Advantage 1: US-Yemen Relations
Status quo Perception of current US-AID is that it prioritizes counterterrorism
Sharp 2011 (Jeremy M. Sharp , Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, “Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations” CRS Report, March 22, 2011 http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/159782.pdf)
Most experts believe that this cooperation comes with the full knowledge that Saleh’s government is corrupt, its commitment to combating extremism is mercurial, and its ability to dispense patronage to key allies is reduced due to dwindling oil revenues. Thus, in order to make the best of a daunting policy challenge, the Administration has focused on short term security cooperation in conjunction with a more long-term approach to promoting development and good governance not just bilaterally but in partnership with the international community. Nevertheless, despite rhetoric about the U.S. commitment to tackling Yemen’s bigger problems (i.e., water shortages, illiteracy, corruption), the bulk of U.S. attention, both diplomatically and financially, is directed toward counterterrorism and stopping AQAP from attacking the U.S. homeland.
Water aid packages are key to maintain relations
Boucek 2011 (Christopher, Associate Affiliation: Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, “Sen. Bob Casey holds a hearing on U.S. policy in yemen, July 19, 2011 LN)
Much of American policy towards Yemen has been focused on counterterrorism. And despite, I think, all of the efforts of our government and what we heard in the first panel, I think the perception in Yemen is still that counterterrorism and Al Qaida is what the United States cares about.
And while there's certainly a need for a robust counterterrorism program, there are also a number of other things that we can look at and we probably should look at.
And I would say that corruption and access to water are two of the most important issues that we can focus on. These are issues that affect every Yemeni. These are things that we can do to improve the situation, because security and stability will come when the situation and conditions in Yemen improve full stop for everyone in Yemen.
We need to make sure that our policy is geared towards addressing the Republic of Yemen, not the government. I think that's an important message that we need to maintain. And we need to make sure that we continue to focus our aid and assistance programs not only on areas where we're concerned about Al Qaida or radicalization, because, again, that sends the message that this is the only reason why we're interested in Yemen.
Water policy rebuilds relations and stabilizes a post-Saleh Yemen – This is our last window of opportunity
Gude and Sofer 2011 (Ken and Ken, June 2011 “The Last Best Chance to Save Yemen,” Center for American Progress, June http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/06/pdf/yemen.pdf)
Clearly, the ongoing fighting makes the delivery of relief supplies difficult, but during the cease-fire while Saleh is out of the country it is possible for the nongovernmental organizations, with U.S. and GCC support, to deliver immediate critical aid to the Yemeni people. Additionally, Saleh’s absence from the country provides an opportunity to call for a temporary cease-fire to allow humanitarian relief to come in. The most important issue of concern is the growing water shortage throughout the nation. Yemen already faced water supply issues as the most water poor nation in the Middle East, but the loss of domestic oil, which powers the drills that pump water, has cut off large sections of the population to water supplies. Disaster relief organizations should immediately start supplying the population with water supplies, while the United States simultaneously works with Saudi Arabia to divert nearby diesel fuel to get the water pumps up and running again. The next priority will be to reconnect the country’s electrical grid, which has largely been shut down by rebel tribes, and give the population access to electricity again. Coming to the direct aid of the Yemeni people during this crisis is not only morally the right thing to do, but it would improve the standing of the United States with the population on the verge of a major political transition. The violence and political turmoil in Yemen has cost the country $5 billion—17 percent of its GDP—and put the poorest country in the Middle East on the verge of economic collapse. Whoever leads the next Yemeni government will need significant support far beyond military assistance to fight terrorism. As President Obama highlighted during his speech on the Middle East two weeks ago, the unrest across the region largely reflects a frustration with limited economic opportunity. The United States should make clear that it is prepared to assist a post-Saleh Yemen with a package of economic aid and development programs. Economic assistance in a post-Saleh Yemen should center around three key issues: establishing a postoil economy, developing the country’s agricultural sector, and implementing a smarter water strategy. The economic challenges of Yemen are not ones that the United States could or should help solve on its own, as the other Arab Gulf nations have significant interest in seeing a stable Yemen on its borders. President Obama should call on Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar to use their oil and natural gas wealth to develop a debt relief and investment program similar to what the president proposed for Egypt and Tunisia. At the very least, the money for tribal patronage paid for by Saudi Arabia should be diverted to strategic investment in the Yemeni economy. The details of what role the United States and regional partners will play in Yemen’s economic future will need to be addressed in close cooperation with the leaders of Yemen’s next government to ensure that economic policies and assistance are coordinated for effectiveness. There are genuine tradeoffs by promoting such active involvement by the Gulf nations, who have proven reluctant to allow an open, democratic nation to grow on their borders. Given our domestic fiscal restraints and limited ties to the future leaders of Yemen, however, coordinating our priorities for Yemen’s future with the capabilities of our regional partners will be essential to putting Yemen on the path toward stability. Conclusion The latest bout of political violence in Yemen threatens to push an already fractured country into a genuine failed state. While it is true we have limited capacity to end the violence and political unrest, the United States must take advantage of the last remaining window of opportunity—Saleh’s forced departure to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment—to help bring about a peaceful resolution to the crisis.
