0***Uzbek Weapons Transfer 1NC***
Obama spending political capital on Military aid waivers for Uzbekistan – it will pass now
Stephen Zunes 11/11 (“Obama Administration Seeks to Resume Military Aid to Uzbekistan Dictator,” Professor of Politics and Chair of Mid-Eastern Studies at the University of San Francisco, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-zunes/obama-administration-seek_b_1087528.html)
The U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee, in a move initiated by the Obama administration, has voted to waive Bush-era human rights restrictions on military aid to the Islam Karimov dictatorship in Uzbekistan, one of the most brutal and repressive regimes on the planet. The lifting of the restrictions, now part of the Foreign Operations bill, is before the full Senate and appears to have bipartisan support. The Obama administration has indicated that it intends to provide taxpayer-funded military assistance to Uzbekistan once the legislation passes both houses of Congress.
New democracy aid ensures backlash – costs capital.
Emily Cadei, CQ Staff, Mon May 23, 11, “Obama Aid Initiative No Sure Thing”, http://old.news.yahoo.com/s/cq/20110523/pl_cq_politics/politics000003874266
The Obama administration's proposed economic assistance for the Middle East and North Africa has a relatively modest price tag, but it could face serious resistance in Congress. In particular, President Obama's proposal for expanded American investment and commerce in the region, outlined in a speech last week, risks becoming bogged down in the sort of domestic political disputes that have stalled many other trade initiatives with the developing world in recent years. Obama, who will seek to rally U.S. allies to work with him on Middle East economic assistance during his European trip this week, called in his speech for the United States to "focus on trade, not just aid; and investment, not just assistance" for emerging democracies in Egypt and Tunisia, and possibly elsewhere depending on how uprisings in neighboring countries play out. Such an approach would cost much less than traditional development assistance -- among other things, it would marshal private sector resources and involve investments the government would likely recoup. That should help its viability in Congress, which has little appetite for expensive new foreign aid programs at the moment. "No one should expect this Congress to pass a Marshall Plan for the Middle East," Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., said May 19, referring to the American aid program to Europe after World War II. In contrast to the administration's $2 billion Middle East proposal, the Marshall Plan, when adjusted for inflation, cost more than $100 billion. [ For complete coverage of politics and policy, go to Yahoo! Politics ] In a speech to the U.S. Institute of Peace, McCain said new members of Congress "were elected to cut spending, not to increase foreign assistance. . . . If we are going to help countries like Tunisia and Egypt to grow their economies, we will need to be much more innovative." A Different Model for Aid Kay Granger, R-Texas, chairwoman of the House Appropriations subcommittee that funds foreign aid, said Monday she does not approve of Obama's proposal because "we don't know" who will lead the new Egyptian government. Speaking at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee's annual conference, Granger also said helping the Egyptian people directly, as opposed to the government, "is a very different situation" and indicated that she might be able to support such efforts. Sarah Margon, an expert on development and conflict at the Center for American Progress, a liberal think tank, said a Marshall Plan-like approach would be wrong for the Middle East from a development perspective, as well. Margon credited the president's proposal for breaking with the historical approach to foreign assistance in the region that has been "overly focused on military assistance, top-heavy," and "less flexible." The new economic assistance plan, if well executed, will be more sustainable than past Middle East aid, as well as less costly, she said. Elements of the approach the president is pushing include creation of enterprise funds to foster investment in local enterprise, lending or guaranteeing up to $1 billion in borrowing needed to finance infrastructure and support job creation through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and a $1 billion debt swap to help ease Egypt's bilateral debt of more than $3 billion. Senate Foreign Relations Chairman John Kerry, D-Mass., Joseph I. Lieberman, I-Conn., and McCain introduced legislation in March to authorize the enterprise funds. Their bill (S 618) was marked up by the Foreign Relations panel May 17. McCain said last week he is also working with Kerry on an authorization bill for some of the other elements of Obama's proposal, including debt relief. The president also promised to launch a "comprehensive Trade and Investment Partnership Initiative in the Middle East and North Africa," with a goal of increasing trade with the region, promoting greater integration with U.S. and European markets and opening "the door for those countries who adopt high standards of reform and trade liberalization to construct a regional trade arrangement." McCain called for Congress to press forward on those initiatives, as well. "We should move urgently to begin negotiations on free-trade agreements with Egypt and Tunisia -- and to explore ideas for new free-trade areas in the Middle East and North Africa," he said. Sen. Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, the top Republican on the Appropriations subcommittee that funds foreign assistance, also backs the administration's proposals. "If the president wants to assist Egypt and Tunisia, count me in. If he wants to create trading regimes with the Mideast, count me in," Graham said. Plenty of Skeptics But the administration proposal may be too ambitious in the current budgetary climate in the Senate and the House. Even before Obama laid out his plans, lawmakers questioned the idea of substantial debt relief to Egypt, given its cost and uncertainty about the future government in Cairo. "I don't know if a billion dollars is doable," Sen. Bob Casey, D-Pa., said when asked about the president's proposal, explaining that any significant new investment "is under a great deal of scrutiny" right now on Capitol Hill.
