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### Contention 1—In support of dissent

### We begin with a story that broke in the U.S. media this month about the fate of the Yemeni journalist Abdullah Shaye who dissented against the official U.S./Yemen story on who was conducting drone strikes in Yemen

Greenwald 3-14-12

Glenn Greenwald is a former Constitutional and civil rights litigator and was named by The Atlantic as one of the 25 most influential political commentators in the nation. He is the recipient of the first annual I.F. Stone Award for Independent Journalism, and is the winner of the 2010 Online Journalism Association Award, Obama’s personal role in a journalist’s imprisonment <http://www.salon.com/2012/03/14/obamas_personal_role_in_a_journalists_imprisonment/singleton/>

As we now know, on December 17, 2009, President Obama ordered an air attack — using Tomahawk cruise missiles and cluster bombs — on the village of al Majala in Yemen’s southern Abyan province; the strike ended the lives of 14 women and 21 children. At the time, the Yemeni government outright lied about the attack, falsely claiming that it was Yemen’s air force which was responsible. The Pentagon helped bolster this misleading claim of responsibility by issuing a statement that “Yemen should be congratulated for actions against al-Qaeda.” Meanwhile, leading American media outlets, such as The New York Times, reported — falsely — that “Yemeni security forces carried out airstrikes and ground raids against suspected Qaeda hide-outs last week with what American officials described as ‘intelligence and firepower’ supplied by the United States.” Those U.S. media reports vaguely mentioned civilian deaths only in passing or not at all, opting instead for ledes such as: “Yemeni security forces carried out airstrikes and ground raids against suspected hide-outs of Al Qaeda on Thursday, killing at least 34 militants in the broadest attack on the terrorist group here in years, Yemeni officials said.” While it is certain that dozens of civilians were killed, Scahill notes that “whether anyone actually active in Al Qaeda was killed remains hotly contested.” There is one reason that the world knows the truth about what really happened in al Majala that day: because the Yemeni journalist, Abdulelah Haider Shaye, traveled there and, as Scahill writes, “photographed the missile parts, some of them bearing the label ‘Made in the USA,’ and distributed the photos to international media outlets.” He also documented the remnants of the Tomahawks and cluster bombs, neither of which is in Yemen’s arsenal. And he provided detailed accounts proving that scores of civilians, including those 21 children, had been killed in the attacks. It was Shaye’s journalism that led Amnesty International to show the world the evidence that it was the U.S. which had perpetrated the attack using cluster bombs, and media outlets to reveal the horrifying extent of the civilian deaths. Shaye’s work was vindicated when WikiLeaks released a diplomatic cable — allegedly provided by Bradley Manning — in which Yemen’s then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh joked with David Petraeus about continuing to lie to the public: ”We’ll continue saying the bombs are ours, not yours.” Shaye has engaged in other vital journalism over the past couple of years in Yemen. He conducted several interviews with Anwar al-Awlaki, including one which is often cited as evidence that Awlaki believed the attack by Nidal Hasan on the Fort Hood military base to be justifiable, and that the cleric spoke with the attempted Christmas Day bomber. Shaye’s journalism has been cited by Western media outlets as a credible source about what was taking place in Yemen (such as when he reported that, contrary to U.S. and Yemeni claims, Anwar Awlaki was not among those killed in that 2009 air attack). And one of the nation’s leading Yemen experts, Princeton’s Gregory Johnsen, told Scahill that “it is difficult to overestimate the importance of his work” in understanding what is happening in Yemen. Despite that important journalism — or, more accurately, because of it — Shaye is now in prison, thanks largely to President Obama himself. For the past two years, Shaye has been arrested, beaten, and held in solitary confinement by the security forces of Saleh, America’s obedient tyrant. In January, 2011, he was convicted in a Yemeni court of terrorism-related charges — alleging that he was not a reporter covering Al Qaeda but a mouthpiece for it — in a proceeding widely condemned by human rights groups around the world. “There are strong indications that the charges against [Shaye] are trumped up and that he has been jailed solely for daring to speak out about US collaboration in a cluster munitions attack which took place in Yemen,” Philip Luther, Amnesty International’s Deputy Director for the Middle East and North Africa, told Scahill. The Yemen expert, Johnsen, added: “There is no publicly available evidence to suggest that Abdulelah was anything other than a journalist attempting to do his job.”

### Shaye was silenced because the U.S. did not like what he had to say

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Shaye’s real crime is that he reported facts that the U.S. government and its Yemeni client regime wanted suppressed. But while the imprisonment of this journalist was ignored in the U.S, it became a significant controversy in Yemen. Numerous Yemeni tribal leaders, sheiks and activist groups agitated for his release, and in response, President Saleh, as the Yemeni press reported, had a pardon drawn up for him and was ready to sign it. That came to a halt when President Obama intervened. According to the White House’s own summary of Obama’s February 3, 2011, call with Saleh, “President Obama expressed concern over the release of Abd-Ilah al-Shai.” The administration has repeatedly refused to present any evidence that Shaye is anything other than a reporter, and this is what State Department spokesperson Beth Gosselin told Scahill in response to his story: “We are standing by [President Obama’s] comments from last February. We remain concerned about Shaye’s potential release due to his association with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. We stand by the president’s comments.” When asked whether the US government should present evidence to support its claims about Shaye’s association with AQAP, Gosselin said, “That is all we have to say about this case.” So it is beyond dispute that the moving force behind the ongoing imprisonment of this Yemeni journalist is President Obama. And the fact that Shaye is in prison, rather than able to report, is of particular significance (and value to the U.S.) in light of the still escalating American attacks in that country. Over the past 3 days alone, American air assaults have killed 64 people in Yemen, while American media outlets — without anyone on the scene — dutifully report that those killed are “suspected Al Qaeda insurgents” and “militants.”

### The silencing of Shaye is an exemplar of punishing dissent in an effort to deter dissent in the future

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That much of what we know about this horrific airstrike comes from two imprisoned individuals (Abdulelah Haider Shaye and, allegedly, Bradley Manning), along with a group the U.S. government clearly wants to indict (WikiLeaks), is telling indeed. As the NSA whistleblower whom the Obama administration unsuccessfully attempted to prosecute for “espionage,” Thomas Drake, wrote this week, the unprecedented Obama war on whistleblowers is, at its core, about punishing those whose expose the deceitful and improper acts of the U.S. Government and deterring those who might do so in the future.

