Plan – The United States Federal Government should expand its Civil Military Support Element’s democratic governance program for Yemen consistent with a local level approach.

Advantage One

Contention One is Counterinsurgency

Intervention to rebuild failed states is inevitable

Choksy & Choksy, Former Director Middle East Studies at Indiana, ’11

[Carol E. B. Choksy, Adjunct lecturer in Strategic Intelligence and Information Management at Indiana University, CEO of IRAD Strategic Consulting, Inc, PhD from U Chicago, Jamsheed K. Choksy, Professor of Central Eurasian, International, Iranian, and Islamic Studies and Former Director of The Middle Eastern Studies Program at Indiana University, Council on the Humanities at the US National Endowment for the Humanities, PhD from Harvard University, “American Intervention in Failing Countries is Necessary,” May 12th 2011]

Intervention to stabilize and reconstruct failed, failing, fragile, and even re-orient hostile countries may not be avoidable for the U.S….

 impact everyone and require attention and resolution.[9]

Current post-intervention reconstruction will fail to successfully utilize COIN

Luján, Special Forces Major,  ’12

[Fernando Luján, International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations based at the Center for a New American Security, Major in the U.S. Special Forces, Served in the Pentagon's AfPak Hands program, “Beyond Groundhog Day,” Foreign Affairs; Jan/Feb 2012, Vol. 91 Issue 1, pg. 180-183]

The real danger as the United States withdraws

AND

soldiers to repeat the mistakes of the past.

Only COIN can win future wars – the alternative is coercive tactics which ensure escalation

Kahl, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for The Middle East, ’07

[Colin Kahl, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “COIN of the Realm,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63035/colin-h-kahl/coin-of-the-realm?page=show]

HEARTS AND MINDS Counterinsurgency refers to military,

AND

to "eliminate extremists without alienating the populace."

Failure to control these conflicts will cause large-scale escalation

Horowitz & Shalmon, PoliSci Prof @ UPenn, ’09

[Michael C. Horowitz, Assistant Professor of Political Science at The University of Pennsylvania, PhD in Government from Harvard University, Foreign Policy Research Institute Scholar, Dan A. Shalmon, Senior Analyst at Lincoln Group, LLC., Graduate Student at Georgetown University, “The Future of War and American Military Strategy,” Spring 2009]

In an uncertain international security environment, small-scale events can spiral unpredictably, triggering large-scale conflict. …

politically fragment, the United States could find itself embroiled in a sporadically technology-intensive “small war” or stability operation.  

Failed states cause disease spread

African Studies Centre, ’03

[The Transnational Institute, The Center of Social Studies, Coimbra University, and The Peace Research Center – CIP-FUHEM, “Failed and Collapsed States in the International System,” December 2003, http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/sovereign/failed/2003/12failedcollapsedstates.pdf]

In the malign scenario of global developments the

AND

faced with direct attacks on their national security.

Disease spread causes extinction

Greger, Director of Public Health at The Humane Society, ’08 

[Michael, M.D., Director of Public Health and Animal Agriculture at The Humane Society of the United States, Bird Flu: A Virus of Our Own Hatching,http://birdflubook.com/a.php?id=111]

Senate Majority Leader Frist describes the recent slew

AND

a tune whistled whilst passing a graveyard.”3154 

North Korea collapse is inevitable

Kim, ’11

[Hyung-Jin Kim, Writer for the Associated Press, “SKorea: Nuclear push could bring North's collapse,” January 17th 2011, http://www.kansascity.com/2011/01/17/2588331/skorea-nuclear-push-could-bring.html]

Impoverished North Korea could bring its own collapse

AND

see it as an indication of their desperation."

Irregular warfare capabilities key to prevent the collapse from escalating

Maxwell, Special Forces Commander, ’10

[Colonel David S. Maxwell, US Army Special Forces Officer, Commander of Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines, Faculty at the National War College, “Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula,” November 30th 2010, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/11-23/ch_14.asp]

The fundamental assumption for this paper is that the threats that may emerge following collapse or conflict on the peninsula will be characterized by being irregular and ….

insurgency to accomplish the classic insurgent goal of ridding a land of an occupying power. Additionally, it should be noted that the term irregular warfare in Korean is the same as unconventional warfare and this breeds confusion within the alliance.

