state power and that all citizens are guaranteed certain freedoms under the law”:      In the foreign policy domain, the Brotherhood rails against “U.S. and Zionist domination,” demands the recognition of Palestinian rights, and may one day seek to revise the terms of Egypt’s relationship with Israel through constitutional channels. The Brotherhood will likely never be as supportive of U.S. and Israeli interests in the region as Mubarak was. Yet here too, the best way for the United States to minimize the risk associated with the likely increase in its power is to encourage and reward judiciousness and pragmatism. With a track record of nearly 30 years of responsible behavior (if not rhetoric) and a strong base of support, the Muslim Brotherhood has earned a place at the table in the post-Mubarak era. No democratic transition can succeed without it.  We obviously shouldn’t be sanguine about what the Muslim Brotherhood represent. These are not liberals in disguise. They hold a lot of views that I, and I think many Egyptians, find abhorrent. But so does Mike Huckabee. The important thing is having processes in place that encourage moderation and coalition-building, thereby preventing extreme religious conservatives from implementing their crazier ideas. But the bottom line is that a truly democratic Egypt, if and when it arrives, will make choices and include actors that the U.S. doesn’t like. We should start getting used to that idea.

Case 1NC

The Obama Administration already over-rode previous restrictions AND provided the Muslim brotherhood with political party training – solves both advantages 

Democracy Digest, Nov 4 

(2011, “US will be ‘satisfied’ if Islamists win Egypt’s election,” )

The United States would be “satisfied” if Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood won November’s elections, the Obama administration’s head official for Middle East transitions said today.  “I think the answer is yes, I think we will be satisfied, if it is a free and fair election,” said William Taylor, the newly appointed special coordinator for regional transitions.  “What we need to do is judge people and parties and movements on what they do, not what they’re called,” he told a

democratic momentum would give Islamist groups an incentive to embrace constitutional politics, he suggested, while undermining the appeal of violent jihadist groups.  “This movement toward democracy has the ability to repudiate the terrorist narrative,” Taylor said.  The Obama administration shares the concern of many analysts that any appearance of hostility to Islamist parties or hints of political engineering to keep them from office will rebound in their favor.  “Political Islam will not go away because the West ignores it; Islamist parties will, however, become more moderate if they are included in government,” says Marwan Muasher, the former foreign minister and deputy prime minister of Jordan.  Recent developments confirm “an accelerated Islamization of the Arab world,” writes historian Benny Morris – a regional trend “far different from what many Western idealists anticipated when they coined the term ‘Arab Spring.’”  But “Islamists are unlikely to take over new governments in the Arab world, and seeking to prevent Islamist parties from participating in governance would actually be counterproductive,” Muasher argues. “Countries in transition have no choice but to open up the political system.”  Another leading official this week rejected suggestions that the administration should counter illiberal trends in Egypt’s transition and give incentives for democratic reform by adding conditionalities to US aid.  “Now is not the time to add further uncertainty to the region or disrupt our relationship with Egypt,” said Andrew Shapiro, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. “Conditioning assistance risks putting our relations with Egypt in a contentious place at the worst possible moment,” he told the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.  The administration this week defended its non-partisan approach to democracy assistance, explaining why political party training is made available to groups from across the political spectrum, including Islamist parties.  “We provide training for political parties to help them use polling, for example, or help them do constituent services or preparation – election preparations, these kinds of things,” said Taylor, the new transitions coordinator.  “So NDI, for example, the National Democratic Institute, they have trainings, and they will invite a range of parties, including – all across, let’s just say all across the spectrum,” he said. “Sometimes, Islamist parties show up; sometimes they don’t. But that’s – it has been provided on a nonpartisan basis, not to individual parties.”  While some analysts – and former Islamist activists - insist that while Islam and democracy are compatible, Islamism is an inherently anti-democratic ideology. But the administration appears inclined to give the Brotherhood the benefit of any doubt.  “As these Arab countries are going into political transitions, a number of new people are coming into the political process, many of whom describe themselves as Islamists. But that doesn’t necessarily mean that they are anti-democratic.” Shapiro said. “We need to support an effort and structure to channel this energy that’s coming into the political process into an understanding of what democracy means and the benefits of it, and our training on the ground is designed to do so.”  But the West’s democracies have a moral responsibility and a strategic interest in supporting the region’s “movements of modernity and enlightenment,” writes Raghida Dergham, Al Hayat’s senior diplomatic correspondent.  “The most important element on the road to change in the Arab region resides in constitutions,” she contends,” and this is why Islamist political parties want to rush to hold parliamentary elections which they would win, leading them to hold the keys to the country’s constitution.”  It is not surprising that Islamist parties are ascendant as secular rivals have insufficient time to organize and lack the necessary funding.  “This is at a time when Islamist parties are receiving financial support not just from individuals who believe in them, but also from governments in the region that have decided to support extremist and moderate Islamist movements with funds and sometimes even with arms,” she argues.

Kerry’s visit to the Muslim Brotherhood solved the advantage already – your evidence doesn’t even mention the word aid, and it’s a poor representation of what the author was actually saying.  NOTE: This is the only card in the advantage that mentions Muslim Brotherhood statements and not just pure speculation.

Husain 12-12

(Ed, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies – Council on Foreign Relations, “Was Senator Kerry right to meet with the Muslim Brotherhood?”, Global Public Square – CNN Blog, 2011, http://globalpublicsquare .blogs.cnn.com/2011/12/12/was-senator-kerry-right-to-meet-with-the-muslim-brotherhood/)

There is much anger among many Egyptian secular liberals about Senator John Kerry’s meeting with leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo on Saturday. Soon, in Washington, DC, Republican lawmakers will chide Senator Kerry too. I am no friend of the Muslim Brotherhood, but old policies of isolating the Muslim Brotherhood are no longer viable in the new Middle East.  Meeting only with secular Egyptian leaders such as presidential candidates Mohamed ElBaradei or Amr Moussa yields very little political profit for the United States, and results in a net loss of remaining credibility for Egypt’s secularists. By meeting with Islamists, the United States ensures political gains for the short to medium term.  However unpalatable, and whatever the disagreements and complaints, the Muslim Brotherhood has won roughly 40 percent of the vote in the first round of parliamentary elections. As such, they are an elected, legitimate political force. Soon, we will hear howls of anger from some in the U.S. Congress, media, and think tank circles about why the Muslim Brotherhood should be shunned. They will argue that the Brotherhood supported the Nazis (so did former Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat, who later made peace with Israel); that it is anti-American (true, but all the more reason to love-bomb them); and that it created Hamas (it did, but it does not control Hamas and closer ties with Egypt’s Brotherhood can result in greater influence over Hamas terrorism).  [[[[MSU Card Ends Here]]]]