### We have a responsibility in educational forums to explore the role of dissent and efforts to suppress it, to provide a space for unfettered dissent

Schostak 11

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Wikileaks, Tahrir Square – their significance for re-thinking democracy

http://www.enquirylearning.net/ELU/politics/tahrirwikileaks.html

Freedom with equality21 is fundamental for the imagination and expression of alternatives as the basis for critiques of present local circumstances and global historical conjunctures22. Freedom with equality makes a radical demand. Without freedom only a limited range of approved views can be heard - hence not all views are equally available for debate. Without equality, minority views, critical views can be overruled, hence their freedom to be heard and taken into account in debate negated. Thus there is a critical demand on education and research to scrutinise under the principle of freedom with equality the governance, administration and organisational structures adopted by policy makers by which they impose their will upon people across the whole range of spaces and places involving all forms of collective work, play, the expression of views, the exchange of goods and services, and engagement in action in everyday life. All governance, administration and organisational structures must be continually challenged by both research and education, if they are to sustain the exercise of reason, expression of views, the imagination of alternatives, the voicing of experience, debate as a basis of decision making and collective engagement in action under conditions for freedom with equality in all matters. Neither education nor research, on this principle, can be a client of a particular group expressing interests that require the repression or subservience of other groups and individuals. Thus education and research, on this principle, is radically open to the voices of all. Under these conditions subservience and the injustices experienced that have been variously constructed historically and maintained throughout the economic, political, social, cultural, religious spheres of community life by force or the threat of force cannot continue without challenge in public. Without a radically and dynamically open political organisation voices will be excluded and thus injustices unheard. Thus the work of education and research involves the continual creation of the conditions to include new voices in public spaces of debate, decision making and action23. But education and research arc not the preserve of specialists. It is the unfinished and unfinishablc work of all. It is here, I think, in this work of education and research where we find our Tahrir Square, a no-space of democracy always creating the place of its emergence in every act of engagement with others. It here that wc can construct the forms of democratic organisation in every sphere of life that arc the countervailing powers to Power.

### In any organizational structure embracing dissent rather than suppressing it is vital

James 11

Dr. Helen James is an Adjunct Associate Professor with the Australian Demographic and Social Research Institute, The Australian National University Civil Society and the Duty to Dissent, The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law Volume 13, Issue 3, June 2011 <http://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol13iss3/special_1.htm>

The renowned American lawyer Cass Sunstein, in his splendid book Why Societies Need Dissent,[2] explicated the view long held amongst exponents of theoretical democracy that dissent is the leaven which propels societies to be productive, innovative, creative, attractive to human beings from diverse cultural backgrounds; that dissent unleashes the regenerative capacities which enable societies to thrive and not atrophy. In fact dissent, defined as the public expression of disagreement with majority-held views, is the essential component of open democratic politics, as it underpins the operations of the various “freedoms” – the freedoms of association, media, religion, speech – to protect which we have been repeatedly told by leaders of the world’s major democracies since 1939 that we must go to war. This imperative itself has produced major eruptions of dissent from those disagreeing with the prescription. Dissent in all organizations, minor and major, whether the local book club or the highest organs of government, is a forum for proposing alternate views, for bringing additional information to bear on decision-making processes which could have far-reaching consequences for those responsible for the administration of government. For example, had the late President John F. Kennedy not listened to dissenting voices, the unimaginable catastrophe of nuclear war with the former Soviet Union could have occurred in 1962 at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. Sunstein rightly considers that dissent is, however, a much undervalued quality in democratic polities, and of course one that is repressed in non-democratic polities. We are only too well aware of the fate of political dissenters from present-day Syria, Yemen, and Libya to Myanmar, China, Russia, and South America. But we like to fondly believe that dissent is welcomed in democratic societies as an expression of the validating principles of oppositional politics. Outside formal institutional fora, sadly, this is rarely the case. While many democratically elected politicians claim they uphold the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the American Constitution and similar documents or legal frameworks operating in other major Western democracies, in practice those who publicly dissent from majority views or challenge perceived politically correct norms are frequently ostracized, expelled from their places of work, careers destroyed, imprisoned, or even killed. Being a dissenter is not a comfortable career, even in established Western democracies. Despite the much-vaunted freedom of the press, during the widely unpopular Iraq War of 2003 which saw thousands of demonstrators (dissenters) pour onto the streets of major Western capitals, some journalists who challenged the government line of the day, both in the United States and in Australia, were persecuted, threatened with imprisonment and loss of their livelihoods. And not just during the 2003 Iraq War, but also the earlier Vietnam War era (1965-1975, the epitome of dissent being marked by Daniel Ellsberg’s unauthorized leaking of the Pentagon Papers in 1971 and their publication in The New York Times and The Washington Post. Pursued by the administration of the day, Ellsberg has now found his place as a hero of the history of dissent who exposed to the public and the Congress the culture of mendacity within the U.S. Administration. Yet freedom of the press, that bulwark of democracy as it has been instilled in millions of school children, is a major public institution by which dissenting views are conveyed to the population at large. When the press/media is co-opted by government, that government resiles from the high standards of accountability and transparency which we consider paramount in consolidated and established democracies; and conversely, the lack of “freedom of the press” and associated freedoms are critical measures of dictatorship. Dissent thus has a checkered history both in democratic and non-democratic societies, a principle frequently more recognized in theory than in practice. Indeed, the worldwide decline in freedom of the press and its associated culture of political dissent in recent years has been the subject of the latest survey and freedom index by Freedom House, which notes that 2010 was the fifth consecutive year in which this negative finding has been observed. The Duty to Dissent America was born in dissent. Those who sailed on The Mayflower in 1620 and their descendants who fought the War of Independence in 1776 not only sought to establish the primacy of dissent in a modern democratic polity, but also gave credibility to the notion that the principled individual has a duty to dissent in pursuit of a civil society. Their voyage across the ocean, establishment of the “Commonwealth” of Massachusetts, and later repudiation of the authority of the Crown of England, were part of the fabric of dissent in which modern journalism was born. In that era, politics and religion walked the same path, as Anne Hutchinson found out when, in 1636, her dissenting religious views caused the political leaders to expel her from their community. She sought refuge in Rhode Island. Governmental and religious authorities worked closely together, considering that each had the power to dictate the parameters of an individual’s faith, a system of governance which had given rise to the major religious wars of Western Europe, and the relentless persecution from which the Pilgrim Fathers had initially fled. Whilst in modern times it is generally acknowledged in most Western democracies that a person’s religious views are a private matter, not the purview of the state, this development in public policy has been a hard-won perspective over which much blood has been spilt. Resistance to religious persecution has been the crucible for the public expression of dissent across numerous societies, leading to concomitant political activism, either through pursuit of arms or through the medium of print, as may be seen in the journalistic forays of a kindred spirit, the English Presbyterian dissenter Daniel De Foe. He published the 1703 satiric pamphlet, The Shortest Way with the Dissenters, which pilloried the established Church of England. It earned him some time in the stocks and set him on the path to being acknowledged as the father of modern journalism. The less fortunate English bookseller John Smith in 1791 published a similar pamphlet, “A Summary of the Duties of Citizenship,”[3] an attack on the abuses of the Church of England, for which he was put on trial in 1796. His wife had, unknown to him, sold a single copy of the pamphlet. He earned a harsher punishment, being sentenced to having his hand struck off and to serving time in prison, which so impacted his health that he died. The fury of the English Establishment may be gauged by the introduction to his indictment, which reads: Indictment [for libel and sedition, inciting disaffection towards King, Clergy, and Government]: That John Smith, being a wicked, malicious and ill-disposed person and greatly disaffected to our Lord the King and the Government of this kingdom, and wickedly, seditiously, and maliciously contriving and intending to scandalize and deface, and bring into hatred and contempt, our said Lord the King, and the established Government, Religion, and Law of this Kingdom, and the Clergy of the Church of England as by law established, and the Army of our said Lord the King: and to insinuate and cause it to be believed that the Government of this kingdom as by law established is an usurped, unjust and tyrannical government, and that the Army of our said Lord the King is used and employed by the Government of this Kingdom as an instrument of tyranny and oppression over the people thereof, and thereby to raise and excite sedition, discontent, and irreligion in the minds of the liege subjects of our said Lord the King, on the 17th day of 1795, in the county of Middleses, that is to say, in the parish of St Giles’s in the Fields and St. George’s, Bloomsbury, wickedly, seditiously, and maliciously did publish, and cause and procure to be published, a certain Libel, containing therein, amongst other things, divers wicked, scandalous, and seditious matters and things of and concerning of our said Lord the King and the established Government, Religion, and Laws of this kingdom, and of and concerning the Clergy of the Church of England as by law established, and the Army of our said Lord the King.[4] If one detects something of the fury of Shakespeare’s King Lear when Cordelia refuses to state publicly how much she loves him, and thereby declines to acknowledge his authority by playing the game, then perhaps one is simply recognizing the Rumpelstiltskin type of fury which seems to characterize authoritarian presumptions of compliance. This has nothing to do with the theory of consent or its withdrawal, but everything to do with the capacity or otherwise of governmental authority to accept criticism in an appropriate manner. While John Stuart Mill in his 1859 essay, On Liberty, took the stance that the time had passed when it would be thought necessary to defend the principle of ‘liberty of the press’ as what he identifies as ‘one of the securities against corrupt or tyrannical government,’[5] sadly this is not the case. The politico-religious reverberations of the ‘War on Terror’ have produced governmental authorities which only too readily revert to the coercive practices of earlier historical eras. The problem of suppression of dissenting opinion lies with us today as much as it did in John Smith’s or Daniel De Foe’s time, for how frequently do we hear legitimately elected governments not only indignantly refuting even mild criticism and relentlessly pursuing the criticizer, but then also putting in place expensive bureaucracies to deflect and criminalize any future criticism?