Northern supply route is key to afghan success
Bill Marmon 2010 (is Assistant Managing Editor of European Affairs, February – March 2010
New Supply ‘Front’ for Afghan War Runs Across Russia, Georgia and the ‘Stans,” http://www.europeaninstitute.org/February-–-March-2010/new-supply-front-for-afghan-war-runs-across-russia-georgia-and-the-stans.html)
In the meantime, the opening of alternative supply routes for the military is a formidable achievement. If the Afghan war ends with anything like success, the NDN will likely be hailed as an important element of that success. Creation of the NDN once again proves the old axiom: “It’s OK for strategy to be conducted by amateurs, but logistics requires professionals.”
And, failure in Afghanistan destroys the credibility of U.S. global leadership
Weinstein ‘04
(Dr. Michael A., Power and Interest News Report, 11-12, http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=235&language_id=1)
The persistence of insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, which has hampered rebuilding efforts in both countries and blocked their emergence as credible democracies, diverts U.S. resources and attention from other interests and -- as long as progress is slow or nonexistent -- sends the message that Washington remains vulnerable. The recent election of Hamid Karzai to Afghanistan's presidency has not changed that country's political situation; power outside Kabul remains in the hands of warlords, the drug trade remains the major support of the country's economy, and the Taliban insurgency continues. In Iraq, Washington counts on elections in January 2005 for a constitutional assembly to provide legitimacy for the state-building process, but at present that goal seems unlikely to be achieved. Washington for the foreseeable future will be tied down managing the consequences of its earlier interventions. If Washington decides to retreat -- more likely from Iraq than from Afghanistan -- its loss of power will be confirmed, encouraging other powers to test its resolve elsewhere. Only in the unlikely case that Washington manages to stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq in the short term will other powers think twice about probing U.S. vulnerabilities. In South America, Brazil will attempt to secure a foothold for the Mercosur customs union and beat back Washington's efforts to extend the N.A.F.T.A. formula south. In East Asia, China will push for regional hegemony and is likely to put pressure on Taiwan and to try to draw Southeast Asian states into its sphere of influence. Beijing can also be expected to drag its feet on North Korean denuclearization and to continue to oppose sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program. Russia will attempt to increase its influence over the states on its periphery that were formerly Soviet republics. Moscow will try to strengthen ties in Central Asia, the Transcaucasus and Eastern Europe (Belarus and Ukraine), and to fend off Washington's inroads into those areas. The European Union, with the Franco-German combine at its heart, will continue its moves to assimilate its Eastern European members and extend its sphere of influence to the entire Mediterranean basin through trade agreements. In each of these regions, Washington will face tests leading to the possibility of an overload of challenges and a decreased likelihood that any one of them will be handled with sufficient attention and resources. Within the general scenario, Islamic revolution remains a disturbing factor. If there is another major attack within the United States, Washington's security policy will fall into disarray and the population will suffer a traumatic loss of confidence that will adversely affect the economy and will open the possibility of a legitimation crisis or a burst of ultra-nationalism. Even if there is not another event like the September 11 attacks, homeland security and the international adjustments that are necessary to serve it will divert attention and resources from other challenges. The geostrategic constraints on Washington are exacerbated by the financial limits posed by the budget deficit and the possibilities of a precipitous decline in the dollar and rising raw materials prices. How much the United States will be able to spend to protect the interests perceived by its leaders remains an open question. It is widely acknowledged that post-war nation building has been underfunded in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that major increases in expenditures are unlikely. Most generally, Washington is faced with the choice of rebuilding U.S. power or slowly retreating to an undisputed regional power base in North America. It is not clear that the Bush administration will have the resolve or the resources to rebuild its military and intelligence apparatus, and restore its alliance structure. During the first term of George W. Bush, Washington was the initiator in world affairs, attempting to carry through a