U.S.-Yemen Cooperation is key to stability
Glass 2010 (Nicole Glass, Global Majority E-Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1 (June 2010), pp. 17-30
“The Water Crisis in Yemen: Causes, Consequences and Solutions”)
VII. Conclusion
The water crisis in Yemen has the potential to cause the destruction of the nation. The
water crisis was triggered by a sharp population increase, misguided agricultural policies promoting the use of water, the growing of qat, a lack of governmental regulation on using water, and a vulnerable climate to global warming. Due to inadequate water, Yemenis are suffering from lack-of-water-induced food shortages, and dehydrationrelated health problems. The water crisis has also triggered some local conflicts, which led to a decline in tourism and had therefore also negative implications on Yemen’s economy. Internal conflicts have also made it impossible for the Yemeni government to regulate water use in conflict-affected areas. For Yemen to survive as a nation, some believe it must cooperate with the United States to receive foreign aid, regulate water use and implement strict regulation policies, prohibit (or at least minimize) the cultivation of qat, import fruits and vegetables that require lots of water, prepare for climate change and use positive images (like the Rowyan cartoon) to encourage the population to participate in water conservation methods. Al-Asbahi (2005) recommended that Yemen uses rainfall water harvesting methods, improves its irrigation efficiency, investigates groundwater availability and studies the desalination of water to possibly use it as a future source. Today, Yemen is trying to make some changes, though only time will show if these attempts will be sufficient to avert an even more severe crisis.
Yemeni instability causes Saudi Arabia-Iran proxy wars
Bipartisan Policy Center 2011
Project Co-Chairs: Ambassador Paula Dobriansky, former Undersecretary of State
Admiral (Ret.) Gregory Johnson, former Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe
Fragility and Extremism in Yemen, Bipartisan Policy Center, January 2011 pg 3
Were the situation to deteriorate further, and Yemen to fail completely, the United States would likely witness a security vacuum on the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula. At best, this would mirror Somalia across the Red Sea; at worst the two could combine to destabilize the entire region. This would permit greater freedom of maneuver for al-Qaida and pirates astride a major chokepoint for international energy flows; exacerbate ongoing internal conflicts, potentially turning them into Saudi-Iranian proxy wars and/or spilling over into neighboring countries; and could trigger major humanitarian disasters among an extremely impoverished and underserviced population. The calls for excising this latest terrorist cancer—al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, the merger of Saudi and Yemeni al-Qaida militants—have been swift and all but unanimous. The need for action, however, ought not obscure the difficulty of the task. Instead, our response should be based on a thorough analysis of challenges facing Yemen and their underlying causes, including how state fragility and extremism are intricately interwoven. Terrorist threats continue to emanate from Yemen not because the government lacks the military strength to eradicate them, but because the regime has done little to resolve the myriad social, economic and political problems that beset the county. Extremist groups have persisted, indeed thrived, in Yemen by exploiting these weaknesses and the state’s resultant lack of legitimacy.