 As chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a senior U.S. statesman, Senator Kerry’s words and cautions are important. In meeting with the Muslim Brotherhood, he sets a new and brave precedent.  First, the emphasis on Egyptian economic regeneration is of vital importance to ordinary people in Egypt. Senator Kerry struck the right tone in his remarks after the meeting. Democratic transformation goes in tandem with economic advancement in Egypt. Here, the United States can and must help Egypt.  Second, the Muslim Brotherhood leaders renewed their commitment to maintaining Egypt’s international treaties, an indication that they were not in the business of nullifying the Camp David Accords.  Third, this meeting and further collaboration with the Muslim Brotherhood demolishes the al-Qaeda narrative and Iranian propaganda that the United States is at war with Islam. When the mothership of all extremist organizations in the region, the Muslim Brotherhood, welcomes U.S. assistance and influence, we should see it as an advance in helping recast the image of the United States in Arab countries.  Fourth, the Muslim Brotherhood is on an intellectual and political journey. Where they lead, others will follow. It is a healthy sign that they and other Islamists are meeting U.S. leaders in public. The content and quality of behind-the-scenes meetings, done properly, will lead to trust and cooperation.  I wrote about the vital need to engage with the Muslim Brotherhood for Foreign Policy magazine here and the Financial Times here. It is reassuring that this interaction is underway.  As the United States builds credibility with Islamists, it is important not to forget the West’s ideational allies among secular liberals. Ignoring them in the future risks creating a new, secular anti-Americanism. Going forward, U.S. political and civil leaders should interact with all willing political actors in Egypt.

T – Material 1NC

Interpretation:

“Democracy Assistance” must include transfer of resources – grants or loans

Burnell, professor of politics and international studies at Warwick, 2000

(Peter, Democracy Assistance: International co-operation for democratization, pg. 5

When defining democracy assistance there are three sets of considerations to bear in mind. First, a stipulation about the intentions: democratic advance must be a primary objective although not necessarily the only objective. It is acceptable that there be multiple motives on both sides. Also we should acknowledge the fact that the views of the different actors over precisely what constitutes democracy and democratic advance, and not just their attitudes towards these, may not wholly coincide. Also, 'assistance' and 'aid' do not require a complete lack of self-interest on the part of the providers of assistance. Having said that, the status of 'assistance' provided by foreign governments that do not that themselves meet some democratic threshold is surely questionable. Their interest in say boosting certain participants in the democratic process of another country may lie in actually disrupting the democratization of the state concerned. The support given to the rise of sectarian politicla parties with separatist agendas is an example. But there are circumstances where even this might be construed as a victory for democracy, if it leads to greater political self-determination for minority groups who have been severely discriminated against or oppressed for many years. Second, the methods of democracy assistance must be peaceful. A central feature is the transfer of resources of one sort or another. Third and following the example of the conventional meaning of international development assistance, the terms on which the transfer takes place include a concessionary element or at the very least the arrangement is negotiated on a not-for-profit basis (the execution of the arrangements may be contracted out to for-profit actors). This last reflects the fact that the providers want their offers to be adopted. They are not proposing a commercial market transaction. Much democracy assistance is funded on a grant basis. Where the arrangements are loan-based, fixing the level of the concessionary element that is sufficient for it to qualify as assistance can involve somewhat arbitrary judgments.

The plan just incentivizes a dialogue – they are “democracy support.”

Lappin, University of Leuven (Belgium) Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies

PhD candidate, 2010

[Richard, participant in democracy assistance missions with the UN, EU, OSCE, and Carter Center, University of Belgrade political sciences visiting scholar, Central European Journal of International & Security Studies, Volume 4 Issue 1, ―What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance: the problem of definition in post-conflict approaches to democratization‖ http://soc.kuleuven.be/iieb/docs/2010/CEJISS-lappin.pdf]

By the end of the 1990s, the term ‘democracy assistance’ had acquired increased and extensive usage in academic literature and become a natural part of the rhetoric of the development programmes and foreign policies of Western countries . Yet, despite this growing recognition, the term has rarely been clearly or comprehensively defined. Typically, the term is used with the assumption that the reader will automatically understand the meaning; however, such casual usage can cause confusion, especially as other terms can be used to describe similar phenomena, such as the often used umbrella term of ‘democracy promotion,’ as well as a host of other variants including ‘development aid,’ ‘political aid,’ ‘democracy support,’ ‘democracy aid,’ and ‘support for democratic development’ (Burnell 2000c: 3) . As such, it is critically important that researchers are cognizant of the breadth of meaning attached to democracy assistance by different people and practice precision in their own usage and definition of the term . Indeed, if we are unable to achieve accuracy in our terminology, the utility of the approach, both in theory and in practice, will ultimately be undermined. Democracy assistance can be most accurately defined as the non-profit transfer of funds, expertise, and material to foster democratic groups, initiatives and institutions that are already working towards a more democratic society (De Zeeuw and Kumar 2006: 20) . These transfers are usually funded through governmental development agencies, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), or the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) . The programmes themselves are undertaken by a diverse group of inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and, to a lesser extent, through bilateral agreements . Chief amongst the IGOs are the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), and the Organisation of American States (OAS) . The most prominent NGOs include the Carter Center, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and the Centre for Electoral Promotion and Advice (CAPEL) . In addition, within a given country, there will also be a range of local counterparts who receive democracy funding including electoral commissions, state institutions, civil society groups, media groups and political parties.

1.            Limits: Hundreds of small interventions like Obama phone calls, State Department delegations, cultural exchanges, athletic events, etc.

Precision disad

Lappin 2010

University of Leuven (Belgium) Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies

PhD candidate, 2010  [Richard, participant in democracy assistance missions with the UN, EU, OSCE, and Carter Center, University of Belgrade political sciences visiting scholar, Central European Journal of International & Security Studies, Volume 4 Issue 1, ―What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance: the problem of definition in post-conflict approaches to democratization‖ http://soc.kuleuven.be/iieb/docs/2010/CEJISS-lappin.pdf]

By the end of the 1990s, the term ‘democracy assistance’ had acquired increased and extensive usage in academic literature and become a natural part of the rhetoric of the development programmes and foreign policies of Western countries . Yet, despite this growing recognition, the term has rarely been clearly or comprehensively defined. Typically, the term is used with the assumption that the reader will automatically understand the meaning; however, such casual usage can cause confusion, especially as other terms can be used to describe similar phenomena, such as the often used umbrella term of ‘democracy promotion,’ as well as a host of other variants including ‘development aid,’ ‘political aid,’ ‘democracy support,’ ‘democracy aid,’ and ‘support for democratic development’ (Burnell 2000c: 3) . As such, it is critically important that researchers are cognizant of the breadth of meaning attached to democracy assistance by different people and practice precision in their own usage and definition of the term . Indeed, if we are unable to achieve accuracy in our terminology, the utility of the approach, both in theory and in practice, will ultimately be undermined.

T is a voting issue, or the aff would read a new indisputable case every debate

Executive CP 1NC

The Executive Branch of the United States federal government should significantly expand economic assistance to Shiite communities in Bahrain focused on anti-poverty programs, expanded employment opportunities on the naval base, and housing subsidies. 