### Any efforts to suppress or deter dissent in an effort to promote conformity are antithetical to the valuing of dissent

Lott 06

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THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PUNISHING DISSENT: NEGATIVE REACTIONS TO ANTIWAR VIEWS IN THE UNITED STATES, In Collateral damage: the psychological consequences of America's war on terrorism, Ed. By Paul R. Kimmel, Chris E. Stout google books p.73

The negative responses to antiwar views reported in the U.S. media serve as a case study of factors that maintain uniformity in beliefs and behavior and achieve conformity to norms. Cialdini and Trost\*1 define social norms as "rules and standards that . .. guide and/or constrain social behavior without the force of laws . . . and any sanctions for deviating from them come from social networks, not the legal system" (p. 15\*2). It is precisely this phenomenon of social sanctions that is illustrated by the range of negative reactions to dissent that have been briefly presented here. These serve to punish dissenters through rejection, name-calling, derision, and threats and to inform would-be dissenters of the consequences of deviating from the majority view.

Our knowledge of the conditions that increase the probability of conformity to majority views does not help us identify the conditions that are sufficient or necessary for independent behavior. What may be operating in dissent or independence is the existence of competing reference groups4" that support different behaviors. Showing independence from the norms of one group may show allegiance with those of another. We need to formulate a research agenda that will uncover antecedents of independence, identify consequences, and test hypotheses about the relationships between such behavior and both personal and situational variables. Democracy rests on the free expression of different views so that decisions can be made by weighing the strengths and weaknesses of alternative positions. It is therefore vital that pressures to conform to a majority view are not so overwhelming that minority positions quickly give way. We need to understand how continued maintenance of an independent minority position can be achieved.

### In educational settings we should be encouraging the protection of dissent

Lott 06

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THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PUNISHING DISSENT: NEGATIVE REACTIONS TO ANTIWAR VIEWS IN THE UNITED STATES, In Collateral damage: the psychological consequences of America's war on terrorism, Ed. By Paul R. Kimmel, Chris E. Stout google books p. 74

Discussions of issues related to conformity and independence are vital for constructive citizenship and active community participation. The benefits of dissent in contributing new information and ideas that stimulate discussion and argument need to be recognized. Greenberg9 has argued that antiwar movements have produced valuable social and political works of art, philosophy, and criticism and have also given rise to lasting and influential organizations. We should recognize this and inform our students, for example, that Thomas Jefferson was among the targets of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 that made it illegal to say harshly critical things about the U.S. government.8 A major strategy for those in public policy positions is to foster ways to increase our knowledge of, and attention to, variables related to the expression of opinions and values. Sternberg has proposed that our schools should teach "the 'other three Rs'—reasoning, responsibility and resilience" (p. 55). I would add to this the teaching of "independence"— not an R, but a behavior related to all three of his additions to the school curriculum and vital to the maintenance of a vibrant democratic society.

### The importance of dissent is not tied to “fixing” problems but raising awareness

Stitzlein 12

SARAH M. STITZLEIN is Assistant Professor of Philosophy of Education and a core faculty member of the Women’s Studies Department at the University of New Hampshire THE RIGHT TO DISSENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOOLING Educational TheoryVolume 62, Issue 1, Article first published online: 16 JAN 2012

Dissent takes many forms, which, at times, overlap. The first type of dissent is that of the cultural critic, who interprets and critiques cultural events and practices in order to expose their shortcomings and ultimately direct attention toward better ways of living. Cultural critics work to help others see some aspect of cultural practice, norms, or law that the community had not previously seen as problematic. While these critics serve a valuable social role, their efforts typically stop at writings or speeches; they turn the continued, and often more challenging, aspects of the movement for change over to others. This brings us to the second type of dissent, which involves building a movement to raise awareness of an issue that has been silenced or ignored by the mainstream. This form of dissent may also entail making it known that some stakeholders do not agree with the view of those in power. Dissidents of this type put forward alternative information and form independent organizations, both noteworthy aspects of a healthy democracy.10 They may march, picket, or protest. While they may not necessarily ‘‘fix’’ a problem, they make it known that there are people who disagree, build solidarity with others who hold an alternative view, or destigmatize an issue by bringing it into public view through consciousness-raising. The third type uses dissent to change minds or practices. This targeted form of social change may play out under a picket sign, but it may also occur through more subtle democratic contributions or participation within the system the dissident seeks to change. It tends to be a far less flashy approach, aimed at genuinely changing the opinions of other people or of presenting alternative perspectives, rather than just demanding their attention or urging them to do something differently. Such change of opinion, however, may require the instigation of controversy in order to challenge witnesses to question their beliefs and to consider alternative ones. The fourth type of dissent involves rallying one’s compatriots. The aim is not to change the minds of opposing groups, but rather to enliven, impassion, and ignite one’s supporters as a cheerleader of sorts. This ‘‘preaching to the choir’’ may involve sharing stories or facts that support a viewpoint held by one’s group or using coalition-building techniques and public announcement systems to mobilize one’s group.11