That causes nuclear war
United Press International 09 (“Saudi-Yemen conflict sharpens region's rivalries” http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2009/12/01/Saudi-Yemen-conflict-sharpens-regions-rivalries/UPI-23441259705297/) BAL
If the U.S. initiative to solve the nuclear issue founders, the prospect increases that Israel, jittery about the challenge to its regional nuclear monopoly and growing international criticism about alleged war crimes, could launch the pre-emptive strike it has threatened for so long against Iran. The Saudi-Iranian faceoff is heightened by Riyadh's fears of Iranian and Shiite expansion following the emergence of a Shiite-ruled Iraq. The deadlock in efforts to secure an Arab-Israeli peace, after a decade-and-a-half of futile negotiations, only makes things more fraught. But at the root of all this is the religious schism between the Sunnis, Islam's mainstream sect, and the breakaway Shiites that dates from Islam's early days in the 7th century over who should have succeeded the Prophet Mohammed. The prospect of a direct confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran over Yemen, fueled of course by the covert activities of both sides in Lebanon, Iraq and the Palestinian territories, will be heightened if the fighting in Yemen gets worse and drags in others.
Ignore their inevitability claims - US civil society aid solves stability and terrorism
Barbara Bodine 2010, Retired Ambassador to Yemen 1997-2001, and Lecturer/Diplomat-in-Residence at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, “Yemen: Primer and Prescriptions” (http://www.ndu.edu/press/yemen.html)
Yemen is not a failed state. It is fragile and faces challenges—economic, demographic, political, and security—that would sunder other states. There are those who would write it off as a lost cause, dismiss it as a sinkhole of assistance, outsource the solutions to the neighbors, or turn it into a “Third Front” even though we have not yet completed or been unquestioningly successful in the first two fronts in Iraq and Afghanistan. To write it off is premature. To declare it a sinkhole overstates the quality and consistency of our assistance to date. To outsource to the neighbors is abdication, and a counterproductive one at that, and to open a Third Front is pure folly. The United States, along with international partners, has the ability to help Yemen walk back from a precipice if it is willing to commit sufficient resources—financial and political—to a broad, sustained, coordinated, and strategic engagement that learns the right lessons of the first two fronts, understands the challenges that Yemen faces and the historical context that is still at play, and suppresses the impulse to apply the false templates of other fragile and failed states. The fundamental challenges Yemen faces are the lack of critical natural resources—energy and water—and insufficient state and human capacity, not will. The Yemen government is not unmindful of the threat posed by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), but it is not its sole threat, it is not (yet) an existential threat, and it is not on a par with the inherent threats that resources and capacity pose. A security-centric approach will not be sufficient or successful in addressing our immediate security interests or Yemen’s medium- and long-term stability challenges. Efforts at security that do not address stability based on legitimacy ignore a basic lesson of Iraq and Afghanistan. A partnership with Yemen to deny AQAP sanctuary on Yemeni soil or the capability to operate with impunity against Yemeni or international interests must understand that Yemen operates within the context of two equal if not greater security challenges to state survival: the rebellion in the north, and persistent secessionist sentiments in the south. The northern and southern threats are economic- and state infrastructure–driven more than ideological. They cannot be resolved militarily but require more than a “humanitarian” response or new power-sharing arrangements. Mediated efforts are best left to regional partners with no direct agenda or checkered history in the country, such as the United Arab Emirates. To the extent the Yemeni people see our presence and efforts in their country as an American Third Front against al Qaeda with Yemen little more than the battleground, and see no corresponding commitment to Yemen or its people, resentment toward the United States and its allies will increase. Anti-Americanism does exist, but it reflects frustration and disillusionment with American policy in and toward Yemen, including widely erratic assistance levels over the past few years, as much as general antipathy toward American military operations in the region. Our announced economic and development strategy is an improvement but is still woefully inadequate. To be effective and credible, it needs the profile, funding, and sustained commitment of the security package. It must work on governance, state, and human capacity at the national and local levels.