CP appeases Shiites and ensures sustainability of the fleet

Cooley & Nexon, 11

(Columbia & Georgetown Profs, “Bahrain’s Base Politics, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67700/alexander-cooley-and-daniel-h-nexon/bahrains-base-politics?page=show)

It is time for U.S. officials to reconsider their basing policies. First, they should create broader constituencies for the continued presence of the U.S. military in host countries. In Bahrain, this means U.S. policymakers should do their best to ensure that the Shia community garners economic benefits from the naval base and its related facilities, rather than allowing those benefits to be monopolized by a handful of elites. The base contributes about $150 million annually to Bahrain's economy, or about one percent of GDP. Last May, U.S. officials announced a plan to double the size of the base by 2015, with the intent of spending an additional $518 million. Given the precarious current political environment, U.S. planners should ensure that Bahraini Shia companies and workers gain a large share of the resulting contracts. Second, Washington needs to avoid thinking about its basing arrangements in terms of a simple trade-off between pragmatism and idealism. As recent events suggest, traditional strategies of binding the United States to loyal strongman regimes can undermine both U.S. interests and values. Defense officials and U.S. diplomats can best preserve security contracts and commitments by broadening their engagement with a wide variety of political, social, and economic actors, even over the initial objections of authoritarian elites. Third, U.S. officials should make efforts to decouple the rationale of a given basing relationship from support for a particular regime. This means creating political space between Washington and the policies of authoritarian host countries whenever possible. With respect to Bahrain, U.S. officials should make clear that the U.S. military maintains its facilities for the defense of its territory and for regional stability -- not for the purposes of propping up the ruling family. At the same time, Washington needs to signal that it believes that both countries' interests are best served by greater political liberalization. Abandoning the idea of a zero-sum trade-off between pragmatism and idealism is particularly important when considering U.S. policy toward Bahrain. Some see Bahrain as a proxy state in the struggle among Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Iran, and so they believe that further pressuring Manama to democratize will open the door to Iranian domination. But this misreads the national loyalties of Shia Bahrainis and confuses the main source of current Iranian influence. Bahrain's Shiites have shown little interest in allying themselves with the deeply reactionary regime in Tehran. Indeed, the more Washington promotes the inclusion of Shiites in Bahrain's political system, the less of a political opening Tehran will have. Some observers raise legitimate concerns about such hedging strategies, on the grounds that the United States should avoid reinforcing suspicions among its strategic partners that it will abandon them in a political pinch. But a nimbler approach to relations with host countries and their citizens would not mean abandoning autocratic allies. Ensuring that the benefits of U.S. bases are more broadly distributed, cultivating ties with a larger swath of host countries' civil societies, and clarifying the nature of the strategic relationship are all prudent steps that should do little to jeopardize strategic relationships that often pay significant dividends for the host countries. Of course, Washington's ability to hedge its bets will differ from strategic partner to strategic partner; U.S. officials will always have to tread carefully lest they push too far and overly antagonize current governments. But it is better to gain flexibility before the next political crisis hits than be forced to scramble after it is under way.

Solves the case-bigger internal link to Shiite unrest

Terrill, 2011

Terrill, 8/2/11 – Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute (Andrew, “The Arab Spring and the Future of U.S. Interests and Cooperative Security in the Arab World,” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/The-Arab-Spring-and-the-Future-of-US-Interests/2011/8/2#bahrain)

Perhaps the most reasonable approach in the aftermath of this tragedy is for the United States to continue efforts to move the process of reconciliation forward while attempting to curb government excesses. It now seems likely that Bahrain's already deep sectarian divide will become more serious and intense in the aftermath of punitive measures taken against Shi'tes following the suppression of anti-government protesters. Most of the reforms called for by the protestors, including a Constitutional monarchy, were moderate by Western standards, and a deadlocked process can only leave the Shi'ites with a smoldering sense of injustice. Nevertheless, Bahrain's government can still take some important steps to limit the permanent damage to intercommunal relations. One step which is already being implemented and needs to be continued is for the wealthier Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to provide significant economic aid that will be directed at Bahrain's Shi'ite community including better housing, infrastructure, and especially job creation.25 Bahrain is a small country with approximately 1,000,000 citizens, so programs to raise the Shi'ites out of poverty can be of considerable value in maintaining social stability. Bahrain's grating economic problems and a lack of economic opportunity should be correctable. Additionally, the Bahraini government has promised a serious national dialogue with the opposition. This effort may be valuable, but only if it involves a meaningful approach to important issues. If the government appears to be using such activities as a way to delay reform or imply progress when none exists, serious problems will emerge. The United States needs to support such dialogue so long as it appears to be sincere. In general, the situation in Bahrain and particularly the violence there has harmed U.S. interests and improved the position of Iran, but this situation may be reparable if strong attention is paid to the needs of Bahraini Shi'ites.

Executive CP 2NC

It stabilizes Bahrain and prevents Iran influence

Terrill, 12/14

Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, “The West and the Durability and Problems of Monarchies in the Arab Spring,” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/The-West-and-the-Durability-and-Problems-of-Monarchies-in-the-Arab-Spring/2011/12/14