unilateralist program that, if successful, would have made the United States a permanent superpower protecting globalized capitalism to its advantage. In Bush's second term, Washington will primarily be a responder, because it is mired in the failures of the unilateralist thrust. The image of decisive military superiority has been replaced by a sense of U.S. limitations, and massive budget surpluses have given way to the prospect of continued large deficits. Reinforcing Factors from the Election As the Bush administration attempts to deal with persisting problems resulting in great part from actions taken during the President's first term, it will face difficulties that follow from the need to satisfy the constituencies that made for the Republican victory. The election confirmed that the American public does not share a consensus on foreign policy and, indeed, is polarized. It is also polarized on economic and social issues, along similar axes, creating a situation in which any new policies proposed by the administration are likely to be met with domestic opposition and at the very least partial support. Besides being a drag on foreign policy initiatives, polarization also affects Washington's international posture by the attention and commitment that the administration will have to give to the domestic battles that it will fight in congress in order to push a legislative agenda that will satisfy its constituencies. During his campaign and in his post-election press conference, Bush committed his administration to ambitious policy initiatives to take steps in the direction of privatizing Social Security and to reform the tax code radically. Both of those plans, along with tort reform and extension of tax cuts, will generate fierce conflicts in congress and quickly exhaust the President's "political capital" available to win support on other issues. The vision of an "ownership society," in which government regulations and entitlements are dismantled or scaled back, is the domestic equivalent of neo-conservative foreign policy; it is a utopian view with little chance of success. If the administration seriously pursues its plans, it will be preoccupied domestically and, consequently, will devote less attention to world affairs. Focus on domestic politics will be increased by the need to satisfy social conservative constituencies by appointing judges favorable to their positions on "moral values." Here again, there will be strong opposition if appointments are perceived by Democrats and moderate Republicans as too ideologically favorable to the religious right. Protracted battles over judgeships -- whether successful or not -- would further diminish Bush's political capital for foreign policy initiatives by heating up partisanship. It is possible that the administration will not pursue its agenda aggressively and will seek compromises, but that is not likely because of pressures within the Republican Party. The same constituencies that voted in Bush elected a Republican congress, and its members face reelection contests and the consequent need to satisfy their bases. Since Bush cannot serve a third term, Republican officeholders can no longer depend on his popularity to help carry them to victory. They also do not have a unifying leader with a political strategy to coordinate diverse constituencies. The combination of the lame-duck effect and the strategy void will drive Republicans to depend on their particular constituencies and press their claims assertively. The administration will be under pressure to push its domestic agenda vigorously at the same time that the various Republican factions fight for control of the party and Democrats move to exploit any weaknesses that appear. It is likely that Republican loyalty to Bush will be strained, further decreasing the administration's latitude and forcing it to bargain for support. The Republican majority is less solid than it might seem on the surface and includes factions that are at odds with administration foreign policy. Conclusion Persistent and emerging political conditions all point in the direction of drift and reactivity in U.S. foreign and security policy -- the election has intensified tendencies that were already present. There is little chance that a new security doctrine will be created in the short term and that a coherent political strategy will influence Republican politics. Lack of public consensus will inhibit foreign policy initiatives, whether unilateralist or multilateralist. Washington's operative foreign policy is likely to be damage control. As Washington drifts, the rest of the world will test it, probing for weaknesses. Under steady pressure from many sides, the Bush administration will be drawn toward retrenchment, retreat and eventually retraction in international affairs. The scenario of American empire has faded into memory and the prospect that the U.S. will eventually become a dominant regional power with some global reach becomes more probable.