Escalation goes global

Bennett & Lind, Government Prof @ Dartmouth, ’11

[Bruce W. Bennett, Senior Defense Analyst at The RAND Corporation, Jennifer Lind, Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, “The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements,” International Security, Volume 36, Number 2, Fall 2011]

A government collapse in North Korea could unleash

AND

risk of escalation to the nuclear level.7

Irregular warfare is the only possible starting point for future conflict – deterrence prevents the independent initiation of large-scale intra-state conflict

Nagl & Burton, Security Studies Prof @ West Point, ’09

[John A. Nagl, Former President of the Center for a New American Security, Professor of National Security Studies at West Point, Former Military Assistant to The Deputy Secretary of Defense, D. Phil from Oxford, Rhodes Scholar, Retired Lieutenant Colonel, Served in Iraq, Brian M. Burton, Bacevich Fellow at CNAS, MA in Security Studies from Georgetown, “Dirty Windows and Burning Houses: Setting the Record Straight on Irregular Warfare,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 32, Issue 2, pg. 91-101, April 2009]

The second main argument against increasing the military’s

AND

the challenges that will be forced upon us.

The plan is key to successful international implementation of COIN – 2 reasons

First is Local Governance

The plan creates a model of local governance focused COIN which is key to solve insurgencies

Gillam & Moran, Army Major, ’11

[Jarrod J. H. Gillam, Major, United States Army, James E. Moran, Major, United States Air Force, “THE UNITED STATES AND YEMEN: COIN IN THE ABSENCE OF A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT,” Naval Postgraduate School, December 2011]

Within this construct, the United States is

AND

to identify and destroy AQAP through legitimate means.

And, governance focused COIN is key to solve failed states

Nagl, Security Studies Prof at West Point, ’09

[John A. Nagl, Former President of the Center for a New American Security, Professor of National Security Studies at West Point, Former Military Assistant to The Deputy Secretary of Defense, D. Phil from Oxford, Rhodes Scholar, Retired Lieutenant Colonel, Served in Iraq, “Letters To The Editor,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 54, 3^rd Quarter 2009]

In the 20th century, the primary problem of international ….

 for International Development. New wars demand new warriors, but to date we have shamefully neglected the transformation of our civilian instruments of national power.

Yemen is key to creating a global model for successful COIN

Barry, British Press Award Winner, ’11

[John Barry, Newsweek’s National Security correspondent, British Press Award Winner – The British equivalent of a Pulitzer, National Headliner Winner, Investigative Reporters & Editors Gold Medal, “Obama’s Secret Wars,” Jun 25^th 2011, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/06/25/afghanistan-troop-drawdown-america-s-other-covert-wars.html]

America may be drawing down its Afghan troops

AND

calling themselves al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

The Second Internal Link is Interagency Cooperation

No civil-military cooperation in Yemen now – USAID lacks the information to support the DoD

Mitchell, USAID Service Officer, ’11

[Robert E. Mitchell, Former Foreign Service Office with USAID (Including a tour in Yemen), “Yemen: Testing a New Coordinated Approach to Preventive Counterinsurgency,” August 1st 2011, Small Wars Journal]

Finally, because USAID has a bilateral nation-to-nation program, ….

 to implement and monitor project performance. It remains to be seen if USAID and DoD capabilities can in a coordinated manner meet the challenges set forth as a single American strategy for Yemen. And this was just before the recent turmoil.

The plan provides a framework for synchronizing civil-military action – key to irregular warfare capabilities

Lightsey, Special Forces Major, ’10

[Major Ross F. Lightsey Sr., Assigned to the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's 1st Special Warfare Training Group, Toured as Commander of a CMSE that had elements across Yemen, Pakistan and Tajikistan, Previously served assignments in Special Forces and Civil Affairs, “PERSISTENT ENGAGEMENT,” May 1st 2010, http://www.allbusiness.com/government/government-bodies-offices/15778943-1.html]

In ongoing irregular conflicts, the civil-

AND

mitigate redundancy and overlapping of projects and initiatives.