Most of the monarchies are doing a more effective job of reacting to Arab Spring events because many of them are wealthy, and even the poorer ones benefit from aid provided by their wealthy royal colleagues. Through social benefits programs and public sector pay raises, the rich oil countries are either buying off their populations or attempting to give them a stake in the system depending on how you want to describe such policies. Additionally, monarchical governments, which appear reactionary to Westerners, have often emerged as the least repressive and most responsive governments in the Arab World. The most important of these states, Saudi Arabia, is sometimes seen as having an ultra-conservative government and an ultra-traditional population, which complement each other. Any large-scale dissent could alter this picture, so the Saudis retain a strong interest in maintaining a tranquil population without massive repression. This concern leads to considerable wealth distribution as well as some cosmetic gestures by Riyadh toward democracy at the local level. The Saudis and other monarchical leaders seem to know that their legitimacy is shaky in the 21st century, and they need at least the appearance of responsive government to survive. In this regard, Qadhafi stashed over $200 billion worth of savings and investments in secret funds while allowing many of his people to wallow in poverty. The Arab kings, in contrast, usually know how to spread the money around at least to the extent of taking the steam out of dissent. In the modern era, no one overthrows a republic to establish a monarchy, and the kings, emirs, and their supporters know it. The much poorer Jordanian kingdom has sometimes been described as a likely candidate for regime-threatening upheaval, but this case is dramatically overstated. Jordan has a responsible government with a leadership that has been able to attract vast amounts of foreign aid and investment from the United States, Europe, and the Gulf Arabs. It also maintains a parliament and allows the expression of anti-Israeli sentiment among the population, although this is permitted only within limits. Should a truly democratic government be elected in the near future, it would be under enormous public pressure to renounce the 1994 peace treaty with Israel, distance itself from the United States, and perhaps improve relations with Tehran. Renouncing the treaty and supporting Hamas is a key plank in the leading opposition party’s political agenda, and such actions would be extremely popular among Jordan’s large Palestinian community. Such policies would also lead to a collapse of Western aid, and it is not clear why Saudi Arabia would bother to provide financial aid to a post-monarchical Jordan. These radical changes would probably not help the Palestinians, and Jordan would become a new Bangladesh economically. Most Jordanians are aware of these realities, even if some occasionally seek limited concessions from the government through demonstrations. Under these circumstances, Jordan’s go-slow approach to democratic reform is something responsible leaders may therefore have to accept. Conversely, Morocco looked like a more likely candidate for serious upheaval in early 2011, although this danger appears to have subsided following a program of constitutional reforms and ongoing efforts by the king to outmaneuver the February 20 opposition movement. Yet, if most monarchies are coping with Arab Spring demands with limited or no violence, there is one key exception, and that is the government in Bahrain. Reliable human rights organizations have indicated that the 2011 Bahraini crackdown on pro-democracy Shi’ite demonstrators was extensive and brutal. As anyone who has visited Bahrain knows, that country’s Shi’ite majority experiences crushing, ongoing discrimination, while Shi’ite political leaders often beg for crumbs in the way of public sector jobs and anti-poverty measures for their community. The Bahraini leaders need to address the pain of its Shi’ite population before their fanciful claim of an Iranian guiding hand for the protesters actually becomes true. This means massive anti-poverty and jobs programs, as well as judicial and political reform punctuated by ongoing programs of political amnesty. Bahrain only has about one million citizens. It is time to start providing improved economic opportunities for all of them and thereby lay the groundwork for more comprehensive political participation. The richer Gulf states have promised to help in this effort and Western states need to encourage such actions to the greatest extent possible.

Best data proves the CP solves

Zogby, 11

(3/19, President-Arab American Institute, Economic Roots of Bahrain's Crisis and a Needed Gulf Cooperation Council Response, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-zogby/economic-roots-of-bahrain_b_837928.html)

All too frequently these days, I am asked whether our past polling at Zogby International gave us any advance clues to the uprisings that have occurred in several Arab countries. The answer, of course, is no. We were surprised, as, I believe, were the demonstrators themselves by the outpouring of support and the rapid growth of their movements in Tunisia, Egypt and beyond. But while our polling couldn't predict the uprisings, it nevertheless has been helpful in contributing to our understanding of the issues and concerns that define the political landscape in countries across the region. In preparing for a talk on Bahrain earlier this week, I took a look at a survey of the "middle class" in Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain we conducted a few years ago for McKinsey and Company. It was most instructive. What I found, back then, in that in-depth look into the economic status and outlook of Gulf Arabs were yellow flags flying all over our Bahrain data, warning that the country's citizens were distressed. We found that not only are Bahrain's neighbors in Saudi Arabia and the UAE wealthier, in terms of macro-economic indicators, their citizens are also more satisfied with their current status and more optimistic about their prospects for the future. Ask the questions "are you better off than your parents were when they were your age" and between two-thirds to three-quarters of Saudis and Emiratis say "yes". On the other hand, only one-third of Bahrainis would agree that they are better off than their parent's generation. And when asked whether their children would be better off in the future, more than a half of Saudis and Emiratis agreed that they would be better off, while only 17% of Bahrainis are optimistic about the future of their offspring. Hard data establishes that Bahrain's unemployment is significantly more than double that of its neighbors, but this is only part of the story. Most unemployed Saudis and Emiratis report having incomes (with some being fairly substantial coming from family support; others report income from rental properties or investments, etc). And most of those reporting themselves to be "unemployed" in those two countries come from households in which two or more individuals are employed. In Bahrain, on the other hand, most of the unemployed report having no sources of other income, most have no savings, and most come from households where only one person or no one at all is a wage-earner. One doesn't have to make the leap to a crude type of economic determinism to conclude that this economic stress in Bahrain would have consequences. Bahrainis report being less satisfied with their jobs and the salaries they receive, and give lower grades to government services than their neighbors in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. While this obvious economic distress in Bahrain is only one factor among others to which one can point in an effort to account for the turmoil in the country -- it is a revealing and important factor nonetheless. The issues of political reform, concerns with discrimination, and government accountability have now been brought to the forefront in Bahrain and are the key agenda items for a much needed national dialogue. But as this broader political discussion advances (and one can only hope that it does), the economic needs of Bahrain's people should not be ignored. Meeting economic concerns will not substitute for political reform, but not addressing these economic matters will only make advancing on the political front all the harder. In this area, Bahrain's neighbors have a key role to play. Earlier this year, Gulf Cooperation Council members made a commitment of long-term financial assistance to Bahrain. And now they have sent troops into the country deepening their commitment to their neighbor and fellow member. More must be done. Bahrain needs help. Just as other GCC countries realized that the long-term standoff that shut down a vital part of the country was not sustainable or constructive, so too they must realize that the government's crack-down that ended the standoff will also not solve the country's problems or even contribute to a resolution. An honest, open, and good faith dialogue on all key issues is the only way forward. As that occurs, the GCC can design a more comprehensive economic package for Bahrain -- as an incentive to move the reform process forward, as a sign of GCC solidarity with the Bahraini people and government, and as a way of demonstrating that Arab problems can be solved by Arabs.

Shia grievances are linked to economics – Bahrain needs an infusion of cash to ensure political stability

Black, 11

(2/15, Guardian Columnist, “Bahrain's neighbours are nervy as stress tells along sectarian lines”, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/15/bahrain-stress-sectarian-lines)

Bahrain has the smallest population of any Arab state, but its special problems single it out as a test case for peaceful reform in a region made more volatile by the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia. As unrest in the small Gulf island kingdom entered its second day, the key question was whether calls for change would remain limited or enter a more radical stage. King Hamad's conciliatory tone suggested he recognises the gravity of the crisis. Bahrain's distinction is that the Sunni Muslim Al Khalifa dynasty rules over a restive Shia majority that has long complained about poverty and discrimination for jobs and housing. The population has grown from 750,000 to more than a million in a few years, with Shias in senior jobs decreasing while large numbers of non-Bahraini Sunnis are naturalised. This sectarian division puts Bahrain on a regional faultline, with an assertive Shia Iran glowering across the Gulf at a country that is also home to the US 5th fleet and a key ally for Washington. The Saudis, with their Shia majority in the oil-producing eastern provinces, are watching nervously. Bahrain is the odd one out economically as well, lacking the hydrocarbon riches of Qatar or the UAE and thus the ability easily to buy off dissent in exchange for political quiescence.