### Restricting dissent destroys essential skills of dissent

Stitzlein 12

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I build off of the spirit of the founders by suggesting that if we have a liberal democracy guided by a constitution that protects individual liberties and ensures the rights of minorities and the powerless, then we can only fulfill and sustain this system if we protect the liberties of all and ensure the abilities of minorities to understand oppression in the world around them and fight against it. Understanding one’s oppressed position, especially when internalized, is challenging if one is unable to explore or assess alternative ways of living. With limited skills of critique or opportunities to consider alternatives, oppressed peoples are often unable to vocalize or realize alternative ways of being. I want to be careful here, however, in not assuming that oppressed people do not already have some of these skills. They may indeed possess and exercise these skills, but when their proliferation and development is not encouraged or when they fall on deaf and unresponsive ears (as in the state that does not win the consent of the oppressed and fails to notice the dissent of its minorities), then the state has fallen short of its obligation to provide education as a requirement of justice. Further, the state fails to cultivate a population that can pursue or sustain justice if its citizens lack the capacity and ability to dissent on behalf of their own well-being and that of others.

### Academic settings have a unique obligation to facilitate dissent

Stitzlein 12

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When dissent is viewed as a negative right, schools bear little responsibility other than ensuring that they do not interfere with student dissent and that such dissent conforms to the conditions outlined earlier. But when the issue is reframed as a positive right, it becomes clear that schools are responsible for much more than permitting dissent; rather, they are tasked with cultivating a student’s ability to invoke it. If dissent is seen as a right of entitlement, then it follows that it must be provided to all citizens. But it is not enough simply to grant the right of dissent to adults; children must be able to practice and develop the skills they will employ as adults so that a legitimate and just democracy is maintained. For my purposes here, this means that all public schools would have the obligation to formally develop skills and dispositions of dissent. This widespread application would likely encounter some resistance, especially from stakeholders concerned with local control, parents who may find teaching dissent to conflict with their ability to pass down their lifestyle and to maintain a position of authority in the home, and citizens who uphold strict and unquestioning patriotic loyalty.

### Contention 2-- Dissent against the Topic Selection Process

The experience of debating the topic has led us to recognize the limitations of how democracy is practiced within our own debate community.

The college debate community established its own “democratic” procedures for selecting the college debate topic. This process allows individual schools to vote on the selection of a topic area. The final topic is selected from a slate of topic choices chosen by the topic committee. Like our strategies of democracy assistance in the topic countries, the process through which the community gets to vote on the topic is a sham-ocracy that creates the illusion of choice without the reality.

Scott Harris based on his experience as a former member of the topic committee, told us that he believes there is a fundamental anti-democratic elitism built into the approach of the topic committee. He told us that the topic committee tends to operate from a position of elitism that does not trust the debate community to make the right choices. He said that in each of the three years he was on the topic committee proposals to include a broader version of the topic would be shot down by someone on the topic committee declaring “We can’t put that options on the ballot because it would win.” Dr. Harris said that it puzzled him that a committee selected to represent the community would reject topic wording options from the ballot because the community might like them better than the narrower options preferred by members of the committee.

The construction of this year’s topic is the clearest decision by the topic committee to rig the ballot to restrict the range of choices available. The ballot that was presented to the community by the topic community included a range of options in which each option had the exact same stem “The United States federal government should substantially increase its democracy assistance” with the vote options centered on which countries would be included in the topic process. Michael Hester in his analysis of the debate topic writing process observed the same process that existed when Harris was on the committee—a distrust in giving choices to the community.

Hester

Michael Hester, Debate coach West Georgia

Critical Issues in Debate: Dr. Hester on the Democracy Assistance topic

Podcast: http://puttingthekindebate.com/

 “If the purpose of the second phase of the topic selection process is, the first move is to choose a topic area and the second move is to choose a resolution, it seems like we are over limiting the choices for the voters and I don’t really like that. I wish there was more variety. If we are going to have six choices there should be a bigger variety. Some might say its democracy assistance to some might say democracy assistance for—here is the problem you run into. There was an argument made that was pretty much un-refuted that was made time and again at different parts, that said, you know if you set up the choices this way this will get selected, and one of the common denominators of the this will get selected motivations was that there are that either the simplest wording will be selected or what is perceived to be the most narrow will be selected and you know someone pointed out why shouldn’t we let the voters make that choice and that’s a good point—why not.”

There are a wide variety of ways in which the topic committee could consider expanding the wording options on the ballot

