A. Currency Legislation will attempt to be packaged with TAA – they are JUST shy of the votes now

ICTSD 9/7

(International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development, “Trade Pacts, China Currency Legislation Could All be on the Table as US Congress Returns,” pg online @ http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/113571/ //)

Controversy over Chinese currency could hold back FTAs, some fear Last month, US government data was released that showed that the US trade gap with China grew almost 12 percent during the first half of this year, according to Reuters. However, China’s currency, the renminbi, did experience a sharp appreciation in early August, prompting speculation that Beijing might be taking a new approach to its currency. This change does not seem to have quelled US critics that blame China’s strict control of its currency for the growing trade gap. As a result, some Democrats - both in the House and in the Senate - are calling for a renewed push for legislation that would give the Obama administration the authority to impose tariffs on Chinese imports if Beijing does not raise the renminbi further against the dollar. Senator Sherrod Brown, a Democrat from the US state of Ohio, is looking to attach his currency legislation, which is co-sponsored by Republican Olympia Snowe of Maine, to the streamlined version of the TAA bill that House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committee Chairs agreed upon with the White House earlier this summer. In a statement on 4 August, Brown insisted that passing a TAA extension was only one step in addressing the need for job creation, and that a move on the currency issue could “prevent job loss by ensuring a level playing field for American manufacturers facing a flood of cheap Chinese imports.” Similar statements have also come from Democrats in the House: former House Speaker and current Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi recently told the United Steelworkers - a major industry lobbying group - that it was time for Congress to act on the Chinese currency issue. “If you want to bring those trade agreements to the floor of Congress you better be prepared first to let us bring our bill on China’s manipulation of its currency, which is unfair of America’s workers,” she affirmed. Lincicome noted that, should Brown indeed offer the amendment, there is a “real concern” that such an amendment could hit the required 60 votes to be attached to the TAA bill (or combined GSP-TAA package, if that particular process goes forward). Should Brown push this legislation forward, “the likelihood of [the combined GSP-TAA bill with currency legislation attached] passing both the House and the Senate are very low.” While acknowledging that the growing US-China trade gap is a major motivator behind moves to pass currency-related legislation, he added that “the real key here is that the actual economics of all this is a secondary issue. The issue is politically powerful. It resonates widely with voters and is poll-tested.” A similar attempt last year to pass a bill deeming China to be a “currency manipulator” passed easily in the House with bipartisan support, but failed to make much headway in the Senate. (See Bridges Weekly, 7 October 2010).

B. Obama’s Political Capital is necessary to stop Currency Bill

News Daily 9/2

(“Analysis: Obama's trade legacy in a crucible this fall,” pg online @ http://www.newsdaily.com/stories/tre7814cz-us-usa-obama-trade/ //)

Democrats like House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi and Senator Charles Schumer also have signaled plans to push for a vote on legislation to pressure China to revalue its currency in conjunction with the free trade pacts. That would inflame relations with Beijing and possibly trigger tit-for-tat trade retaliation if Obama does not expend political capital to block it.

C. [Plan Saps Capital]

D. Will crush U.S.-Sino relations and block progress to open foreign markets

Inside US-China Trade 10

(“Think Tank Panel Warns Against House Passage of China Currency Bill,” 9/15/10, pg lexis)