Global nuclear war
Khalilzad ‘95
(Zalmay, RAND Corporation, Losing The Moment? Washington Quarterly, Vol 18, No 2, p. 84)
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
POLITICS
The Times of Central Asia October 17, 2011 (Monday, Uzbekistan is good choice for partnership, SECTION: NATIONWIDE INTERNATIONAL NEWS, LN)
A broad coalition of 20 human rights, labor and consumer groups is appealing to the Obama administration not to renew military aid and sales to Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan is widely considered one of the world's most repressive dictatorships and human rights violators. However the need for a safe alternative route to supply Afghanistan seems to trump any human rights concerns. Obama seems to reject the advice of the rights group. In a statement released late Wednesday, the White House said that Obama had spoken with Uzbek President Islam KarimovIslam Karimov by phone to congratulate him on Uzbekistan's 20 years of independence. Obama also "pledged to continue working to build broad cooperation between our two countries". In response to the letter, State Department spokesperson Emily Horne said, "Uzbekistan and the United States have a common interest in regional stability, "agreements to better support our troops in Afghanistan"."We consider human rights to be an important part of our dialogue with Uzbekistan and are part of every high-level engagement with the government," But nothing positive seems to be happening on the human rights front. The NDN (Northern Distribution Network) is key to supplying Afghan troops especially since transport through Pakistan is becoming increasingly hazardous.The Pentagon wants to ensure that Uzbekistan will permit the supply line to run through its territory in both directions so as troops can withdraw through the territory Such a two-way transit accord is currently being negotiated with Uzbekistan Legislation passed by the U.S. in 2004 forbids military aid to Uzbekistan until the human rights situation improves but Obama administration officials are lobbying congress members to pass a waiver.
Despite opposition Obama’s push will get the Uzbek aid package through
The Times of Central Asia October 17, 2011 (Monday, Uzbekistan is good choice for partnership, SECTION: NATIONWIDE INTERNATIONAL NEWS, LN)
The U.S. inked a new deal with the government of Uzbekistan last week.
The Obama administration has pushed for, and the US Congress is poised to pass, a law allowing the United States to give Uzbekistan aid to buy equipment for its military, known as Foreign Military Financing (FMF). Such financing for Tashkent has been suspended since 2004 because of concern over the Central Asian nation's record on human rights. Predictably, this is sparking worry and concern in the human rights industry. The International Crisis Group, for example, is spearheading a letter-writing campaign to complain about the questionable ethics of the policy: We, the undersigned organizations, deplore the recent move to provide direct security assistance to one of the world's most repressive governments. We call on you to stand behind your strong past statements regarding human rights abuses in Uzbekistan, including those made on the eve of your visit to Tashkent last December to meet with President Islam Karimov. We strongly urge you to oppose passage of the law and not to invoke this waiver. Furthermore, we call on you to publicly reiterate the serious concerns the US government has regarding Uzbekistan's abysmal human rights record. What's so remarkable about this letter is how shortsighted it is. I'm sure in an ideal world we can wish away the war in Afghanistan and make sure every country in the region knows we are deeply displeased with their human rights violations, but in the real world people must make difficult choices. They have to prioritize. And the deal in Uzbekistan is meant to satisfy one purpose only: Afghanistan. Right now, most of the supplies heading into Afghanistan still must go through Pakistan. And Pakistan, as we all know, is a horrific supporter of international terrorism: the Taliban, the Haqqanis, AQ Khan's global nuclear proliferation network, most of the groups in Kashmir, even, potentially, the Uighurs. In country after country in Central and South Asia, the terrorism leads to Pakistan. Pakistan can get away with its intransigence for three reasons: 1. It has nuclear weapons. This is something no one can change, and it is a near-perfect safeguard against any retaliation by India, and against most forms of intervention by the United States or the International Community. 2. Geography matters. Both Pakistan and Iran contain the most efficient routes from Afghanistan to the nearest coast. Again, in a world of reality Iran is a non-option, which leaves us Pakistan. 3. Pakistan is essential to regional peace. Because of its nuclear weapons and its geography, and also its direct sponsorship of international terrorism, the Pakistani government can play a unique role in the eventual peace of South Asia. No one has yet figured out how to do that, but it is nevertheless important. Taken together these three reasons add up to why the U.S. chose to work with Pakistan, rather than around it. It was better, so it seemed in 2001, to help the Pakistani Army's shipping and trucking businesses with ISAF transit fees, and use that to try to get the government to even out its policies. Furthermore, maintaining free and open access for the government agents, military officials, and intelligence agencies made keeping track of everything much easier. Plus, when it wanted to, Islamabad could mysteriously find a very important terrorist, like Khaled Sheikh Muhammed, and hand him over to American interrogators. It seemed awesome. America's dysfunctional relationship with Pakistan is no longer awesome. It is more akin to a drug dealer and an addict now than two countries warily working toward some common goal. But so long as the U.S. war in Afghanistan relies on Pakistani supply lines, Washington's hands are tied. They can't risk cutting off their troops, and Pakistan knows this. So, they have to find an alternative. The biggest reason why the U.S. government has been pushing the NDN for well over three years is so that it can develop an alternative to the Pakistani supply lines. And Uzbekistan is the only other country bordering Afghanistan with access to Eurasian railways, and has a reasonably high-volume rail network for it. Neither Tajikistan nor Turkmenistan have the infrastructure or geography (or politics!) to support an American supply line into Afghanistan. And China's only border with the country is way up at the tail end of the Wakkhan Corridor, with the nearest city as isolated as Kashgar - that's hardly an option either. Nowhere else has the equivalent of Termez, right over the border from Mazar-i Sharif. Which means Uzbekistan.