Demand for constitutional reform is only a means to an end—they really just want economic opportunity

Goodspeed, 11

(Columnist-National Post, 2/14, “Unrest in Bahrain could threaten key U.S. military outpost,” http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/02/14/peter-goodspeed-unrest-in-bahrain-could-threaten-key-u-s-military-outpost/)

Bahrain’s Shiite majority, which accounts for almost 70% of the population, is challenging the island’s Sunni king, Sheik Hamid bin Isa al-Khalifa. They want him to rewrite the constitution to give Shiites a larger share of power and economic opportunity, while demanding investigations into widespread complaints of torture and corruption. Demonstrators are also calling for the release of up to 500 people arrested last fall in a security sweep aimed at crushing emerging Shiite opposition movements. As in Tunisia and Egypt, opposition organizers in Bahrain have used Facebook and Twitter to rally demonstrators. On Monday they sought to bring tens of thousands into the streets, just as the country marked the 10th anniversary of Sheik Khalifa’s attempt to transform a hereditary emirate into a constitutional monarchy. Bahrain is the smallest and most volatile of the Gulf states, with a long history of animosity between a ruling Sunni elite closely allied to the Saudi monarchy and its Shiite majority, which has a religious affinity with Iran. Bahraini Shiites complain they have been marginalized, being excluded from many types of government jobs and making up only a small proportion of the security forces, the country’s largest employer. Shiite villages also frequently fail to receive the same standard of services as Sunni neighbourhoods.

Saudi DA 1NC

Moves towards constitutional reform spark uprisings in the Eastern province and rapid price spikes

Youssef, 12/13

(Columnist-McClathcy Newspaper, “Saudi influence could be key to outcome in Bahrain”, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/02/23/v-print/109290/saudi-influence-could-be-key-to.html

MANAMA, Bahrain — Even as mainly Shiite Muslim protesters camp out in Pearl Square demanding major reforms, the deciding factor in the outcome for Bahrain could be neighboring Saudi Arabia. Behind the scenes and away from the streets, Saudi Arabia, a key U.S. ally and top oil supplier, is seeking to return to the status quo in Bahrain — or at least to slow down calls for change. That Bahrain's Shiite majority could gain more rights and powers from the ruling Sunni Muslims, Saudis think, could lead to unrest among their own Shiites, who live in Saudi Arabia's oil-rich Eastern Province. In that case, reforms and economic incentives might not be enough to stop a movement from spreading there. Bahrain is the first Persian Gulf country to be hit by the unrest that's sweeping the Middle East, and Saudi Arabia is one of the last U.S. allies in the region since the regimes in Egypt and Tunisia fell. Although Bahrain is a tiny island of less than a million, what happens here could unleash calls for change in the much larger and powerful Saudi Arabia. It's a case of Goliath fearing David's wrath. At stake are oil prices, which are now at their highest since October 2008, and even relations with the United States, which is walking a fine line between promoting the will of the people and supporting a long-standing ally. In Saudi Arabia, officials already have quashed several small attempts to launch protests against some government decisions. Three days after the revolt began in Egypt, for example, roughly 50 residents protested the government response to deadly floods in Jeddah. They were promptly arrested. Protesters in Manama are calling for Bahrain to become a constitutional monarchy, rather than an absolute one. Such a shift probably would give the Shiite majority more power. As the Saudis see it, that represents instability for them; Saudi Arabia's Shiite minority could then rise up and ask for more freedoms its own. Protesters in Manama threatened Wednesday to lash out at the Saudi regime if it thwarted their efforts, though they refused to give their names. "If they stop us, we will go there," one protester yelled. For Saudi Arabia, the best outcome in Bahrain is enough change to pacify protesters but not so much that it risks government structure, said James Denselow, a Middle East writer and former researcher for Chatham House, a policy research center in London. "Instability could not get more on Saudi's doorstep than Bahrain," Denselow said. "The outcome that Saudi Arabia wants is . . . for everybody to leave the streets and that small changes be managed by the elite. They want a slow process."

Collapses the global economy

Snyder 2011

Snyder, McIntire School of Commerce – University of Virginia, has two law degrees from the University of Florida, 2/23/’11

(Michael, “5 Dollar Gas? Get Ready To Pay An Arm And A Leg For Gasoline,” http://theeconomiccollapseblog.com/archives/5-dollar-gas-get-ready-to-pay-an-arm-and-a-leg-for-gasoline/comment-page-1)

If revolution strikes in Saudi Arabia and a major production disruption happens it could be catastrophic for the global economy. David Rosenberg, the chief economist at Gluskin Sheff & Associates, is warning that if there is major civil unrest in Saudi Arabia we could end up seeing oil go up to $200 a barrel.... "If Libya can spark a $10-a-barrel response, imagine what a similar uprising in Saudi Arabia could unleash. Do the math: we'd be talking about $200 oil." 200 dollar oil? Don't laugh - it could happen. In fact, if it does happen the global economy would probably go into cardiac arrest. The truth is that if the flow of oil from Saudi Arabia gets disrupted there is not enough spare capacity from the rest of the globe to make up for it. Paul Horsnell, the head of oil research at Barclays Capital, recently said that the world does not currently have enough spare capacity to be able to guarantee that an oil "price shock" will not happen.... "The world has only 4.5m barrels-per-day (bpd) of spare capacity, which is not comfortable." Horsnell also said that even in the midst of potential supply problems, the global demand for oil continues to grow at a very robust pace.... "In just two years, the world has grown so fast as to consume additional volume equal to the output of Iraq and Kuwait combined." For now, Saudi officials are saying all the right things.  They say that there will be no revolution in Saudi Arabia and that there are not going to be any supply problems. For example, Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi recently announced that the rest of the world should not worry because his country is definitely going to be able to make up for any shortage in the global supply of oil.... "What I would like you to convey to the market: right now there is absolutely no shortage of supply." But what happens if revolution comes to Saudi Arabia? Suddenly the whole game would change.

Collapses the CCP

Peek 2011

Liz Peek 11, The Fiscal Times, “Oil Price Surge: How Libya Threatens China Growth”, April 13, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2011/04/13/Oil-Price-Surge-How-Libya-Threatens-China-Growth.aspx