Although it is in China's own interest to revalue its currency and it may take small steps in that direction while the U.S. Congress threatens currency legislation, the danger is that once a bill is actually passed, China will retaliate, he said. This will impose costs on U.S. exports, Scissors said. For U.S. business groups, Menghetti said, one of the main fears is that passing the Ryan-Murphy bill will "take the oxygen out" of the U.S.-China relationship and prevent progress on more important commercial issues. Those include Chinese indigenous innovation policies that restrict foreign firms' market access, rampant intellectual property piracy in China, discriminatory government procurement policies, financial-services barriers and a lack of transparency in economic policy-making, among other issues. China is the only major international market that can generate sufficient growth to allow the Obama administration to meet its goal of doubling U.S. exports in five years, she said. For Scissors, Chinese regulatory mandates to dominate entire industries and restrict foreign ownership in key sectors has more impact on U.S. exports and jobs than the value of its currency. The U.S. should also give more emphasis to supporting the liberalization of China's balance of payments regime, he said. Levy took issue with the Sept. 13 call by New York Times columnist and Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman for imposing tariffs on imports from China to create leverage for currency revaluation. That call for unilateral action is based on a "fairly blinkered analysis" that does not examine possible unintended consequences and appears to ignore that fact that the U.S. is committed to not exceeding its bound tariff rates at the World Trade Organization, he said. Legislation that would alter U.S. antidumping law, such as those advocated in the Ryan-Murphy bill and the Senate bill sponsored by Sens. Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Lindsey Graham (R-SC), are problematic as well, although in more "subtle" ways, he said. One such subtlety is the difficulty of demonstrating that an undervalued currency is "specific" to a particular group and therefore functions as an actionable subsidy, he said. In Menghetti's view, U.S. antidumping methodology for non-market economies (NMEs) already largely takes into account China's undervalued currency by using surrogate country data when calculating dumping margins. "There's no basis for doing the double counting that this legislation is proposing," she said in reference to the Ryan-Murphy bill. She noted that last month's Commerce Department decision not to investigate claims that China's undervalued currency served as a subsidy to coated paper or aluminum extruder exports because the claims lacked proof of specificity or of contingency on exports, as required under international subsidies disciplines, did not examine whether the currency policy actually makes a financial contribution to the exporting companies. Multilateral approaches to achieve currency reform are also imperfect, Levy noted. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has not been empowered to criticize its major members' macroeconomic policies, and those countries, including the U.S. and China, have shown little interest in giving the IMF that power. Bringing a WTO challenge against China's currency regime under Article 15 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade on nullification and impairment of benefits would be "ill-advised" and "fraught with problems," Levy said. Bringing such a case would put pressure on the WTO as an institution, is not likely to succeed, and "could backfire," he argued. For instance, because Article 15 defers to the IMF on exchange rate matters, in order to rule in favor of the U.S., the dispute panel would "have to make up all the details that are missing," he said. And if the panel declined to be pro-active in that way, it would likely rule in China's favor, giving Beijing international support for its currency practices. Levy said Congress is preparing to act against the smallest of three disruptions impacting the U.S. economy -- international trade -- because it is easier to take action on than the other two: technological change and domestic competition. Even though its expanding current account surplus has led to a "fairly broad consensus" in U.S. policy circles that China's currency is undervalued, that does not mean that punitive legislation is the best way to achieve revaluation, he said. "There is relatively little evidence that China responds well to threats from the United States," Levy said.

E. Multiple Scenarios for Extinction

Wenzhong, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2-7-04

(Zhou, “Vigorously Pushing Forward the Constructive and Cooperative Relationship Between China and the United States,” http://china-japan21.org/eng/zxxx/t64286.htm)

China's development needs a peaceful international environment, particularly in its periphery. We will continue to play a constructive role in global and regional affairs and sincerely look forward to amicable coexistence and friendly cooperation with all other countries, the United States included. We will continue to push for good-neighborliness, friendship and partnership and dedicate ourselves to peace, stability and prosperity in the region. Thus China's development will also mean stronger prospect of peace in the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. China and the US should, and can, work together for peace, stability and prosperity in the region.  Given the highly complementary nature of the two economies, China's reform, opening up and rising economic size have opened broad horizon for sustained China-US trade and economic cooperation. By deepening our commercial partnership, which has already delivered tangible benefits to the two peoples, we can do still more and also make greater contribution to global economic stability and prosperity.  Terrorism, cross-boundary crime, proliferation of advanced weapons, and spread of deadly diseases pose a common threat to mankind. China and the US have extensive shared stake and common responsibility for meeting these challenges, maintaining world peace and security and addressing other major issues bearing on human survival and development. China is ready to keep up its coordination and cooperation in these areas with the US and the rest of the international community.  During his visit to the US nearly 25 years ago, Deng Xiaoping said, "The interests of our two peoples and those of world peace require that we view our relations from the overall international situation and a long-term strategic perspective." Thirteen years ago when China-US relations were at their lowest ebb, Mr. Deng said, "In the final analysis, China-US relations have got to get better." We are optimistic about the tomorrow of China-US relations. We have every reason to believe that so long as the two countries view and handle the relationship with a strategic perspective, adhere to the guiding principles of the three joint communiqués and firmly grasp the common interests of the two countries, we will see even greater accomplishments in China-US relations.