LINK -- Plan saps PC – anything other than a hardline on Syria pisses off Congress
Josh Rogin, “16 senators: Syria’s Assad has lost his legitimacy”, May 11, 2011, Foreign Policy, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/05/11/16_senators_syria_s_assad_has_lost_his_legitimacy
Many in the US Congress are getting impatient with what they see as a lack of concrete action by the Obama administration to condemn and punish the Syrian government for its brutal crackdown on civilian protesters. Today, 16 senators are co-sponsoring a resolution calling on the administration to get tough on the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Sen. Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) spearheaded the resolution (PDF) with Sens. Marco Rubio (R-FL), Ben Cardin (D-MD), and John McCain (R-AZ). The foursome held a press conference on Wednesday afternoon at the Capitol to announce their new effort and demand that the Obama administration expand its activities to sanction, condemn, and pressure the Syrian government to stop killing civilians in the streets. “I know that there are some who had hoped when these protests first broke out that Bashar al- Assad would pursue the path of reform rather than the path of violence and brutality. But that has clearly not been his choice. He is not a reformer. He is a thug and a murderer who is pursuing the Qaddafi model, and hopes to get away with it,” said Lieberman. “First and foremost, [the resolution] sends a clear message that Bashar al Assad — through his campaign of violence – has lost legitimacy, and puts the Senate squarely on record as standing with the aspirations of the Syrian people,” Lieberman added. The resolution condemns the Syrian government for its crackdown on peaceful protesters, violating international human rights agreements, withholding food, water, and basic medical services to civilians, and torturing protesters in government custody. The resolution also mentions Iran’s assistance to Syria’s repressive government and Syrian meddling in Lebanon, which has included transferring weapons to Hezbollah. The senators want the administration to expand the targeted sanctions it imposed last month on senior Syrian government officials, sanction Assad directly, expand the effort to combat media and information censorship in Syria, engage more with the Syrian opposition, and seek condemnation of Syria at the U.N. Security Council. The senators also want President Barack Obama to speak publicly about the crisis there. “It’s time to indict the guy who is giving the orders,” said McCain. “And it’s time for the President of the United States to speak up.” Two senior Senate aides said they expect the resolution to move to the Senate floor and be passed relatively soon. Importantly, the Senate resolution declares that the Syrian government “has lost legitimacy” and expresses the belief that the Syrian people should determine their own political future. The State Department has resisted making that statement, knowing that once the administration declares Assad is no longer “legitimate,” all efforts to work with the Syrian government to encourage better behavior will become more difficult. Pressed repeatedly on that very question at Tuesday’s briefing, State Department spokesman Mark Toner refused to say the Syrian government was no longer legitimate. “We believe that he needs to take concrete steps to cease violence against innocent protesters and civilians, and he needs to address their legitimate aspirations,” he said. But Syria’s main advocate in the Senate, SFRC Chairman John Kerry (D-MA), told The Cable on Tuesday that Assad’s chance to be a reformer had passed. “I said we have to put him to the test. I’ve always said it’s a series of tests,” Kerry said. “The chance was lost and that’s the end of it.”