Kuswa 11

Kevin Kuswa aDebate coach at Fresno State

 http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=2329.0

There is a lot more potential within the topic wordings than presently exercised. The normalizing of the wording choices (including the emphasis of the “USFG” or some incarnation of it as the agent of action) is not a result of the controversy area process or the wording selection process. The overall process works well and it allows the community to vote on controversies generated by anyone who wants to write a paper. Gordon Stables has put together an outstanding description of the call for topics that opens up space for creative wording options and the very transparent process itself allows the community to select a wording from a slate of options crafted by an elected committee backed by additional wording papers supplementing the original controversy paper. We could do far worse. We cannot pretend, though, that the topic choices have been spontaneous creations from authors compelled to find the Truth of a controversy. I doubt if we would want those forms of overly technocratic and contingent options in the first place. Novices are still expected to be able to enter the activity from scratch—and many do. At present, though, we tend to work with a number of amalgamations of “area driven phrases” put together with previous used “connectors” along with what a paper author thinks would yield “good” debate and what the community would approve. Tasty sausage, but still sausage. This makes sense. Investing the time in a topic paper is immense as many of you know from first-hand experience. Leaning toward a wording that the mainstream would accept is a secure way to give that area paper the best chance possible. On the other hand, area papers and wording papers could and should take more liberties in terms of alternative suggestions—ways to shift the wording slightly to reveal new components of the proposed debate. Those suggestions would not have to supplant a primary conception of the topic phrasing, but they could illuminate the words and the types of research involved—they certainly would not hurt. In terms of ways to think through alternative wording trajectories, here are a few starting points: 1. Passive voice. It sounds like a good paper (or paper section) within a specific controversy would help make this viable or at least worthy of some consideration. The section of a paper on this would need to float a wording suggestion or two and talk a bit about the multiplicity of agents that could be defended on the affirmative and the exciting clash between topicality and counterplans (fiat and pedagogy) that would have to occur on the negative. Ground for new agent discussions would open on both sides and the controversy itself might take on new dimensions. I have worked through some of this thought process for a media topic, a development assistance topic, and a few others, but would be more than glad to bounce ideas back and forth with any authors. The bottom line is that putting the resolution in the passive (which could happen for any topic, including those we have had recently) is a way to include the USFG as one agent among many possibilities. There is room within the passive voice to debate the question of the agent as it relates to the controversy area. "R: The USFG should expand gun control in the US," becomes "R: Gun control should be expanded in the US." There have been over a dozen passive voice topics in the last fifty years. The community might decide that opening some ground for the affirmative to advocate action (topically) outside the constraints of the USFG might actually bring portions of critical debate closer to the specifics while allowing topicality to matter. And, if desperate, the staunch defenders of the USFG could use counterplans or other forms of agent arguments to try to bring their favorite actor back into the round. 2. Non-USFG agents. This variable is closely related to passive voice, but different. We have had many topics in the past that use agents other than the USFG (“non-agricultural industries should,” “non-communist nations should”). The non-USFG agent is a possibility closely connected to a controversy area that justifies a different set of policy mechanisms. International institutions that include the US have been advocated in papers in the past (the U.N., the IMF), and it would also be possible to debate a wide range of agents that did not include the USFG at all (the OAU, OAS, African Nations, local authorities). This is all about a good controversy paper that really explores what the debates might look like and happens to pick an area that the community is ready to debate. 3. Concise wordings. The wordings are getting longer and longer and they do not really have to grow longer to be better. Options with less than 15 words could be quite helpful. Or, less than 20 words...or 10. A beautiful topic does not (always) need dangling jewelry or topicality tattoos like "at least including...," "limited to this and this...," "through at least one and not more than the following...," etc. The primary variable for a good wording should not be brevity, but we should at least think about simple elegance along the way, recognizing that more words might patch one concern while creating five more. 4. Deeper topic assumptions that might warrant opening: A) The "Resolved :"...this may be too close to the heart of what policy debate is to think about changing, but there are plenty of debates over the meaning of this prefix and the colon that follows it. Would a paper on these options even matter? The different meanings of a colon vs. a semi-colon could play a role, for example. That might be an interesting wording paper. B) The present tense of "should." We all know that "should" helps to define fiat in a way that "could" or "would" does not. Thus, assuming that we must have the word "should" in any topic, why does it always have to be present tense? Would any author entertain a possibility about a historical topic--one that says "should have..."? C) Punctuating the sentence. This relates to the function of the "resolved:," but it might be possible, as one example, to conclude the statement with a question mark instead of a period. This might change the way the affirmative is expected to endorse the topic. The elements listed above may or may not be linked to some of the critical and performative turns in debate. The fact that we have experienced a number of theoretical shifts and paradigms--influenced by technology, but also by fields of argument--is not hard to demonstrate. Questions surrounding the role and agency of the debater-judge-audience as well as critiques of the assumptions behind certain forms of evidence and certain ways of debating are now abundant. At some point the resolutions should reflect some of these turns, at least as much as they can within the parameters given. The fact that the agent has been nothing other than the United States Federal Government since 1995 is not really indicative of the paths being taken in debate since the early 90s. Maybe that is a reason to keep the current formula, but it is probably more of a reason to offer some diversity if possible. Some of these elements might deserve slightly more consideration than others as an option or two for ways we approach the wordings, regardless of the topic area. Some of these elements are closely related to one another and are tied to questions coming from the controversy itself, but each is distinct enough to warrant independent discussion. There really isn't as much consensus and predictability in the community as the topics would have an outside observer conclude. Even if there is some norm for the majority of phrases, over a four year period we should attempt to diversify the possibilities.

Galloway agrees that there should be diversity in the options on the topic ballot

Galloway 11

Ryan Galloway http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=2329.0

Concise wordings. 100% agree. I think the ballot should contain an option of a straightforward, 10-15 word sentence. The key is a strong term of art. When topic writers find a term of art, hang on for dear life and work to revolve the topic around them. I've worked on many, many topics, and the terms of art are rare nuggets. We can't get queasy if we don't "like" what the literature around a question says--embrace it as it creates the topic. Remember, you get to be neg. half the time, and if you don't like the term of art/want to K it, do so on the negative so we can generate the clash around the controversial idea. It isn't as simply as "oh, we'll just find another one," terms of art that truly create a dividing line are rare. Hang on tight when you find one. I would like to see a ballot similar to the nukes ballot, with a 10-15 word resolution, a hybrid-list resolution (the way most resolutions recently have been), and a list resolution. Those seem to be the camps people vote in, so this gives voters a chance to see a topic they really like, and win the debate in the voting process. The committee might be trying too hard to please everyone with every individual topic line item, which creates the "throw in an added word" approach that seems to plague current topics. I'd rather have a cleaner vote on clear choices (I thought the nukes ballot was the ideal way to do this).

This year’s topic ballot did not offer the community diversity of choices—it instead offered 6 options with the same structure and different countries. The mindset which creates a narrow range of choices is premised on the notion that we can’t trust the debate community with a range of choices much like the US federal government does not trust people in the topic countries to vote for the parties it wants elected.

Our advocacy statement is that:

The topic committee should not exclude topic options from the ballot based on the fear that a majority of the community might vote for it.

### **Having a range of choices is vital in any organization. The inability to vote for different options disenfranchises individuals and marginalizes them in the community**

Prezeworski 03

ADAM PRZEWORSKI New York University Economics and Philosophy, 19 (2003) 265–279 Copyright C Cambridge University Press FREEDOM TO CHOOSE AND DEMOCRACY http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/2800/choice.pdf

People may be dissatisfied with the electoral process for two distinct reasons, either because their most preferred alternative is not the outcome of the collective choice or because they are denied a chance to vote for what they most want. Since voting generates winners and losers, the losers are unhappy even when they had a chance to vote for their favorite option. Yet democrats must be willing to lose. Not being able to vote for one’s favorite option, however, is a deeper source of deprivation. When one’s preferences are not recognized in the set of collective opportunities, one is excluded from the political community. Even if some people whose first option is included vote strategically, not for their first choice, they are the ones who decide how to vote. It is voters who should decide whether to maximize utility or to express their preferences in a non-instrumental way. When choices are restricted, they are denied this freedom. When their first choice is not present among the alternatives generated by a democratic system, they may reasonably feel that their political life is impoverished.

It does not matter whether a different wording option wins or not, but having choices is vital to individual agency

Prezeworski 03

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What renders value to choice is that, even if they cannot affect the outcomes, individuals with different views can assert their agency. When I cast a vote for my views, I place them in the public domain. I cannot cause outcomes but I can cause others to recognize that there are views different from theirs. Even if, in spite of Mill, the public appearance of my views were to have no further consequences, even if it did not cause others to reconsider their reasons, I assert my agency merely by having them recorded, counted, in the public sphere. Whether others would consider them or not is up to them; all I can do is to make my views public. But this I can do. The value of choice is that I can cause my views to enter the public realm. Thus, even when one’s vote has no effect on the collective decision, voting for one’s preferred outcome is an assertion of being able to cause. There is a difference between my views being counted, if only to be found in aminority, and my views not being counted at all. The mother of a friend of mine tells the story of her first electoral participation, as a young woman in a small town in Kansas: She cast a vote for Norman Thomas, only to read next morning in the local newspaper that the vote count under the socialist candidate was zero. She spent the rest of her life as a political activist, not because she was under an illusion that she would bring socialism to theUnited States, but because she was a socialist and being counted as one was an assertion of her agency.