For China, though, the Libyan engagement is not entirely positive. Beijing is surely overjoyed to have the world’s attention focused elsewhere, and away from its increasingly harsh repression of political opponents. On the other hand, rising oil prices will buttress higher inflation in China, and consequently feed dissent. Beijing’s escalating crackdown on dissidents has shocked the international community – especially since the international community began to shift its gaze from the calamities in Japan and Libya. In the past few days, after the arrest of famed artist Ai Weiwei, the world has seen the extreme lengths to which Beijing has gone to preempt uprisings of the sort that have convulsed the Middle East. Tentative efforts to import Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution” to China have met with beatings of bystanders and assaults on journalists, the shut-down of innumerable web sites, widespread arrests and the “disappearing” of a steadily growing number of activists – so terrified is the government of civil unrest. It is an extraordinary setback for a country that “came out” to the world just three years ago hosting the most spectacular-ever Summer Olympics. In staging that extraordinary event, Beijing presumed to take its rightful place near the top of the pyramid of nations. With the reign of terror now underway, that ascension seems premature. The increased crackdown in China may presage Beijing’s expectation that itsremarkable economic gains of the past thirty years are unlikely to continue. Chinese officials may fear that slowing growth will not provide the employment opportunities so necessary to satisfy those still migrating from the country to the cities. China’s Minister of Human Resources and Social Security recently reported that notwithstanding indications of labor shortages in certain industrial cities, worker supply still exceeds demand, requiring China to create about 25 million new urban jobs annually for the next several years. The possible disruptive impact of high unemployment makes a potential slowdown in the country’s growth a serious threat. China’s problems are exacerbated by the need to rein in inflation, running at 5.4 percent in March, which has led the government to raise interest rates five times since the financial crisis. It is also causing some to expect a speedier revaluation upwards of the yuan, which would further curtail growth. These issues perhaps explain why China will spend roughly $95 billion this year on security – an outlay for the first time topping the military budget, expected to be about $91 billion. (Many think that China’s military spending substantially exceeds the stated budget, but it does provide a benchmark.) Recent economic news from China indicates that its prospects may have changed. Beijing recently projected that growth will decline from about 10 percent to 8 percent this year and to 7 percent for the next four years. Since the country has a long history of outperforming expectations, most economists continue to project near-double digit growth. However, with interest rates and currency levels on the rise, it is possible that analysts are too optimistic. Indeed, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development suggested as much in a report out this week in which it forecast moderating gains for China. Certain data points support this notion. Economists at the OECD and elsewhere were taken by surprise by news that in the first quarter China recorded its first net import deficit since 2004. Soaring commodity prices were blamed, and it is expected that more common trade surpluses will again become the norm, but the change in tone is noteworthy. Similarly, recent vehicle sales gains in China have slowed drastically, with the industry posting gains a mere fraction of former levels (up 5 percent in March, for instance, against a 75 percent gain a year ago). Overall, the picture is unusually cloudy. The Libyan conflict may have distracted the world’s attention from the repression in China. However, in helping to push up oil prices it also feeds the inflation that ultimately may create the greatest threat to China’s society. Beijing may not be a winner after all. It might prove easier to squash Gaddafi’s forces than to put the “inflation tiger” back in its cage.

Extinction

Yee 2002

Yee, Associate Professor of Government @ Hong Kong Baptist University, and Storey, Asian-Pacific Center for Security Studies, ‘2 (Herbert and Ian, China Threat: Perception, Myths, and Reality, p. 5)

The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a china threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialisation and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbounng countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. A fragmented china could also result in another nightmare scenario — nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords.12 From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.

1NC

Obama is pushing tax cut extensions through 2012, but it’s going to be a fight – extension is critical to recovery

Reuters 1/6

(Obama welcomes jobs data, urges payroll tax cut, 12:39 Est, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/06/us-obama-jobs-idUSTRE8051D020120106) MattG

"We're making progress. We're moving in the right direction. And one of the reasons for this is the tax cut for working Americans that we put in place last year," he said. "When Congress returns they should extend the middle class tax cut for all of this year, to make sure we keep this recovery going," he told workers at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to welcome its new director, Richard Cordray. Obama appointed Cordray on Wednesday despite opposition from Republicans in the U.S. Senate. Data earlier on Friday showed a 200,000 increase in December job creation that beat analyst expectations and helped bring the unemployment level down by a tenth of a percentage point to a still-historically high 8.5 percent. The numbers are a boost for Obama as he seeks reelection in November. He must convince voters his policies are healing the economy after a savage recession, getting them to believe in a more promising future and forget the harsh recent past. "We have made real progress. Now is not the time to stop, so I would urge Congress to make sure they stay on top of their jobs, to make sure that everybody else is able to enjoy hopefully an even more robust recovery in 2012," Obama said.

Major backlash to the plan – congress is clamping down on new spending and reprogramming for the democracy assistance

L.A. Times 2011  Paul Richter, April 12, 2011, “U.S. aid Arabs: Debt worries stymie U.S. aid to Arab nations in transition”, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/12/world/la-fg-mideast-aid-20110413 MattG

Reporting from Washington — The Obama administration's efforts to use foreign aid to help Middle East and North African nations undergoing democratic transitions have been stopped short by a Congress focused on paring federal debt and other spending priorities. The administration is weighing a request from the new government in Egypt to forgive a debt of $3.3 billion, and another appeal from the fledgling administration in Tunisia to forgive a far smaller debt, about $7 million. But the budget battles raging in Washington have made debt relief unlikely, officials said. U.S. lawmakers not only have shut the door on new spending to stabilize countries rocked by the so-called Arab Spring. They have resisted proposals to shift money from other foreign aid programs. Administration officials say such aid offers a way to shape historic change sweeping the region. They fear steep economic declines could cripple nascent democracies in Cairo and Tunis, where popular uprisings toppled dictators this year, and could turn their populations toward Islamist groups that threaten U.S. strategic interests. Opponents say they support democracy in the Arab world but won't necessarily pay for it. "There's just no appetite to spend more money," said Rep. Jason Chaffetz (R-Utah), who serves on the House Budget Committee. "When we can't pay our own bills, it's difficult to justify nation-building in foreign countries." The resistance in Congress reflects in part the influence of "tea party" members and other conservatives who long have opposed foreign aid and who nearly forced the U.S. government to close last week in a bruising fight over budget cuts. Some lawmakers are skeptical because audits have shown that billions of dollars were squandered over the last decade to prop up governments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Others, including Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said the administration hasn't made a persuasive case for new spending. Lugar held up for several weeks a State Department effort to funnel $20 million from an aid program into direct economic support for Tunisia. Lobbyists for the American University in Cairo and the Lebanese American University, independent schools founded by Americans, had argued that the money should not be shifted from their scholarship programs.

Obama’s consistent focus on the middle class economy is reinvigorating his political strength --- key to yearlong extension of payroll tax cut

Calmes, 12/24

(Jackie, 12/24/2011, International Herald Tribune, “Big gains in a small victory for Obama; President offers a lesson on how and when to pick the right political battle,” Factiva)