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Democratic Assistance is not benign but an inherently political action centered around Western interests

Alicia Phillips Mandaville Senior Policy Associate at the Millenium Challenge Corporation, and Peter P Mandaville, Associate Professor in the Department of Public and International Affairs and Co-Director of Mason’s Center for Global Studies at George Mason University, Introduction: Rethinking democratization and democracy assistance, 2007 (http://www.palgrave-journals.com/development/journal/v50/n1/full/1100321a.html)

We begin with some assumptions about the nature of today's democratic development community. First, international organizations that provide technical assistance to political, civic, and elected leaders on a large scale will continue to depend on state-sponsored funding sources to finance their activities. While corporate philanthropists are beginning to recognize the value of supporting the development of more stable political environments in emerging markets, international donors have only recently begun to regularly commit budgetary resources to large-scale democratic governance programming. Secondly, senior decision-making positions on both funding and implementing sides of the relationship are typically populated by individuals with roots in the bureaucratic and structural aspects of democratic governance. Consequently, the people who exercise the most control over the shape of democratic development programmes traditionally emphasize the formal, institutionalized aspects of democracy (legislatures, registered advocacy organizations, electoral processes, etc.). Because this tendency to accept institutionalized structures as the focal point for democratic development programmes is deeply entrenched and personally staked, we believe there must be more critical understanding of the impact such institutionalized structures create.

Democratic development organizations are inherently political because they depend so heavily on bilateral donors. Certain regions and countries receive more technical assistance than others, and Western foreign policy objectives play an enormous role in the allocation of available resources. So long as the policy community views democratic development as a foreign policy tool, decisions about quantity, duration, and type of assistance will be driven by Western foreign policy objectives. The challenge presented to democratic developers is not to determine where assistance is needed, but rather to establish what kind of assistance is needed, and to determine how an organization can maximize the positive impact of its work in a particular country. It is in the resolution of this conundrum that there has to be clear opportunities for democratization implementers of all sorts to apply a more nuanced and less politicized approach to the questions of democratic development.

Democracy assistance is a discursive mask for the neoliberal project

Sussman 06 Professor of Urban Studies & Communications, Portland State University

Gerald, The Myths of ‘Democracy Assistance’: U.S. Political Intervention in Post-Soviet Eastern Europe, Monthly Review, December,

U.S. interventionism, except perhaps in the Second World War, has shown little respect for democratic principles, yet its foreign policy rhetoric, a backhanded tribute to the sensibilities of ordinary people, is always cast in that light. Whereas the U.S. has relied extensively on providing aid to dictatorial regimes throughout the world (a policy it has yet to abandon), in a communication-intensive world environment, it is now considered more politically legitimate to accomplish its neoliberal ends through the discursive framing of “democracy assistance.” With respect to historic Anglo-American designs on Russia and eastern Europe, nothing much has changed since British foreign secretary Lord Balfour declared in 1918 (the year of the British-French-U.S. military intervention in Russia): “The only thing which interests me in the Caucasus is the railway line which delivers oil from Baku to Batumi. The natives can cut each other to pieces for all I care.”

Beyond the broad geopolitical strategy of controlling the oil reserves that beckon foreign intervention in the states configuring the region of the Caspian Sea to central Asia and asserting permanent military dominion over the area, there is the allure of new frontiers for transnational capitalist penetration. The need for political legitimacy and domination embodied in the benign expression “democracy assistance” is shared by a range of transnational corporate and state interests and their local compradores, which rely on public relations propagandists and electioneering mercenaries in hopes of establishing footholds in the region. Rick Ridder, a political consultant and former president of the International Association of Political Consultants, said in reference to the consulting gold rush in Mexico in preparation for the 2000 elections in that country: “If there’s one thing Americans can teach Mexicans it is this: Democracy is a booming business.”

Indeed, “democracy assistance” is a growth industry. The election of “free market” politicians and parties is the gateway through which all sorts of international carpetbaggers and con men, including electioneering experts, are certain to follow. However, there’s no certainty that western expertise and capital will always be welcome or successful. There is indeed much skepticism in the world about the motives behind NED and “democracy assistance.” Poles have referred derisively to the presence of foreign campaign consultants and public relations professionals as the “Marriot brigades”—referring to their favorite place of lodging.