Al-Qaeda can get nukes and they’ll use them
Arbuckle 8 (Larry J. Arbuckle, Lieutenant, United States Navy, June 2008, “THE DETERRENCE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM THROUGH AN ATTRIBUTION CAPABILITY,” http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2008/Jun/08Jun_Arbuckle.pdf)
However, there is evidence that a small number of terrorist organizations in recent history, and at least one presently, have nuclear ambitions. These groups include Al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo, and Chechen separatists (Bunn, Wier, and Friedman; 2005). Of these, Al Qaeda appears to have made the most serious attempts to obtain or otherwise develop a nuclear weapon. Demonstrating these intentions, in 2001 Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, and two other al Qaeda operatives met with two Pakistani scientists to discuss weapons of mass destruction development (Kokoshin, 2006). Additionally, Al Qaeda has made significant efforts to justify the use of mass violence to its supporters. Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, an al Qaeda spokesman has stated that al Qaeda, “has the right to kill 4 million Americans – 2 million of them children,” in retaliation for deaths that al Qaeda links to the U.S. and its support of Israel (as cited in Bunn, Wier, and Friedman; 2005). Indeed Bin Laden received a fatwa in May 2003 from an extreme Saudi cleric authorizing the use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. civilians (Bunn, Wier, and Friedman; 2005). Further evidence of intent is the following figure taken from al Qaeda documents seized in Afghanistan. It depicts a workable design for a nuclear weapon. Additionally, the text accompanying the design sketch includes some fairly advanced weapons design parameters (Boettcher & Arnesen, 2002). Clearly maximizing the loss of life is key among al Qaeda’s goals. Thus their use of conventional means of attack presently appears to be a result of their current capabilities and not a function of their pure preference (Western Europe, 2005). The intentions of the Chechen terrorists are less clear. However, it is clear that this organization has carried out reconnaissance operations at Russian nuclear warhead storage facilities. Additionally, there is evidence that Chechen terrorists considered seizing a Russian research institute in 2002 that contained enough HEU to construct dozens of nuclear weapons (Bunn, Wier, and Friedman; 2005). Some might argue that the decision not to attack the site indicates a lack of nuclear ambitions. However, the fact that the plan was seriously considered lends credence to the possibility that the organization does pose a serious potential nuclear threat. It is likely that few terrorist organizations seek to obtain a nuclear capability. However, as can be seen from above, such organizations do appear to exist. Sadly, the organizations that have demonstrated these intentions have also demonstrated that they have the capability of conducting complex planning, are well financed, and have an ideology that resonates with significant numbers of people.
The impact is extinction
Sid-Ahmed ‘4
(Mohamed, Managing Editor for Al-Ahali, “Extinction!” August 26-September 1, Issue no. 705, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm)
A nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nagazaki, even if -- and this is far from certain -- the weapons used are less harmful than those used then, Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear technology, had no choice but to capitulate. Today, the technology is a secret for nobody. So far, except for the two bombs dropped on Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten. Now we are at a stage where they can be detonated. This completely changes the rules of the game. We have reached a point where anticipatory measures can determine the course of events. Allegations of a terrorist connection can be used to justify anticipatory measures, including the invasion of a sovereign state like Iraq. As it turned out, these allegations, as well as the allegation that Saddam was harbouring WMD, proved to be unfounded. What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.