US-Uzbekistan cooperation is key to Afghan stability
Trend Aug 2, 2011 (“U.S ambassador: Uzbekistan has great potential for rapid development” http://en.trend.az/news/politics/1913213.html)
Uzbekistan has great potential for rapid development and a modern infrastructure promoting the effective use of this potential. The U.S intends to cooperate with Uzbekistan in the further economic development, U.S. Ambassador to Uzbekistan George Krol told media. "After gaining independence, Uzbekistan has achieved great success," he said. "The special attention was paid to social and economic development. This factor serves to provide stability and development in Uzbekistan over the years." Krol said that President Obama's administration considers the development of economic cooperation with Central Asia, including Uzbekistan, as a priority issue. This helps to create conditions to further improve the business climate for Uzbek and U.S companies and to expand investments. He recalled that mutually beneficial agreements were reached at a business forum of Uzbek and the U.S business circles in February to further strengthen trade and investment ties between the two countries. The representatives of U.S. big companies, such as "Boeing", "Case New Holland", "ExxonMobil", "FMN Logistics", "General Electric", "Honeywell", "General Motors", "Microsoft", known for their advanced technologies, systems, customer services and high quality products attended the forum. "The U.S. is convinced that an open market, strong financial and legal systems, stimulating entrepreneurship are important factors in long-term development and prosperity," the ambassador said. Krol also recalled that the U.S and Uzbekistan actively cooperate in the field of education and many other fields, including the protection of human rights, regional security. "Your country always played an important role in ensuring regional stability, security and development," he said. "Both Uzbekistan and the U.S are interested in stable and peaceful development of Central Asia." The ambassador stressed the important role of Uzbekistan in establishing international efforts to bring peace and stability in Afghanistan, the socio-economic restoration of the country. He said that Uzbekistan's active assistance in supplying electricity to Afghanistan, the implementation of infrastructure projects deserve attention.
AT: Jobs
No vote won’t pass Obama not pushing.
Buffalo News 10-20-11.
The burning issue facing our country is that 14 million people are out of work, but our government in Washington can’t get its act together to do anything about it. Our leaders should be the ones out of work. The president presented his jobs bill with great fanfare, and the Senate shot it down. Then the Republicans, who have had nothing positive to offer, slapped together their jobs proposal, and it was worse than the president’s. Now the White House says it will try to gain passage of President Obama’s jobs bill piecemeal. That would be fine if the White House would pick only those pieces that are assured to be effective. But the failure of leadership by Obama and Congress has resulted in aides putting together their bills based on philosophical economics that are not guaranteed to produce anything—particularly anything soon.
Hegemony: Checks Back Russia and China Influence
US arms sales to Uzbekistan will fortify U.S. presence in Central Asia
Peter Chamberlin Oct 9, 2011 (Has been actively opposing all non-defensive war
http://therearenosunglasses.wordpress.com/2011/10/12/u-s-aid-to-uzbekistan-the-danger-for-russia/)
This question is now occupied by many political scientists. Who is more advantageous to this apparent convergence: Tashkent and Washington? As explained by the expert of Masterforex-V Eugene Olhovsky (Canada), the benefits of Barack Obama are as follows: 1. Uzbekistan’s role in the transit of military goods has increased significantly. This is largely due to major problems in Pakistan and heightened risks of the Southern Corridor to supply troops. Now we are talking about the possibility to transfer through the territory of Uzbekistan is not only military goods, but a living force by coalition forces. That increased risk of Tashkent and explains the need for military aid. 2. The importance of Uzbekistan to the United States. For Barack Obama, who wants to demonstrate his nation success of the mission in Afghanistan, all that is connected to the military operation in the country, it is extremely important. Therefore, the cooperation with Uzbekistan is considered only in this plane. 3. U.S. influence in Central Asia politicum. Fortifying in Uzbekistan, Washington will shake a lot of Russian and Chinese positions in Central Asia, which for him is always on hand.
A2 AIRLIFT SOLVES
Airlift capabilities are overstretched and inadequate for the job
Bill Marmon 2010 (is Assistant Managing Editor of European Affairs, February – March 2010
New Supply ‘Front’ for Afghan War Runs Across Russia, Georgia and the ‘Stans,” http://www.europeaninstitute.org/February-–-March-2010/new-supply-front-for-afghan-war-runs-across-russia-georgia-and-the-stans.html)
The new routes are difficult and long, but they offer incontrovertible security advantages over the routes through Pakistan – an option that invited Taliban commanders to see the road as a long, exposed jugular vein of the U.S. force in Afghanistan. And there must be a surface route because air shipments to Bagram, the main Afghan airfield, cost $14,000 a ton, a prohibitive price tag. Even if Washington were ready to pay whatever it costs, air lift capabilities are already being strained (including those of civilian contractors) by the task of simply delivering weaponry and other “sensitive” materials. This air route also involves over-flight permissions that need to be secured (and often renegotiated frequently): in Kazakhstan, for example, U.S. access to the large airfield at Manas has been an on-and-off option that now seems to be “on” after bargaining that led to a fourfold increase in U.S. aid assistance to that country.
