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Tetti K
The affirmative’s democracy assistance policy is rooted in a violent discourse of emancipation that frames the US as needing to save the barbaric populations of Yemen. This leads to framing of certain populations, like the Islamic other, as threats tied to a destructive politics of care.
Teti, Lecturer in IR at the University of Aberdeen, 2007
(Andrea, “Confessions of a Dangerous Paradigm: Democratisation, Transitology and Orientalism,” http://www.abdn.ac.uk/pir/notes07/Level5/PI5000/Teti%202007%20Confessions%20of%20a%20Dangerous%20Paradigm.pdf) JDB
A crucial implication of this [ . . . ] threat – both external and internal.
The alternative is postcolonial critique – vote negative as an act of critiquing the discursive imperialism throughout the plan, advantages, and framing of democracy assistance – this is necessary to avoid trapping critique in an ivory tower
Shome, Professor of Communication, 1996 (Raka, “Postcolonial Interventions in the Rhetorical Canon: An "Other" View,” Communication Theory, February, p. 50-52) PM
Second, the postcolonial critique of [ . . . ] as well as contribute to.
NEXT OFF, THE CP
Plan: the European Union should [plan text]
EU solves better - geographical proximity and history of relations
Mona Yacoubian 2004 “Promoting Middle East Democracy“ (special adviser to the United States Institute of Peace’s Special Initiative on the Muslim World, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and an adjunct fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies) http://www.worldcat.org
Geographically, the European Union [ . . . ] of the Gulf Cooperation Council
US empirically ineffective at consolidating democracies
Jeffrey Kopstein 2006 (Director of the Centre for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, Munk Centre for International Studies. Professor of political science, University of Toronto) The Washington Quarterly, 29:2, 85-98 “The transatlantic divide over democracy promotion”
Yet, although the U.S. model [ . . . ]a lesser extent in Serbia
SAUDI DA
A. Uniqueness.
US-Saudi relations are close and friendly due to their partnership on security.
Smith, 11. (James B. Smith is the U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. “Saudi-US partnership: Moving forward together.” http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentID=20111003109872.) {M.e. 10.04.11}
Late last month President [ . . . ] Property Rights and regulatory policies.
B. Link.
Turn – Saudi Arabia will hate the plan and intervene
Nasr, Professor of International Politics at Tufts, 2011
(Vali, “Will the Saudis Kill the Arab Spring?” Bloomberg News, 5/23/11, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-23/will-the-saudis-kill-the-arab-spring-.html) JDB
The kingdom has emerged as [ . . . ]which qualify on neither count.
C. Impact.
1. Weakening US-Saudi relations forces Saudi nuclearization
Jason Burke correspondent for The Guardian, Saudi Arabia worries about stability, security and Iran In a UK speech, Prince Turki al-Faisal outlines Saudi Arabia's concerns relating to the Arab spring, its foreign policies and Iran, 29 June 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/29/saudi-arabia-prince-turki-arab-spring-iran
In the short term, Saudi [ . . . ] the Saudis has frayed considerably.
2. Saudi nuclearization ensures Middle East nuclear catastrophe
Eric S. Edelman et al 2011 (ERIC S. EDELMAN is a Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; he was U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in 2005-9. ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH is President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. EVAN BRADEN MONTGOMERY is a Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Foreign Affairs The Dangers of NATO a Nuclear Iran Andrew F. Krepinevich, and Evan Braden Montgomery Subtitle: The Limits of Containment January 2011 - February 2011 SECTION: Pg. 66 Vol. 90 No. 1 )
Were Saudi Arabia to acquire [ . . . ] creating incentives for an attack.
Tribal law and reliance on military wages serves as a backstop preventing complete collapse of Yemen into chaos.
Dr. Steve C. Caton August 11, 2010 (Professor of Contemporary Arab Studies in the Department of Anthropology at Harvard University) “Yemen: not on the verge of collapse” http://www.pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/POMEPS_BriefBooklet3_Yemen_WEB-Rev.pdf
The power of the tribes [ . . . ] more accurate understandings of them.
Econ collapse doesn’t cause war – empirically denied
Miller, Economist and Adjunct Professor at Ottawa, 2K
(Morris Miller, economist, adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Administration, consultant on international development issues, former Executive Director and Senior Economist at the World Bank, Winter 2000, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Vol. 25, Iss. 4, “Poverty as a cause of wars?”)
The question may be reformulated [ . . . ] of violence to abort another).
No Impact to bioweapons
Easterbrook 03 (Gregg, senior fellow at The New Republic, July 2003, Wired, “We’re All Gonna Die!” http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=2&topic=&topic_set=
Like chemical agents, biological weapons [ . . . ] to happen in the future.
Iran won’t proliferate - capability
Fitzpatrick 2011
(Mark Director, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London Thursday 3 February 2011http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/irans-nuclear-chemical-and-biological-capabilities/press-statement/)
The most pressing proliferation concern [ . . . ] to rapidly expand uranium production.
WMD use by Al Quaeda unlikely in near future- weaponization and scientific knowledge present barrier to successful use.
Peter Bergen ( fellow at the New America Foundation and New York University’s Center on Law and Security) “Reevaluating Al-Qa`ida’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities” 2010 http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/CTCSentinel-Vol3Iss92.pdf
Nevertheless, governments must be cognizant [ . . . ] a limited number of casualties.
Commitment trap unlikely- US unlikely to respond to chemical attack with nuclear means when conventional methods can suffice.
Susan B. Martin (Former Research Fellow, International Security Program)”Responding to Chemical and Biological Threats” International Security 25.4 (2001) http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/ v025/25.4martin.html#authbio1
In a recent issue of [ . . . ] punishment by a particular means.