### **In educational forums we have a unique obligation to scrutinize our organizational structures and maximize choice—**

Schostak 11

John Schostak is currently a researcher at the Education And Social Research Institute, Manchester Metropolitan University

Wikileaks, Tahrir Square – their significance for re-thinking democracy

http://www.enquirylearning.net/ELU/politics/tahrirwikileaks.html

Freedom with equality21 is fundamental for the imagination and expression of alternatives as the basis for critiques of present local circumstances and global historical conjunctures22. Freedom with equality makes a radical demand. Without freedom only a limited range of approved views can be heard - hence not all views are equally available for debate. Without equality, minority views, critical views can be overruled, hence their freedom to be heard and taken into account in debate negated. Thus there is a critical demand on education and research to scrutinise under the principle of freedom with equality the governance, administration and organisational structures adopted by policy makers by which they impose their will upon people across the whole range of spaces and places involving all forms of collective work, play, the expression of views, the exchange of goods and services, and engagement in action in everyday life. All governance, administration and organisational structures must be continually challenged by both research and education, if they are to sustain the exercise of reason, expression of views, the imagination of alternatives, the voicing of experience, debate as a basis of decision making and collective engagement in action under conditions for freedom with equality in all matters. Neither education nor research, on this principle, can be a client of a particular group expressing interests that require the repression or subservience of other groups and individuals. Thus education and research, on this principle, is radically open to the voices of all. Under these conditions subservience and the injustices experienced that have been variously constructed historically and maintained throughout the economic, political, social, cultural, religious spheres of community life by force or the threat of force cannot continue without challenge in public. Without a radically and dynamically open political organisation voices will be excluded and thus injustices unheard. Thus the work of education and research involves the continual creation of the conditions to include new voices in public spaces of debate, decision making and action23. But education and research arc not the preserve of specialists. It is the unfinished and unfinishablc work of all. It is here, I think, in this work of education and research where we find our Tahrir Square, a no-space of democracy always creating the place of its emergence in every act of engagement with others. It here that wc can construct the forms of democratic organisation in every sphere of life that arc the countervailing powers to Power.

candidate was zero. She spent the rest of her life as a political activist, not because she was under an illusion that she would bring socialism to the United States, but because she was a socialist and being counted as one was an assertion of her agency.

### Embracing dissent is vital to agonistic debate

Ivie 07

Robert Ivie, Professor of American Studies & Communication and Culture Member of the Interdepartmental Graduate Committee on Mythology Studies; Adjunct Faculty Member in the Cultural Studies Program Indiana University, Dissent from war google books

Constructive dissent from war is difficult but not infeasible for ordinary citizens doing what they can to promote peace as a consideration of conscience. Accordingly, this book speaks to the matter of feasibility, of what can be done with effort by conscientious citizens, that is, what common people can do in common to inhibit war by adopting a humanizing strategy of political communication. The give and take of politics—the vibrant clash of opinion and the contestation of perspectives—is agonistic but not necessarily antagonistic. Indeed, political theorists such as Chantal Mouffe consider the basic challenge of pluralistic politics to be one of converting antagonistic into agonistic relations. In her words, "The aim of democratic politics should be to provide the framework through which conflicts can take the form of an agonistic confrontation among adversaries instead of manifesting themselves as an antagonistic struggle between enemies."14 Even as conflict and division define the human condition, Kenneth Burke stresses, we can develop strategies of identification along various dimensions of communication to bridge differences and increase tolerance. "Identification is compensatory to division," he maintains, in a world where communication is never absolute or perfect. Sustained effort backed by "richly humane" imagery can help us to understand better and value more highly "people in circumstances greatly different from our own.1'1\* The importance of cultivating a humanizing discourse of dissent would be difficult to overstate, especially since enemy-making war propaganda is designed to desensitize the public to the human attributes of adversaries by demonizing one side and deifying the other. Yet, anti-war dissent tends toward an idiom of negative criticism chiefly, if not exclusively, and a dehumanizing exercise in reverse recrimination that demonizes the nation at war and its leadership. This, too, is a polarizing discourse, which readily reverts to the alienating language of good and evil. To transcend the dilemma of recrimination is perhaps the greatest challenge of peacebuilding dissent. A public forced to choose between an absolute claim to national virtue and a bleak charge of collective malevolence is disinclined to the latter and thus disposed by default, if for no other reason, to stay the course of belligerence. The sharp criticism of an impending or present war, and of a warring regime, is an indispensable demonstration of nonconformity to the call to arms, but it is not the only gesture in a peacebuilding idiom of counter-persuasion. A second gesture, an expression of humanizing solidarity, is required to escape the downward pull of reciprocal recrimination. The double gesture of peacebuilding dissent from war—of nonconforming solidarity—transcends competing attributions of evil by redirecting our attention to the human realm of error, imperfection, limited perspective, and the greater need for tolerance and reconciliation. Thus, at its best, dissent is a nonconforming expression of humanizing solidarity. That, at least, is the argument of the book. My aim is to focus attention on dissent from war as a viable and healthy practice of democratic citizenship. We are "democracy's children," in John McGowan's words, "called into existence in plural societies in which freedom of speech and the press combines with wide-open debate among competing visions of the good life [and| the good polity."16 To champion democracy is to remain vigilant against the suppression of dissent but also to promote the best practices of dissent. Thus, it is especially important during periods of crisis and an ongoing global war on terrorism to examine—even interrogate—the cultural status, political role, and rhetorical characteristics of dissent as a vital democratic practice in the US. Dissent is critical to holding ambitious governments and misguided policies accountable to public scrutiny and democratic standards. Without open debate, government defaults to secrecy, repression, and extremism in the name of national security. As Cass Sunstein argues, freedom of speech is a safeguard against senseless conformity; a culture of free speech is the foundation of democratic self-government; and dissent within the polity is a protection against ideological extremism, political polarization, and unchecked power. Thus, "well-functioning societies take steps to... promote dissent."17 A healthy democracy encourages wide criticism and robust debate. It fosters a culture of constructive contestation that respects diversity of opinion and variations in perspective on matters of political judgment. It values dissent for questioning and contesting the views that most people hold at any given point in time. Consistent with the nation's commitment to the democratic principle of collective self-government, dissent is opposed to political orthodoxy. As Steven Shiffrin observes, "The commitment to sponsor dissent assumes that societal pressures to conform are strong and that incentives to keep quiet are often great."18 The democratic value of dissent, then, consists largely of honoring, protecting, and practicing "speech that criticizes customs, habits, traditions, institutions, or authorities."1\* This is especially the case, Nancy Chang insists, when the nation's security is threatened and the temptation is greatest to curtail freedom of speech.20 Thus, it is particularly important for a democratic people to understand what is at stake when dissent from war is curbed, to recognize such dissent as an everyday practice of responsible citizenship and productive deliberation—not as something to be despised and marked as strange, disloyal, or threatening—and to explore how dissent can help to address a crisis of terror in today's volatile world.