That means CMSE use gets modeled in future military campaigns

Mitchell, Former USAID Service Officer, ’11

[Robert E. Mitchell, Former Foreign Service Office with USAID (Including a tour in Yemen), “Yemen: Testing a New Coordinated Approach to Preventive Counterinsurgency,” August 1st 2011, Small Wars Journal]

Much can be learned from America‘s linked military and civilian development initiatives in Yemen, a country in which the United States Agency for International …

 failure and where American anti-terrorism programs are not yet active.

That’s key to implementing an effective COIN strategy – Yemen will provide a test case for future operations

Kotlow, Fellow @ The Washington Institute, ’11

[Colonel Kazimierz Kotlow, Visiting Senior Service College Fellow at The Washington Institute, Recently Served as the Defense & Army Attaché at the US Embassy in Yemen, Former Special Forces Detachment Commander, “Countering Extremism in Yemen: Beyond Interagency Cooperation,” March 31st 2011, Small Wars Journal]

Extremism, especially violent extremism, is a

AND

as well as attacks on our allies.5

Advantage Two

Contention Two is Terrorism

AQAP is expanding now – we need to shift current strategy to solve

Zimmerman, Gulf of Aden Expert @ AEI, 2-17

[Katherine Zimmerman, Gulf of Aden Team Lead for the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project, Specializing in Yemen and Somalia, “Recipe for Failure: American Strategy toward Yemen and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” February 17th 2012, http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/zimmerman-recipe-for-failure-american-strategy-february-17-2012]

The threat to Americans from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (…

 addressed once there is a clear successor to Saleh, an assumption that is unlikely in the extreme. The prospects for managing AQAP’s growing threat to the United States with these approaches are thus very poor.

The plan’s interagency coordination and engagement provides us with the intelligence to target senior AQAP leadership

Cillufo & Watts, President’s Special Assistant for Homeland Security, ’11

[Frank Cilluffo, Director Homeland Security Policy Institute at GWU, Former Special Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, Clinton Watts, Senior Fellow Homeland Security Policy Institute, Former US Army Officer, Former FBI Special Agent, “Yemen & Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Exploiting a Window of Counterterrorism Opportunity,” HSPI Issue Brief 11, June 24^th 2011]

Successfully implementing a drone and SOF approach in

AND

an end to U.S. engagements.

Civil Affairs operations are key to effective intelligence

Lightsey, Special Forces Major, ’08

[Major Ross F. Lightsey Sr., Assigned to the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's 1st Special Warfare Training Group, Toured as Commander of a CMSE that had elements across Yemen, Pakistan and Tajikistan, Previously served assignments in Special Forces and Civil Affairs, “Civil Affairs Support to The Surge,” March-April 2008]

Using CA capabilities to a strategic advantage required creativity. Our strategy was to provide the “ground truth” of the civil situation to the commander …

 Experienced and dedicated CATs can greatly enhance rapport between the ground forces and the Iraqi citizens. During the summer of 2007, there was a major offensive campaign, Operation Arrowhead Ripper, focused on pushing al-Qaeda in Iraq, or AQI, out of Baqubah, the provincial capital of Diyala province.

Taking out the local Yemeni leadership is key to destroy the organization – internationals like Awlaki don’t matter

Koehler-Derrick, Instructor @ West Point, ’11

[Gabriel Koehler-Derrick, Associate at the Combating Terrorism Center, Instructor at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, M.A. in International Affairs from Columbia, “A False Foundation? AQAP, Tribes and Ungoverned Spaces in Yemen,” Conducted based on Twelve Months of Fieldwork in Yemen, Including the Governorate of Marib, and Phone Interviews with Contacts in Marib and al-Jawf, September 2011]

Defensive measures must complement the direct application of

AND

even more importantly an enormous investment of patience.