Alt: Reject the aff, their neoliberal justifications are incompatible with morality

Wendy Brown, Political Theory Prof. @ UC Berkeley, “Neo-liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy”, Theory and Event 7:1 2003

What remains for the Left, then, is to challenge emerging neo-liberal governmentality in EuroAtlantic states with an alternative vision of the good, one that rejects homo oeconomicus as the norm of the human and rejects this norm's correlative formations of economy, society, state and (non)morality. In its barest form, this would be a vision in which justice would not center upon maximizing individual wealth or rights but on developing and enhancing the capacity of citizens to share power and hence, collaboratively govern themselves. In such an order, rights and elections would be the background rather than token of democracy, or better, rights would function to safeguard the individual against radical democratic enthusiasms but would not themselves signal the presence nor constitute the central principle of democracy. Instead a left vision of justice would focus on practices and institutions of shared popular power; a modestly egalitarian distribution of wealth and access to institutions; an incessant reckoning with all forms of power -- social, economic, political, and even psychic; a long view of the fragility and finitude of non-human nature; and the importance of both meaningful activity and hospitable dwellings to human flourishing. However differently others might place the accent marks, none of these values can be derived from neo-liberal rationality nor meet neo-liberal criteria for the good. The development and promulgation of such a counter rationality -- a different figuration of human beings, citizenship, economic life, and the political -- is critical both to the long labor of fashioning a more just future and to the immediate task of challenging the deadly policies of the imperial U.S. state.

Obama will get TAA through the house after pressuring conservative anti-spending republicans

Reuters 9-7-11(“Republicans ask Obama to send Congress trade pacts” http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/07/us-usa-congress-trade-idUSTRE7864BK20110907)

"MAKING HEADWAY"

The White House and Republicans have locked horns repeatedly this year over the longstanding program. Democrats consider TAA a key part of the U.S. social safety net. But many Republicans, with a strong push from the party's anti-spending Tea Party wing, question the need for the program and its effectiveness. The program was expanded in 2009 to cover service industry workers and provide more generous benefits. Those reforms have expired, but the core program continues. Earlier this year, House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave Camp, a Republican, struck a deal with the White House and Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus, a Democrat, on a slimmed down version of TAA that includes many of the 2009 reforms. The White House wants the compromise TAA bill approved along with the free trade pacts, but angered Republicans when it threatened to include the legislation in the implementing bill for South Korean agreement. Shortly before the August congressional recess, Reid and Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell issued a joint statement aimed at reassuring the White House that Republicans would not block action on TAA in the Senate. But an administration official on Wednesday, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the White House still needed "to nail down the specifics on a bipartisan, bicameral path" to approve the trade deals and TAA. "We hope to see the same progress in the House that we saw in the Senate before recess. We're not there yet, but we're making headway," the administration official said.

[Link]

Failure collapses Relations

Thai Press Reports September 1 (South Korea Severe Damage to Alliance Expected if FTA fails CRS, , LN 2011).

Section: General News - A collapse in the United States of a free trade pact with South Korea would deal a heavy blow to the alliance, with many South Korean policymakers seeing it as a "betrayal," a think tank affiliated with U.S. Congress said Monday.

It would also undercut Washington's efforts to maintain its economic clout in Northeast Asia, according to the Congressional Research Service (CRS).

The warning came amid a protracted delay in U.S. steps toward ratifying the agreement, dubbed KORUS FTA.

It remains uncertain when the Barack Obama administration will submit a related bill to Capitol Hill. Lawmakers return from a month-long recess Sept. 6.

"A collapse of the KORUS FTA would probably have a profound symbolic effect, particularly upon the way South Koreans view the alliance," the agency said in a report made public on Monday.

If the deal is rejected or subjected to a prolonged delay by Washington, the report said, it would be a "psychological blow to many South Korean policymakers, many of whom would likely see it as a betrayal." South Korea's policymakers believe that they made "politically costly concessions" when they accepted Washington's request for additional deals on autos, beef, labor and the environment last year, the agency said. The FTA was initially signed in 2007.

The CRS said a failure of the FTA would lend credence to arguments in South Korea that the "U.S. commitment to Korea and Northeast Asia is declining." The fate of the trade pact could also affect the U.S. campaign to "institutionalize its economic presence in East Asia," it added.

The CRS, meanwhile, estimated that the FTA, if it takes effect on a full scale, will increase the U.S. gross domestic product by $ 10.1 billion to $ 11.9 billion a year.