Pushing standard approaches to advocacy destroys portable dissent skills

Gordon 09

Mordechai Gordon Quinnipiac University, Hamden, CT, M. Gordon (ed.), Reclaiming Dissent: Civics Education for the 21st Century, 11–26. © 2009 https://www.sensepublishers.com/files/9789087908867PR.pdf

This book focuses on the value of dissent for the survival of our democracy and the role that education and schooling can play with respect to this virtue. The idea for this book comes out of my interest in politics and education and my deep concern about the erosion of democracy in the United States in the last several decades. One of the most striking characteristics of this erosion is the fact that dissent is discouraged and even suppressed in the mainstream media, in our public schools, and in public debates in general. Particularly troubling is the way in which conservative leaders and groups are pushing schools to support their reactionary agenda, one that emphasizes standardization, traditional notions of authority, and blind patriotism. Such an agenda undermines the development of those skills and facilities students need to become critical and active citizens in a democracy. As a result, the meaning and value of dissent for the life of a democracy is lost upon most students and citizens in the United States. Indeed, as one of the key democratic virtues, dissent seems to be all but forgotten in this country.

### Dissent against majority opinion is essential

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In particular, we need to take a serious look at the dangers that the lack of dissent in the United States poses to the strength of our public schools, the power of our free press, and the integrity of our political institutions. By dissent, I mean the rejection of the views that the majority of people hold. To dissent implies to disagree with or withhold consent from a proposal, law, or an action of a government or a group of people in power. Dissent is usually associated with difference of opinion, disagreement and nonconformity with conventional views or sentiments. The list of famous dissidents includes people such as Gandhi, Martin Luther, Rosa Parks, and Salman Rushdie, to mention only a few. These dissidents were individuals who were willing to sacrifice personal comfort and security for the sake of exposing some serious social problem and establishing a more humane and democratic society.

### Turn, conformity to norms of a community crush dissent

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In light of Socrates’ experience, we can see that dissent is frequently related to critical thinking and the search for truth. This is not to say that every dissident is a person who is committed to thinking and finding the truth. Yet historically speaking, dissidents were more often than not people who questioned popular beliefs and refused to take things for granted (e.g. Galileo, Martin Luther King and Nelson Mandela). Moreover, for Socrates, dissent implies a willingness to stand tough against popular beliefs and an eagerness to defend the truth at all cost. In this view, dissent and disagreement are preferable to consent and conformity because the former are likely to lead to a deeper understanding of complex issues like the nature of the good life and whether or not the United States should have attacked Iraq. Consent and conformity, on the other hand, have historically led people to support misguided practices, unethical policies, and even criminal acts (the Holocaust is a case in point)4.

### Dissent is on balance better for the community

Gordon 09

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Conformists, on the other hand, can deprive the public of invaluable information and even tacitly support criminal acts. Cass Sunstein (2003) summarizes this point well: Conformists are often thought to be protective of social interests, keeping quiet for the sake of the group. By contrast, dissenters tend to be seen as selfish individualists, embarking on projects of their own. But in an important sense, the opposite is closer to the truth. Much of the time, dissenters benefit others, while conformists benefit themselves. If people threaten to blow the whistle on wrongdoing or disclose facts that contradict an emerging group consensus, they might well be punished. Perhaps they will lose their jobs, face ostracism, or at least have some difficult months. (p. 6) Dissenters are important for democratic societies not only because they expose various dangerous truths but also because they often speak out and struggle against unjust laws and practices. Here, I think, the example of Henry David Thoreau is instructive. In an introduction to a collection of Thoreau’s writings, Joseph Wood Krutch notes that the slavery question drove Thoreau, who in the earlier part of his life would have been inclined to withdraw from society and immerse himself in nature, to fight against this grave injustice: “To Thoreau, who cherished individual freedom as the most precious of human rights, slavery could not but be the blackest of evils, and so, in time, he was to find himself somewhat incongruously enrolled among the defenders of the active abolitionists” (Thoreau, 1962, p. 13).

### Embracing dissent and rejecting conformity improves any community

Gordon 09

Mordechai Gordon Quinnipiac University, Hamden, CT, M. Gordon (ed.), Reclaiming Dissent: Civics Education for the 21st Century, 11–26. © 2009 https://www.sensepublishers.com/files/9789087908867PR.pdf

As Sunstein writes,

Diversity, openness, and dissent reveal actual and incipient problems. They improve society’s pool of information and make it more likely that serious issues will be addressed. I do not deny that great suffering can be found in democracies as elsewhere. There is no guarantee, from civil liberties alone, that such suffering will be minimized… But at least it can be said that a society which permits dissent and does not impose conformity is in a far better position to be aware of, and to correct, serious social problems. (p. 149)

## \*\*\*\*2AC\*\*\*\*

## Agonism K

They musta gone crazy reading this evidence- their attempt to quell our act of dissent is hostile to life- it’s the imposition of the universal sovereignty of the topic community and a refusal to accept our dissent

Christa Davis Acampora 2, Professor of Philosophy at Hunter College of the City University of New York, Fall 2002, “Of Dangerous Games and Dastardly Deeds,” International Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 34, No. 3

Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals, a Streitschrift—a polemic, a writing that aims to provoke a certain kind of fighting—portrays a battle between "the two opposing values 'good and bad,' 'good and evil'." Nietzsche depicts slavish morality as that which condemns as evil what perpetuates the agon—namely, self-interest, jealousy, and the desire to legislate values— but rather than killing off the desire to struggle, slavish morality manipulates and redirects it. Prevention of struggle is considered by Nietzsche to be hostile to life: an "order thought of as sovereign and universal, not as a means in the struggle between power-complexes but as a means of preventing all struggle in general—... would be a principle hostile to life, an agent of the dissolution and destruction of man, an attempt to assassinate the future of man, a sign of weariness, a secret path to nothingness" (GM II:11). "The 'evolution' of a thing, a custom, an organ is [...] a succession of [...] more or less mutually independent processes of subduing, plus the resistances they encounter, the attempts at transformation for the purpose of defense and reaction, and the results of successful counteractions"(GM II:12). For Nietzsche, human beings, like nations, acquire their identity in their histories of struggles, accomplishments, and moments of resistance. The complete cessation of strife, for Nietzsche, robs a being of its activity, of its life.

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And, they lead to cessation of politics to expediency- we lead to challenging that expedient frame and the most effective methods for engagement

Walt 11 – Stephen M. Walt, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, July 21, 2011, “International Affairs and the Public Sphere,” online: <http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/>

Furthermore, if academic scholars made a practice of asking practitioners what topics or questions might be most interesting or useful, the benefits for both communities might be considerable. For instance, what if people with real-world experience were regarded not just as potential consumers of scholarship or as data points in a survey, but as a source of guidance about scholarly research agendas, methods, and modes of presentation? Instead of deriving dissertation topics or research ideas primarily from lacunae in the academic literature, we could also ask policymakers what sorts of knowledge they would most like to have, or what recurring puzzles merit extended scholarly attention. Among other things, outside experts are more likely to ask “so what?” when confronted by an elegant and well-crafted study addressing a question that is of interest to hardly anyone. In the same spirit, we could also encourage students to plumb real-world policy debates in order to identify underlying theoretical or empirical disputes that drive policy disagreements. Obviously, scholars should still develop their own research agendas and not take their marching orders from non-academics blindly, but more extensive dialogue between the worlds of theory and of practice at the initial stages of a research project could improve the overall quality of the research itself and make it more likely that policymakers would pay attention to the results.