President Barack Obama did not win much substantively with his victory over House Republicans in their showdown over extending payroll tax cuts and unemployment aid for two months. But he got a lot politically: a big start toward retiring the perception -- fair or not, and even among Democrats -- that in a pinch with the other party he will inevitably surrender.  In less than an hour Friday, the House and Senate dispensed with weeks of partisan bickering, passing a bill to ensure a two-month extension of the tax holiday and unemployment benefits for millions of Americans. Mr. Obama then signed it into law.  The fight over how and whether to pass an extension was settled Thursday afternoon, when the House speaker, Representative John A. Boehner of Ohio, agreed -- against the will of many of the chamber's most conservative members -- to a Senate bill to extend the benefits for two months while a longer deal was hammered out.  The perception of weakness had dogged Mr. Obama for much of the year since gains by Republicans in the 2010 midterm elections gave them control of the House and a share of power in Washington. But it became threatening, both to Mr. Obama's leverage with Congress and to his prospects for re-election, after the epic summer fight over raising the nation's debt limit.  In September, the White House set out to change the image of Mr. Obama from compromiser in chief to determined voice of economic populism, beginning a push for a job-creation plan that it viewed as a win-win. Either Mr. Obama would pass his plan -- which was not likely given Republican opposition both to additional stimulus measures and to the higher taxes on the wealthy that he proposed to offset the package's cost -- or he would get political credit for trying, given the popularity of the plan's individual provisions.  And he would make it clear that Republicans would obstruct anything he proposed, especially if it meant higher taxes on the rich.  What surprised the administration, and not least Mr. Obama, was how much House Republicans would contribute toward the White House's goal through their miscalculations in waging this holiday-season showdown over tax cuts for 160 million workers and assistance for several million jobless Americans.  The stand by House Republicans, which openly divided the party and put them in conflict with Senate Republicans, helped Mr. Obama perhaps as much as anything the White House and congressional Democrats did.  Vin Weber, a Republican Party strategist and former congressman, acknowledged that Mr. Obama had won at least "a nice tactical victory to end the year" as well as higher approval ratings in recent polls. Mr. Weber said he learned long ago from a pollster to President Ronald Reagan that "one of the central ingredients of a president's approval rating is the public's sense of his ability to dominate Congress."  "The substantive issues," he said, "are secondary."  "What Republicans in the House didn't understand -- and I love these guys by and large -- but what they didn't understand is that you don't fight every issue," Mr. Weber added. "And if you're going to fight an issue like this, you're going to give him a victory and hurt yourself in the process."  As glum and divided as Republicans were at the outcome, Democrats were celebrating that Mr. Obama had stuck by the united front he forged with them this fall.  "The White House must feel pretty good about muscling home a victory for the middle class," said John Podesta, chairman of the liberal Center for American Progress and a former chief of staff to President Bill Clinton. "And importantly for the fights of 2012, they learned those muscles work."  Congressional Democrats have long been suspicious that Mr. Obama was too eager to cut deals with Republicans that would benefit him politically but not his party -- by reducing Medicare and Social Security spending, for example, to get a so-called grand budget bargain. But this week they freely credited him with the victory, for his persistence and his refusal in the endgame to negotiate with House Republicans.  An aide to congressional Democratic leaders said, "The White House just went all in and closed off the House G.O.P.'s hoped-for exit ramp"-- that is, Republicans' belief that Mr. Obama would ultimately give in rather than risk blame if payroll taxes went up for millions on Jan. 1.  For the White House, which has long chafed at the criticism that Mr. Obama has been a soft touch for Congressional Republicans, the outcome was vindication.  Last December, liberal Democrats were outraged when Mr. Obama agreed to extend the expiring Bush-era tax cuts for the rich by an additional two years, after having campaigned to end them. The White House said that was the price to get Republicans, who were newly emboldened by their election victories, to support a one-year payroll tax cut and extended unemployment aid -- without which, the administration and many economists believed, the economy could tip into another recession.  Most galling to the White House, however, has been the lingering criticism from Democratic insiders and grass-roots supporters alike about the August debt-limit deal. In that compromise, Mr. Obama accepted deep spending cuts but Republicans blocked any tax increases.  Mr. Obama had no choice but to compromise then, his aides argued; the nation risked economic calamity if it could no longer borrow to pay its debts, and Mr. Obama's Republican adversaries professed to be willing to see that happen. Even so, administration officials said, the deal was not only better than the critics suggested but it helped set the trap that House Republicans walked into this month.  The deal increased the debt ceiling through 2012, not to this month as some Republicans had wanted, and thereby removed the threat of default from Republicans' end-of-the-year bargaining arsenal. With the stakes much lower, after August Mr. Obama was liberated to press a harder bargain. Starting in September with his jobs package, he did.  "For the first time I think you see a kind of consistency and coherency in terms of an economic message," Geoff Garin, a Democratic pollster, said of Mr. Obama. "The pivot point was the jobs speech, and the jobs speech occurred after he had dealt with the extension of the tax cuts and dealt with the debt ceiling. Those two things freed him up to do what he's been doing."  Also a factor was the hard lesson Mr. Obama learned from his past negotiations with Mr. Boehner, first in the spring talks over this year's domestic spending and then in their summer effort for the grand bargain to reduce long-term debt: Mr. Boehner cannot deliver his defiantly anti-government and Tea Party-inspired majority in the House.  When that proved true yet again, Mr. Obama was bolstered just as Mr. Boehner was further undermined. Whether Mr. Obama continues to play a strong hand will be tested soon -- when Congress reconvenes in January to resume the fight over a full-year extension.  

Causes global wars

Royal ‘10

(director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense (Jedediah, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal, and Political Perspectives, pg 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent stales. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level. Pollins (20081 advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 19SJ) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fcaron. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately. Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Mom berg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write. The linkage, between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict lends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other (Hlomhen? & Hess. 2(102. p. X9> Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blombcrg. Hess. & Wee ra pan a, 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DcRoucn (1995), and Blombcrg. Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force arc at least indirecti) correlated. Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that Ihe tendency towards diversionary tactics arc greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked lo an increase in the use of force. In summary, rcccni economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict al systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

Internal Revenue CP 1NC

CP Text: The United States Federal Government should remove all Internal Revenue Code lobbying restrictions on charities and foundations that offer assistance to foreign NGO’s to ____________

Removing IRC lobbying restrictions ensures direct funding by charities and foundations of foreign NGO’s that solve the aff

Crimm 2005

(Nina, Professor of Law at St. Johns, Democratization, Global Grant-Making, and the Internal Revenue Code Lobbying Restrictions, 79 Tul. L. Rev. 587, accessed online via Lexis 12/17) MattG