AQAP is preparing to attack India

Roychowdhury, Former Commander of The Indian Army, ’11

[General, Shankar Roychowdhury, Former Chief of Army Staff, Former Member of Parliament, “India needs a 360° terror appraisal”, September 6, Deccan Chronicle, http://www.deccanchronicle.com/editorial/dc-comment/india-needs-360%C2%B0-terror-appraisal-659]

In this context, Al Qaeda and its emerging connections in Yemen have become very relevant for India. Yemen’s predominantly tribal culture and harsh inaccessible terrain …

 Threats to India’s national security can build up in any quarter, from any region of the world. India should have no doubts that it is very much on the AQAP’s target list, through local proxies like the LeT in Pakistan, including possible “ricin bomb” operations. So even as Mr Hazare wrestles with the threat of corruption to ensure good governance, India must take due note of other threats as well and exercise the requisite caution.

Escalates to nuclear war

Zarate, President’s Deputy Terrorism Advisor, ’11

[Juan Zarate, Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism,  “An alarming South Asia powder keg”, Washington Post, February 18^th 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/18/AR2011021805662.html]

In 1914, a terrorist assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo - unleashing geopolitical forces and World War I. Today, while the United States rightly worries about al-Qaeda targeting the homeland, the most dangerous threat may be another terrorist flash point on the horizon…

repeat itself with Lashkar-i-Taiba. Asymmetric threats that serve as flash points for broader geopolitical crises may be the greatest threat we face from terrorism.

AQAP will get the resources to launch a nuclear attack

Williams, Coordinator Fissile Materials Working Group, ’11

[Sarah Williams, Coordinator of the Fissile Materials Working Group and Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow at the Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy, "After bin Laden: Nuclear terrorism still a top threat," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists – Fissile Materials Working Group, May 13^th 2011, www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/fissile-materials-working-group/after-bin-laden-nuclear-terrorism-still-top-t]

Osama bin Laden's death may represent a significant

AND

priority must be securing this potential source material.

The US will retaliate – triggers full scale nuclear conflict

Speice, ’06

[Patrick F. Speice, Jr.,

AND

Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427]

Accordingly, there is a significant and ever

AND

triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. 50

2AC Solvency

Predictions good – Even if we can’t predict the future with certainty, it means we must be more wary of future crises

Kurasawa, ’04

[Fuyuki Kurasawa, Assistant Professor of Sociology @ York University, Toronto, & a Faculty Associate of the Center for Cultural Sociology @ Yale, “Cautionary Tales,” Constellations Vol. 4 No. 11, December]

When engaging in the labor of preventive foresight

AND 

and avoidable sources of harm to our successors. 

2AC Say No

The plan creates sustained positive relations with the Yemeni people that gives us access to remote parts of the country – that’s Gillam and Moran

Yemen says yes – they want more outreach efforts

Koehler-Derrick, ’11

[Gabriel Koehler-Derrick, Associate at the Combating Terrorism Center, Instructor at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, M.A. in International Affairs from Columbia, “A False Foundation? AQAP, Tribes and Ungoverned Spaces in Yemen,” Conducted based on Twelve Months of Fieldwork in Yemen, Including the Governorate of Marib, and Phone Interviews with Contacts in Marib and al-Jawf, September 2011]

Successfully countering al-Qa`ida in 

AND 

.S. intelligence capacity in the country. 

Say yes – they only dislike combat presence

Terrill, ’11

[W. Andres Terrill, Middle East Specialist at the Strategic Studies Institute, Retired U.S. Army Reserve Lieutenant Colonel, Foreign Area Officer (Middle East), Ph.D. in International Relations from Claremont, “The Conflicts in Yemen and U.S. National Security,” January 2011, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA536229&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf%5Djap]

**Note: Zindani – Leader of the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood/Major Yemeni Politician

While the current military relationship with the United 

AND 

sent to Yemen to wage war against AQAP.

2AC T Governance [Governance Bad]

We meet – we’re democratic governance

We meet – the plans assistance includes rule of law and elections assistance

Sisco & Ellis, Military Liason For President Karzai, 10

[Liutenant Commander James Sisco, Afghan Hand serving in Afghanistan, Previous tours in the Navy Irregular Warfare Office, And in Afghanistan as the military liaison for President Karzai, Dr. David C. Ellis, SOCOM Human Terraign Analyst Deployed in Afghanistan, “Implementing COIN Doctrine in the Absence of a Legitimate State,” October 13th 2010, Small Wars Journal]

The governance component is the means of actually 

AND 

Establish the Procedures for Village and District Elections.