Impact: Russian Relations
Cooperation with Uzbekistan is key to US-Russian Relations
Bill Marmon 2010 (is Assistant Managing Editor of European Affairs, February – March 2010
New Supply ‘Front’ for Afghan War Runs Across Russia, Georgia and the ‘Stans,” http://www.europeaninstitute.org/February-–-March-2010/new-supply-front-for-afghan-war-runs-across-russia-georgia-and-the-stans.html)
Russian assistance is obviously crucial, and that U.S. dependence on Moscow always raises some eyebrows in the security-policy community in Washington among people who worry that Moscow may someday take advantage of the leverage it has gained thanks to the NDN running across Russian territory. Proponents of the NDN contend that the route is an example of cooperation between the U.S. and Russia (and the European Union) that offers advantages to all three parties and could help pave the way to more such “triangular cooperation.” In any event, the U.S. needs this alternative so direly that it is worth some political risk, according to Obama administration officials. Russia has strong incentives not to hit the “off switch,” they add. Similarly, CSIS concluded that the Russian position is accurately formulated by Zamer Kabulov, the Russian ambassador to Afghanistan and a veteran of the Soviet war in Afghanistan, when he told the Times of London: “it’s not in Russia’s interest for NATO to be defeated and leave behind all these problems…we’d prefer NATO to complete its job and then leave this unnatural geography.” Of course, from Moscow’s vantage, the issues could be seen as a reprise of “the Great Game,” the long-running 19th Century struggle between Britain and Russia for control of central Asia that may be revisited in coming decades between Russia and U.S.-led NATO in the region.
Impacts: Econ South Asia
Successful NDN will reinvigorate Central Asian Economies
Bill Marmon 2010 (is Assistant Managing Editor of European Affairs, February – March 2010
New Supply ‘Front’ for Afghan War Runs Across Russia, Georgia and the ‘Stans,” http://www.europeaninstitute.org/February-–-March-2010/new-supply-front-for-afghan-war-runs-across-russia-georgia-and-the-stans.html)
Opening the new routes has been a quiet triumph of the U.S. military and diplomatic corps. The U.S. Central Command continues working to expand the supply routes to multiply the military options and cope with the additional logistical demands of 30,000 more U.S. troops and 10,000 more European and other allied reinforcements. With the arrival of these numbers and also more contractor corps that use the military resupply system, there will be a short term “bow wave” effect as infrastructure and pre-positioning supplies for the expansion moves to the area.
Civilian policy observers see a potential long term gain for the U.S. in taking a leadership role in re-establishing the Silk Road that once brought thriving commercial life to Afghanistan and beyond. The NDN could also create a positive collateral effect of re-establishing a “Modern Silk Road,” which boosters say would contribute to the long term economic development of Afghanistan and surrounding countries. The new routes could presage a Modern Silk Road (“MSR”) if the routes opened for the military convert into civilian commerce and enhance regional prosperity for the adjacent central Asian nations. .
Afghanistan failure collapses central asia and inflames anti-western sentiment – turning the aff
Akbulut (U.S.A.K.) member of the International Strategic Research Organization, July 19, 2007, (Isil, “If Afghanistan Collapses?”, Turkish Weekly, http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=46931#)
Considering the economic, military power and natural resources of the country, Afghanistan is probably one of the most insignificant countries in the world. The social organism composed of tribes, is rather immature even considering the region is in the country. Probably, on these grounds, the United States perceived Afghanistan as an easy target. Consequently, a king, a president and a head of state were artificially brought in lead to the invaded country. It was estimated that the economy of the country could be cheaply managed by the outside resources of less value and cleared of the “enemy forces” by the assistance of the NATO and the American weapons. However, the estimations turned out to be wrong after nearly 6 years. The economy of the country became more dependent on the drug smuggling and other illegal activities then before, and the economic and social problems in Afghanistan are worse than they were before the American invasion. The dominance of the more radical and extremist religious elements of the country such as Taliban and al-Qaida has been established again, and they get stronger and stronger. If the situation in the country continues as it is and the power of the US army ebbs, the loss of Afghanistan would be devastating for both the region and the whole world. Above all, Pakistan is very much vulnerable to the changes in Afghanistan. Pakistan, whose demographical structure is composed of many tribes, is one of the largest Muslim countries in the world. The geographical features of Afghanistan and Pakistan’s borders preclude offensive security arrangements. In regard to ethnic, social, linguistic and religious structure, there are lots of similarities between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan is a country which could not tackle even its own problems, because of its fledgling democracy, economy and other disadvantages. In the case of Pakistan, it could be said that the country would face the process of “Afghanistanization” if the problems of Afghanistan are added on to its own. Apart from Pakistan, Afghanistan is a key country for the Central Asia as well. Uzbeks, Tajiks and other societies are widespread in Afghanistan, and the changes in this country would inevitably affect the neighboring Muslim Central Asian republics. Besides most of Central Asian republics, especially Uzbekistan would not be able to resist the extremist and radical movements in Afghanistan. Under these circumstances, there is the risk that Afghanistan’s problems would spread not only on the direction of Southern Asia but also to Central Asia. In addition to Pakistan and Central Asia, the failure of the reforms and moderate groups in Afghanistan will add another Palestine, Iraq or Chechnya issue for the Muslim world. All these problems increased the victimization feeling of the Muslims and deepened the mistrust between Muslims and the West by luring many Muslims to the extremist ideas. In another word, if the world cannot solve the Afghanistan problem, Afghanistan will spread all over the world. Considering all these risks, it should be understood that Afghanistan is more powerful than it has been imagined in terms of resistance of the extremist and militarist groups.