Alliance is key to solve the economy, prolif and war

PRITCHARD ET AL 9. [Jack, President, Korea Economic Institute, John Tilelli, Chairman and CEO, Cypress Int’l, and Scott Snyder, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korea Studies, “A New Chapter for U.S.-South Korea alliance” Council on Foreign Relations -- June 16 http://www.cfr.org/publication/19635/new_chapter_for_ussouth_korea_alliance.html]

While all eyes have been trained on North Korea's belligerent and aggressive actions in recent weeks, it is important to note that the U.S.-South Korea alliance has emerged as a linchpin in the Obama administration's efforts to successfully manage an overcrowded global agenda, and a pivotal tool for safeguarding U.S. long-term interests in Asia. When South Korea's President Lee Myung-bak meets with President Barack Obama at the White House Tuesday, the two leaders must effectively address three main areas: policy coordination to address North Korea's nuclear threat, the development of a global security agenda that extends beyond the peninsula, and collaboration to address the global financial crisis as South Korea takes a lead on the G-20 process. By conducting a second nuclear test in May, followed by a number of missile launches, North Korea has forced its way onto the Obama administration's agenda. First and foremost, effective U.S.-South Korea alliance coordination is critical to managing both the global effects of North Korea's nuclear threat on the nonproliferation regime and the regional security challenges posed by potential regime actions that lead to further crisis in the region. North Korea's internal focus on its leadership succession, and the apparent naming of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's little-known and inexperienced youngest son as his successor, make the task of responding to North Korea's aggressive and destabilizing actions all the more challenging. Both deterrence and negotiation must be pursued on the basis of close consultations. Presidents Obama and Lee must also develop coordinated contingency plans in the event of internal instability in North Korea. Through effective U.S.-South Korea alliance coordination, it should be possible to forge a combined strategy capable of managing the nuclear, proliferation, and regional security dimensions of North Korea's threat. A coordinated position would also strengthen the administration's hand in its efforts to persuade China to put pressure on North Korea. Both countries also face hostage crises involving citizens detained in North Korea. The recent conviction of two U.S. journalists heightens the stakes for the United States, although the administration has tried to decouple their plight from Pyongyang's missile tests. Second, Presidents Obama and Lee should set the stage for a reinvigorated vision of a broader role for the U.S.-South Korea alliance as an important component of a broader U.S. strategy toward East Asia. A critical aspect of this vision is a mutual commitment to jointly address sources of global and functional instability beyond the peninsula. Lee Myung-bak has offered a vision of a global Korea that features an expanded commitment to peacekeeping and development assistance that is in greater proportion to South Korea's economic clout as the world's 13th largest economy. As the third-largest contributor of troops to Iraq, South Korea has also demonstrated its capacity to make valuable contributions to post-conflict stabilization. The U.S.-South Korea alliance can serve as a platform by which South Korea can make such contributions in many other areas, including Afghanistan. South Korea has already made commitments to send engineers and medical personnel to Afghanistan. It is poised now to expand its contributions, in line with its broadening scope of interest in contributing to global stability and its economic prowess. Third, South Korea is an essential partner in addressing the global financial crisis. Its emphasis on fighting protectionism and promotion of stimuli at the April G-20 leaders meeting in London illustrate how closely its priorities are aligned with those of the United States. A U.S. Federal Reserve Bank line of credit to South Korea last fall played a critical role in stabilizing the South Korean's currency and forestalled a possible repeat of South Korea's difficulties in the Asian financial crisis of a decade ago. The Obama and Lee administrations have the opportunity to send a powerful signal opposing protectionism by winning legislative support in both countries for the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement negotiated by their predecessors. With the necessary revisions to meet new political conditions, Mr. Lee and Mr. Obama should urge their respective legislatures to consider early ratification of the trade pact. This would both support more effective coordination on the global financial crisis and underscore its value as a precedent that sets high standards for trade agreements in Asia, in contrast to the proliferation of Asian trade agreements that do little to promote a more open Asian trade and investment environment. U.S.-South Korean coordination to manage North Korea's challenge to nonproliferation norms, the global financial crisis, and the transition in Afghanistan will underscore the practical value of alliance contributions to meet mutual interests in global security and prosperity. For this reason, Presidents Obama and Lee have a compelling interest in establishing a firm foundation for unlocking the potential of alliance cooperation in the service of our shared interests.