AQAP will strike Saudi oil and the royal family
Juneau 2010 (Thomas, Middle East Policy Council Journal Essay, “Yemen: Prospects for State Failure - Implications and Remedies” Volume 17, Issue 3, pages 134–152, Fall 2010)
Implications of Failure
The convergence of multiple and intensifying challenges raises the strong possibility that Yemen will continue its slide towards failure. Under such a scenario, as the central government’s authority further erodes, it will exert less and less control over increasing swaths of the countryside and smaller cities, and eventually over larger cities and certain neighborhoods of cities it will still control. Those areas will fall under the partial or complete control of a wide array of well-armed tribes, warlords and, to a much smaller extent, AQAP. Terrorism The possibility of AQAP’s increasingly using its safe haven as a launching pad for terrorist operations is the most worrying potential implication of a failed Yemen. Low and decreasing government authority provides a base for the group to organize itself, recruit and train operatives, and launch operations. The country is strategically located, bordering on Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil producer and host of Islam’s two holiest sites, and in close proximity to Somalia, a failed state and terrorist haven. Yemen’s tribal culture, plentiful access to weapons and criminal networks, and large recruiting pool of young men also converge to make it an ideal base. A key question concerns AQAP’s ambitions: does the group intend to focus on Yemen, the Arabian Peninsula, or the United States? Evidence suggests that, having consolidated the organization in 2008 and 2009 by merging its Saudi and Yemeni branches and by establishing a more durable foundation, AQAP rapidly leapt from targeting governmental and foreign interests in Yemen, to having regional and global ambitions. At the local level, AQAP has shown a keen strategic and tactical sense with a dual strategy of choosing mostly foreign (embassies and tourists) and government targets (security services and oil installations), while avoiding civilian casualties and improving its relations with tribes that either host it or could eventually do so (especially in the southern and central governorates of Abyan, Marib, Shabwa and al-Jawf).37 This gradually entrenches AQAP in Yemen and makes future efforts to tackle it more difficult, as this would imply also taking on its tribal allies. AQAP has learned lessons from al-Qaeda’s mistakes in Iraq and Somalia and its successes in Pakistan and Afghanistan: terrorist groups are best served not by Hobbesian anarchy but by making deals with hosts in areas of tribal self-government.38 As part of this approach, AQAP has adopted a narrative integrating traditional Yemeni grievances against corruption and poverty.39 Despite recent successes, it is not a given that AQAP will succeed in establishing long-term mutually beneficial relationships with tribes. Both do share some common interests: tribes can offer AQAP shelter and an operational base, while AQAP can offer money and fighters. Potential conflicts, however, are numerous. Tribes, above all, prize local autonomy, which could conflict with al-Qaeda’s objectives of establishing an Islamic caliphate and launching operations against distant enemies. Repeated attacks by central forces against AQAP could, on the one hand, inflame local feelings against Sanaa and drive tribes closer to AQAP. At the same time, it is not inconceivable that, as happened in Iraq, some tribes could eventually assess that they have more to lose from hosting AQAP. Whether AQAP succeeds in avoiding the latter scenario is key to its future in Yemen. It should be remembered, however, that this has little or no bearing on the inexorable erosion of state authority in Yemen, though it will considerably influence the implications. AQAP demonstrated its regional ambitions with two failed attacks on Saudi Arabia in 2009, including an aborted assassination attempt against a deputy minister of the interior. AQAP, which has been vociferous in its opposition to the Saudi regime, is highly likely to continue targeting the kingdom, chiefly its oil installations and members of the royal family. That said, though a successful attack on a member of the royal family would undoubtedly have an important psychological impact, it would be unlikely to cause major instability. There have been no reported attacks thus far in 2010, but in March, Riyadh announced the arrest of over 100 suspected AQAP militants, who were allegedly planning suicide attacks on oil installations.40 Finally, an important unknown in AQAP’s regional ambitions is whether it intends to strike other states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC);41 though this is plausible, there is no hard evidence of the group’s plans. The failed December 25, 2009, attack against an airliner near Detroit, rapidly claimed by AQAP, spectacularly brought to the world’s attention the group’s growing international ambitions — and the fact that it has the capabilities and will to act. The group’s trajectory and statements in past months suggest that more attacks on U.S. soil or against U.S. interests in Yemen or the Middle East are likely. One potential vector for AQAP’s global ambitions could be the three dozen or so American former convicts who converted to Islam in U.S. prisons and reportedly joined extremist groups in Yemen after their release.42 The possibility of a nexus forming between AQAP and al-Shabab, an al-Qaeda-linked group in Somalia, has attracted some attention.43 Though there has been little evidence so far of cooperation beyond rhetorical promises of support,44 there is potential for future association on the basis of proximity (at its narrowest, the Gulf of Aden is only 150 km wide), existing personal ties,45 and the strong criminal and smuggling networks linking the two countries. AQAP’s growing presence in the southern governorate of Abyan, giving it access to the waters of the Gulf of Aden, could eventually facilitate such contacts. The large presence of Somali refugees in Yemen also provides a tool for networking and a potential recruiting basin. There were, for example, media reports in early 2010 of Yemeni security forces raiding Somali refugee communities and detaining al-Shabab loyalists.46 Humanitarian Consequences State failure in Yemen would have dire humanitarian consequences. The combination of insecurity and difficult geography would render the delivery of assistance to some regions impossible. The result could well include a significant refugee crisis, with hundreds of thousands trying to cross the Saudi or (in smaller numbers) Omani borders. Some might also try to cross the Red Sea to Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan, or even Egypt. As areas of the country suffer from insecurity and growing water and food scarcity and lose what little government services they have, hundreds of thousands and possibly millions are also at risk of becoming internally displaced. The current humanitarian situation in the North, where around 200,000 live in dire conditions in makeshift camps, could provide a foretaste of things to come.