A2 DEM Turns
Key to Uzbek Democracy
Democracy aid is key to democratization of Uzbekistan
Thom Shanker and C.J. Chivers, June 16, 2005, “Balancing act on Uzbekistan: Which way will Washington lean?” http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/15/world/americas/15iht-uzbek.html
The major focus of the American military-to-military relationship with Uzbekistan has been defense reform, establishment of a professional officer and noncommissioned officer corps, communications, movement from conscription to a professional military, interoperability with NATO, counternarcotics and counterterrorism, Pentagon officials say. Officials defend these programs as important to pulling Uzbekistan toward democracy.
"Defense and military cooperation is an important means of promoting democratic values - respect for human rights, support of democracy, professionalization of the military and civilian control of the military," said Bryan Whitman, a Pentagon spokesman. "This cooperation supports overall U.S. goals toward democratization, stronger civil societies and closer integration with the Euro-Atlantic community."
Security Assistance --> Military Professionalism
US-Uzbek security assistance is key to military professionalism and improvements in human rights
The Times of Central Asia October 11, 2011 (Tuesday, “U.S. may ignore Uzbekistan human rights issues to facilitate Afghan supply,” SECTION: NATIONWIDE INTERNATIONAL NEWS)
Now I can see why people would object to Uzbekistan's human rights record - it is atrocious, and there is no excuse for it. If all we look at is Uzbekistan's human rights record, it must seem like madness to them reward the Karimov regime with military training and equipment. The reality of Security Assistance, as its known, is actually more complex. Recent studies have indicated that SA arrangements lead to an increased professionalism (pdf) in a host country's security forces. In Egypt, that U.S.-trained professionalism is widely credited, at least in a partial way, with the military's decision not to open fire on the protesters at Tahrir Square earlier this year. There are plenty of reasons to be skeptical of SA as a cure-all for unprofessional and abusive security services, but that doesn't mean the value SA can provide should be dismissed out of hand. When it comes to improving the situation in Uzbekistan, there are almost no options left. International isolation only made things worse-the country is now more repressive, and less respectful of human rights, than in 2004, the last year the U.S. and EU maintained extensive contacts with the regime. Blanket engagement did not work very well, either, but the human rights situation there never got this bad. Maybe it's time for the human rights industry to stop letting the perfect be the enemy of the good I don't think Uzbekistan has any prospects at all for turning into a model country, not even if its elderly dictator Islom Karimov dies and a new regime, devoid of his family members takes over. The repression in Uzbekistan has become overly personalized in Karimov himself (and his daughters), and as a result people tend to lose sight that it is in fact a systemic problem driven by a class of elites at the top of Uzbek society. When dealing with a system we lack the means to topple or catastrophically change, maybe the best we can hope for is marginal improvement. Over time, small improvements in Uzbekistan's human rights record can add up in some major ways. Maybe small improvements are all we can hope for at this point. From two perspectives, the U.S. partnership with Uzbekistan makes sense: it is a far better choice of transit country than Pakistan, and this partnership at least has a small chance of maybe improving things a bit. It is pure folly to object to that outlook, or to write it off, as the human rights industry seems to want, as selling out to a vicious thug. In the real world, away from New York and Brussels, there sometimes are no perfect choices, only degrees of imperfect ones. A security partnership with Uzbekistan is one of those imperfect choices.