Counter Interpretation – Democracy assistance is civil society, governance, elections and rule of law

GAO, ’09

[US Government Accountability Office, September 2009, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09993.pdf]

In January 2006, to better align foreign 

for the 20 countries with the largest allocations.

B. Governance assistance is the largest portion of USAID’s democratic governance program in the Middle East

Seligson et al – prof of poli sci, Vanderbilt – ’08

Azpuru, Dinorah, Steven E. Finkel, Aníbal Pérez‐Liñán, and Mitchell A. Seligson. “Trends in Democracy Assistance: What has the United States Been Doing?” Journal of Democracy 19 (2), 2008. p. 150‐159.

It is often said that Western donors are 

AND 

the future in order to achieve greater impact.

2AC Jackson-Vanik [Complete]

Case outweighs

1. 1. Deterrence makes it suicidal for countries to initiate war with peer competitors – That’s Nagl & Burton
2. 2. Even if war happens the conflict will be irregular – US COIN operations will prevent it from escalating – That’s Kahl
3. 3. Case outweighs – Korea collapse is the only scenario for global war – causes US-China nuclear war – and Indo-Pak war is the most likely scenario for nuclear escalation
   1. a. [Disease, Nuclear Retaliation]

Will only pass if it is linked to other anti-Russia legislation

Jatras, 3/23 --- Principal, Squire Sanders Public Advocacy, Washington, DC (3/23/2012, James George, Vladimir Frolov, 3/23/2012, Russia Profile, “Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Will Russia Graduate From the Jackson-Vanik Amendment?” Factiva)

Until very recently, I would have said 

AND 

more insulting than continued Jackson-Vanik application.

Not until after election

Herspring, 3/23 --- University Distinguished Professor at K State (Dale, Frolov Vladimir, 3/23/2012, Russia Profile, “Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Will Russia Graduate From the Jackson-Vanik Amendment?” Factiva)

Will Russia finally be graduated from the Jackson

AND 

a non-starter until after the election.

Studies prove presidential involvement reduces chance of passage

Klein, 3/19 (Ezra, 3/19/2012, “The Unpersuaded; Who listens to a President?” http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/03/19/120319fa_fact_klein#ixzz1pxjQpFdO)

In January, 2004, George W. 

AND 

of making it harder for him to govern. 

Logical policymaker could pass the plan and repeal Jackson-Vanik

Obama wouldn’t push the plan – it’s an internal military decision – its popular

Wright, ’11

[Matthew Wright, Henry M. Jackson School for International Studies, “TAKING DOWN AL-QAEDA’S NETWORK POST 9/11,” TASK FORCE 2011, COUNTERING AL-QAEDA’S IDEOLOGY: RE-ASSESSING U.S. POLICY TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11]

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM

AND 

with precision and continue to welcome widespread praise.

Yemen operations are covert – Congress won’t know

Davis, ’10 

[Charles, DC Based Journalist, "New Military Clandestine Directive Short on Oversight," Firedoglake, May 26, firedoglake.com/2010/05/26/new-military-clandestine-directive-short-on-oversight-by-design/]

The Obama administration has approved covert military operations 

AND 

going to send you that $200 grand.

Special forces operations are classified

Ruppert, ’11

[Madison Ruppert, Contributing Writer for Activist Post, “Questions raised by the SEAL Team 6 deaths in Afghanistan,” August 6^th 2011, http://www.activistpost.com/2011/08/questions-raised-by-seal-team-6-deaths.html]

Most of the operations carried out by these 

AND 

would likely not begin talking about it now.

Terrorism fear shields backlash

Al-Azaki, ’10 

[Mohammed, "Closely Observing Country's Situation, US Administration to Give Hand to Yemen," YemenPost, April 10, http://yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=3&SubID=1177&MainCat=6]

The American delegation’s visit came shortly after discussions 

AND 

well as ailing economy and depleting oil reservoirs.

Obama circumventing Congress with Egypt aid now

Washington Post, 3-16-’12 (William Wan, “U.S. funding for Egyptian military to resume, senior administration officials say”)

The Obama administration intends to resume funding for 

AND 

also urged Clinton not to resume the aid.