Oil shocks collapse growth
Roubini & Setser 4 (Nouriel Roubini, Professor of Business, Brad Setser, Research Associate, Global Economic Governance Programme, University College, Oxford, August 2004, online)
Oil prices shocks have a stagflationary effect on the macroeconomy of an oil importing country: they slow down the rate of growth (and may even reduce the level of output – i.e. cause a recession) and they lead to an increase in the price level and potentially an increase in the inflation rate. An oil price hike acts like a tax on consumption and, for a net oil importer like the United States, the benefits of the tax go to major oil producers rather than the U.S. government. The impact on growth and prices of an oil shock depends on many factors: - The size of the shock, both in terms of the new real price of oil and the percentage increase in oil prices. At its close of $43 a barrel on July 30, 2004, the current real price of oil is high – well above the levels during the 1990 and 2000 oil minishocks, but it remains well below the peak real oil price of $82 in 1980, and equal to the post 73 real price of $43. The recent 65% increase in oil prices (since the 2002 average price) 3 is comparable to the increase in 2000 (60%, but from a very low starting point, as oil prices had fallen to a low of around $15 in 1999), higher than the increase in 1990 (40%), but much smaller than the increases in 1973 (210%) and 1979-80 (135%). - The shock’s persistence. This will depend on many things, many as much political as economic, since the current high oil price reflects both booming Asian demand (China alone is expected to account for roughly 40% of the increase in demand for oil in 2004) and geopolitical risk in the Middle East (the “fear premium” estimated to add between $4 and $8 to current prices). - The dependency of the economy on oil and energy. The U.S. economy is much less energy intensive than it was in the 1970s, but it also much bigger and produces comparatively less domestic oil. Net oil imports of 1.2% of GDP in 2003 are higher than net oil imports of 0.9% of GDP in 1970. - The policy response of monetary and fiscal authorities These effects are not trivial: oil shocks have caused and/or contributed to each one of the US and global recessions of the last thirty years. Yet while recent recessions have all been linked to an increase in the price of oil, not all oil price spikes lead to a recession. The 2003 spike associated with the invasion of Iraq is a good example.
Extinction
Bearden 2000 (Lt. Col Thomas E. Bearden, PhD, MS, BSCo-inventor - the 2002 Motionless Electromagnetic Generator - a replicated overunity EM generator Listed in Marquis' Who'sWho in America, 2004)
Just prior to the terrible collapse of the World economy, with the crumbling well underway and rising, it is inevitable that some of the weapons of mass destruction will be used by one or more nations on others. An interesting result then—as all the old strategic studies used to show—is that everyone will fire everything as fast as possible against their perceived enemies. The reason is simple: When the mass destruction weapons are unleashed at all, the only chance a nation has to survive is to desperately try to destroy its perceived enemies before they destroy it. So there will erupt a spasmodic unleashing of the long range missiles, nuclear arsenals, and biological warfare arsenals of the nations as they feel the economic collapse, poverty, death, misery, etc. a bit earlier. The ensuing holocaust is certain to immediately draw in the major nations also, and literally a hell on earth will result. In short, we will get the great Armageddon we have been fearing since the advent of the nuclear genie. Right now, my personal estimate is that we have about a 99% chance of that scenario or some modified version of it, resulting.