This Article focuses on the latter group of foreign NGOs, whose endeavors are critical to the democratization processes, perhaps especially in the earliest phases of consolidation. n50 These crucial foreign NGOs often cannot rely on financial (and other) support from national, regional, or local resources. n51 Instead, they frequently must obtain aid from sources outside their own countries.  [*599]  With financial support from outside sources, foreign NGOs have proliferated in recent years and achieved significant and recognized successes. n52 Their numbers and achievements attest to their importance and legitimacy as service providers; as agents to mobilize resources; as advocates of issues of local, regional, and national interest; and as facilitators of reformation and democratic development processes in many countries. n53 Two scholars' testimonials capture their importance: "NGOs are the real DNA of democracy." n54 The documented triumphs of foreign NGOs as facilitators of legislative and governmental policy changes in democratizing countries, especially emerging and developing countries, however, only rarely have been directly linked to funding from U.S. private foundations. n55 In those few reported instances, little detailed information is available. n56 As a result, by necessity, this Article is relatively general and conclusory. It is intended to highlight, and question the wisdom of, the existing I.R.C. lobbying restrictions, which were developed with only domestic considerations in mind, as  [*600]  they impact global grant-making to foreign NGOs whose own legislative activities can contribute to crucial democratization processes in their respective countries after the collapse of oppressive or repressive authoritarian regimes. n57 A few examples, however, indicate the potential importance and impact that could ensue from altering the existing tax constraints on legislative activities. One of the extremely small number of reported successful examples occurred during the 1980s in South Africa, then an oppressed nation, socially divided and economically unstable. n58 Only a very few NGOs critical of apartheid in South Africa existed prior to the 1980s. n59 They had been effectively "banned" as hostile to the apartheid governments of prime ministers H.F. Verwoerd and John Vorster. n60 The situation changed after Prime Minister P.W. Botha came to power. n61 Prime Minister Botha's government did not financially or otherwise support NGOs, but he did allow them "to emerge, organize, and serve the disenfranchised and marginalized majority black population" in South Africa. n62 Thereafter, the antiapartheid South African NGOs sought and obtained direct financial support from abroad without South African governmental intervention. n63 With direct funding from Scandinavian countries, the European Union, and U.S. private foundations, n64  [*601]  antiapartheid South African NGOs worked to weaken the apartheid political environment, establish universal suffrage, n65 modify governmental policies, strengthen democratic institutions, and repeal apartheid legislation. n66 The South African NGOs had identified democratic participation as critical to the economic development of South Africa and its black population. n67 During the transition from apartheid to democracy, South African NGOs engaged in lobbying efforts aimed at government officials, often at the provincial and local levels. n68 A significantly large group of South African NGOs engaged predominantly in policymaking issues with governmental officials. n69 During the transition period, NGOs also worked with the government and political parties to establish new laws that would affect NGOs' operations and funding, as well as their access to the government's premier policymaking arm. n70 In sum, with direct funding from foreign sources, including U.S. foundations, n71 the South African NGOs engaged in legislative activities that helped democratize South Africa. The case of Kenyan NGOs provides another compelling example. In 1986, when Kenya was a one-party state, the government noted with consternation the third sector's ability to set priorities divergent from those of the state. n72 Indeed, by 1990, the state passed legislation to  [*602]  control and restrict the nonprofit sector by effectively subjecting it to administrative control. n73 Kenyan NGOs were incensed and coalesced in opposition. In an attempt to reverse the legislation, "undercurrents" recruited the direct assistance of local missions from such major donor countries as Britain, the United States, Germany, and Japan, as well as multilateral bodies, to pressure or lobby the Kenyan government to repeal the legislation. n74 The Kenyan NGOs, however, dismissed as potentially too brazen the tactic of directly approaching these locally based foreign representatives. n75 Instead, the Kenyan NGOs  contacted the Ford Foundation, USAID, n76 UNICEF, the United Nations Development Fund, the World Bank, and other philanthropies and agencies to solicit support. n77 With their intentional financial aid, n78 the Kenyan NGOs brought to bear sufficient pressure on the state, through "low profile lobbying" and other strategies, to have the offensive legislation substantially modified. n79 It is precisely these types of worthwhile, and frequently critical, endeavors that are instrumental in creating and advancing conditions for, and attributes of, a democracy, especially a democracy emerging and developing after a repressive or oppressive regime. These are the kinds of efforts, however, that frequently may be denied funding by U.S. section 501(c)(3) public charities and private foundations, largely as a result of the current I.R.C. lobbying restrictions. This Article, therefore, argues that we experiment by significantly modifying or  [*603]  eliminating these restrictions in order to encourage our philanthropic institutions to financially aid foreign NGOs in their participation in the democratizing legislative processes of their countries. We can only assume that, without the tax constraints, more foreign NGOs would be able to participate constructively in the transformation of their countries' laws and governmental policies. We should undertake the experiment now. The price to be paid domestically and abroad for not doing so far outweighs the risks of refraining from cautious experimentation.

Large numbers of NGO’s WANT to invest but restrictions have a chilling effect.

Crimm 2005

(Nina, Professor of Law at St. Johns, Democratization, Global Grant-Making, and the Internal Revenue Code Lobbying Restrictions, 79 Tul. L. Rev. 587, accessed online via Lexis 12/17) MattG

Second, it was well known that after World War II public charities increasingly engaged in significant global outreach programs. n237 Despite the trend, Congress did not reflect on the suitability of the lobbying restrictions or their fundamental historic rationales with respect to charities' international endeavors. Sections 501(h) and 4911 do have significant implications for global philanthropy. In particular for purposes of this Article, if a domestic electing public charity makes a grant to a foreign NGO specifically to fund its lobbying activities, n238 the grant amount is treated  [*640]  as a "lobbying expenditure" of the grantor. n239 Additionally, even if a  [*641]   [*642]  grant to a foreign NGO is not earmarked for its lobbying, if the foreign NGO actually uses the funds for lobbying purposes, the amount may be considered a "lobbying expenditure" of the grantor. n240 As a result, if the electing public charity's aggregate "lobbying expenditures," through such grants or otherwise, are excessive under the safe harbor measurement formula, a section 4911 excise tax is triggered. n241 Furthermore, by virtue of grants that produce lobbying expenditures, a public charity's section 501(c)(3) status may be jeopardized. n242 Large numbers of public charities, including those involved in funding projects of foreign NGOs, apparently have not found the safe harbor provision sufficiently attractive to make the election. n243 The  [*643]  complex rules, perceived (or misperceived) constraints, n244 and congressional failure to consider their suitability in a globalizing world n245 may have a chilling effect and ward off potential electors. n246

Indiana

Round 1 vs Michigan KX

Aff: Bahrain

Adv: Heg, K pre-empts

1NC: T-Material, Executive CP, Saudi DA, PTC, Orientalism, Case

2NC: Executive CP, Saudi DA, Case

1NR: Orientalism

2NR: Executive CP, Saudi DA, Case

Round 4 vs Wayne State JM

Aff: Libya Judicial Training

Adv: Civil War, Credibility

1NC: Turkey CP, PTC, Tradeoff, Orientalism, Case

2NC: Orientalism

1NR: Case

2NR: Orientalism and Prolif Case Turn

Round 5 vs Northwestern FS

Aff: Libya Transparency Assistance

Adv: Civil War, Cred, Stability

1NC: Orientalism, Internal Revenue CP, PTC, K Case turns

2NC: Internal Revenue, PTC

1NR: Orientalism

2NR: Internal Revenue, PTC

Round 7 vs Michigan State MZ

Aff: Egy Political Party

Adv: IRF, Stability

1NC: T-Extra, NSS CP, PTC, Orientalism, Case (Inherency, Religious Violence turns)

2NC: T-Extra, Inherence, NSS CP, PTC

1NR: Orientalism

1AR: Conceded case, straight-turned ptx, framework on K

2NR: Orientalism