Aid now to Syria

Barnard, 3/25 (Anne, 3/25/2012, NY Times, “U.S. and Turkey to Step Up ‘Nonlethal’ Aid to Rebels in Syria,” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/world/middleeast/us-and-turkey-to-step-up-nonlethal-aid-to-syrian-rebels.html?_r=1)

BEIRUT — Turkey and the United States plan 

AND 

the opposition from the United States and others. 

Relations resilient and no war

Weitz, 11 --- senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor (9/27/2011, Richard, “Global Insights: Putin not a Game-Changer for U.S.-Russia Ties,” http://www.scribd.com/doc/66579517/Global-Insights-Putin-not-a-Game-Changer-for-U-S-Russia-Ties)

Fifth, there will inevitably be areas of 

AND 

will constrain whoever is in charge of Russia.

Aid in Yemen appropriated but not allocated – plan is internal t/o

GAO – Feb 2012, Uncertain Political and Security Situation Challenges U.S. Efforts to Implement a Comprehensive Strategy in Yemen, http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588955.pdf

Comes from insulated budget – no tradeoffs

SOCCOM, ’06

[US Special Opeartions Command, “Posture Statement 2006,” http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/socom/posture2006.pdf]

The Command’s Urgent Deployment Acquisition (UDA) 

AND 

improving responsiveness while minimizing impact on future systems.

Already cutting aid to non-MENA regions now

Lobe, FPIP, 2-20-’12 [Jim, “Obama Requests Slightly Higher Aid Levels for 2013” Foreign Policy in Focus, http://www.fpif.org/articles/obama_requests_slightly_higher_aid_levels_for_2013]s

"The notion is we're in a new 

AND 

drew concern from a number of aid groups. 

2AC EU Forum Counterplan – New

US says no – political backlash to leading from behind

Reuters 11 (9/21, Obama seeks to ease doubts on global leadership, mobile.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE78K39V20110921)

Foreign policy has slipped down his policy list

AND 

approach undermines U.S. global prestige.

Announcing an intention doesn’t mean they will do it – budget problems will swamp

BBC – 11/15/11, Council denies fears over cuts to EU overseas aid budgets, http://news.bbc.co.uk/democracylive/hi/europe/newsid_9636000/9636356.stm

MEPs questioned the Commission and the Council on 

AND 

€50m funding gap to meet these goals.

Tactical cooperation’s non-unique and doesn’t spillover to higher strategy  

Melia 10,  Deputy Executive Director of Freedom House, previously Director of Research at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, and Adjunct Professor in the School of Foreign Service, at Georgetown University, (Thomas, "Supporting Democracy Abroad: Transatlantic Cooperation at a Crossroads," in “ Shoulder to Shoulder: Forging a Strategic U.S.–EU Partnership,”  transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/transatlantic-topics/Articles/eu-us/forging-eu-us-partnership/us-eu_book_democracy_thomas_melia.pdf)

Emphasis in original 

 Today, with the world in the 

AND 

not contributed to democratic advancement in recent years. 

2AC Pakistan

Aid in Yemen appropriated but not allocated – plan is internal t/o

GAO – Feb 2012, Uncertain Political and Security Situation Challenges U.S. Efforts to Implement a Comprehensive Strategy in Yemen, http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588955.pdf

civilian assistance over fiscal year 2011 actual allocations.

2AC Aid Trade-off – General

Comes from insulated budget – no tradeoffs

SOCCOM, ’06

[US Special Opeartions Command, “Posture Statement 2006,” http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/socom/posture2006.pdf]

The Command’s Urgent Deployment Acquisition (UDA) 

AND 

improving responsiveness while minimizing impact on future systems.

Aid and co op fails - relations inevitably doomed

Gregory Director Pakistan Security Research Unit U. of Bradford 12-25

(Shaun-, (U. of Bradford = UK) Times of India, “For US, policy bigger worry than Zardari”, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-12-25/special-report/30556519_1_raymond-davis-pakistan-civilian-aid)

These tensions boiled over in 2011. The 

AND 

, will be able to find any answers.