### Not unique--Agonistic debate is not required to develop portable critical thinking skills

Westbrook 02

B. Evelyn Westbrook- PhD Rhetoric University of Texas

Debating Both Sides: What

Nineteenth-Century College Literary Societies Can Teach Us about Critical Pedagogies,

Rhetoric Review, 21:4, 339-356 Taylor Francis

The two claims critical pedagogues often make—that agonistic debate challenges both dominant ideologies and students’ beliefs—incite a range of criticisms. Critical of the first claim, Graff objects to what he sees as critical pedagogies’ “predetermined outcome”—the assumption that “the unleashing of critique in the classroom ultimately leads to the unmasking of domination and disenfranchisement” (Jay and Graff 206–07). Beyond being skeptical that conflict and debate will inevitably lead to a critique of the status quo, Graff and Jay are concerned that in their pursuit of social justice, some critical pedagogues might stifle true debate and impose leftist ideologies on their students. While sympathetic to the goals of critical pedagogies, Ellen Cushman questions whether classrooms can ever be sites of social change: She argues that because of their insular focus on the classroom, critical pedagogies offer little of political or social relevance to communities beyond the academy. And skeptical of the second claim, that treating the classroom as a contact zone challenges students’ own beliefs, Joseph Harris fears that importing difference and conflict from readings can balkanize classrooms, polarize debates, and lock students into fixed affinities. Furthermore, Stephen Fishman and Lucille Parkinson McCarthy contend that social critique and student change can take place in Deweyan classrooms that stress cooperation rather than confrontation. Moreover, A. Suresh Canagarajah argues that in “safe houses” rather than contact zones, disenfranchised students may better develop “meta-pedagogical awareness” and achieve the critical distance necessary to both resist and participate in academic discourse.

### Empirically false—Studies of southern literary societies that engaged in switch side debate did not change participants attitudes about slavery; and, the type of switch side arguing in a debate round is strategic switch side for the purpose of a win, not reflective switch side to discover truth

Westbrook 02

B. Evelyn Westbrook- PhD Rhetoric University of Texas

Debating Both Sides: What

Nineteenth-Century College Literary Societies Can Teach Us about Critical Pedagogies,

Rhetoric Review, 21:4, 339-356 Taylor Francis

If societies like the Athenian and Clariosophic did, in fact, train students for public office, how did they influence students to think about the issues they debated? Did students regard debates as contests to be won, diversions from otherwise banal studies, or sincere inquiries into issues of public consequences? Asking these questions of South Carolina College’s Clariosophic Society, which like most other antebellum societies was at its peak before the Civil War, gives us the chance to see members debate particularly passionate political issues at a critical moment in American history (Harding 179). Furthermore, these questions are worth asking of nineteenth-century literary societies like South Carolina’s Clariosophic Society not only because they can provide us with a more complete picture of nineteenth-century rhetorical education but also because they allow us through historical analogy to look critically at today’s writing pedagogies that similarly foreground agonistic debate. The Radical Potential of the Clariosophic Society As war clouds gathered before the Civil War, literary societies all over the United States, but especially in the stronghold of the Confederate South, grappled with serious public questions. South Carolina College’s Clariosophic Society was no exception. Like other southern societies (and like most of their northern and western counterparts), members of the Clariosophic Society vigorously debated contemporary social and political questions, including slavery and secession (Harding 193). In fact, Clariosophics debated so many political questions that one member, Maxcy Gregg, complained in his 1835 valedictory speech of the society’s preoccupation with “politics of the day.” Indeed, of the 135 questions debated between 1842 and 1847, 53 dealt explicitly with contemporary local, national, or international politics.5 Because societies were forums wherein students debated issues of the day, it is tempting to characterize them as instruments of change in a reform era. Indeed, some scholars have (Frederick Rudolph; Richard Hofstadter). However, Rita Saslaw reminds us that college literary societies were extensions of conservative and elite institutions of higher education and therefore assumed the role of preserving the values of society for future generations. Furthermore, except at progressive schools like Oberlin, antebellum literary societies were open only to the most privileged white males. And even at Oberlin, Saslaw argues, societies “did not fill the role of a forum for social activism” but “merely succeeded in providing a protected arena for the discussion of political, philosophical, religious, and historical topics” (200, 201). If debating divisive political and social issues in the composition classroom fosters social critique, as some contend, then we might expect members of the Clariosophic Society to occasionally challenge conventional wisdom and hegemonic ideologies. Because Clariosophics’ votes indicated “their own private feelings as to the question discussed,” society minutes, which record the decisions reached on questions debated, can serve as a barometer of student opinion (Hollis 235). Thomas Harding explains that “as most questions [for debate] were settled by popular vote and the votes recorded, the decisions furnish a first-hand account of what Southern college boys were thinking about in the years that witnessed the disruption of the Union” (193). Furthermore, Harding observes that in the decades immediately preceding the Civil War, “the decisions of the Southern college societies were generally in line with the prevailing attitude toward slavery in the South” (Harding 194).6 Clariosophics’ votes on questions debated between 1842 and 1847 suggest, indeed, that even though societies encouraged discussions of contemporary questions, members consistently reaffirmed dominant Carolinian ideologies and political sentiments rather than critiquing them.7 As historians like Robert Forbes have noted, South Carolinians were “the Americans most dedicated to preserving [slavery]” (81), and South Carolina was what historian Manisha Sinha calls “the secessionist state par excellence” (187). It’s no surprise, then, that in their debates Clariosophic members doggedly upheld Confederate positions regarding slavery and secession: • Is the spirit of liberty higher in countries where there are slaves or where there are none? (debated March 12, 1842, and decided affirmatively8) • Situated as we are should our slaves be debased the means of knowledge? (debated January 7, 1843, and decided affirmatively) • Has a state the right to secede from the Union? (argued on October 31, 1846, and decided affirmatively) • Is it likely that slavery will be eventually abolished? (argued on February 19, 1848, and decided negatively) The Clariosophics’ proslavery and secessionist positions reflect how deeply embedded racial slavery was in Carolinian ideology and politics: In their disapproval of providing slaves “the means of knowledge,” Clariosophics sided with Carolina’s planter politicians, who, fearing insurrection, were reluctant to permit Methodist ministers or missionaries to instruct or preach to their slaves (Ambrose 56). Furthermore, the society’s affirmative decision on the question, “Is the spirit of liberty higher in countries where there are slaves or where there are none?” reflects a characteristic Confederate defense of slavery: Historian Robert Forbes claims that Southern supporters of slavery often stigmatized challenges to slavery as threats to liberty, especially the right to property (81). The liberties and rights of white, propertied men were not surprisingly upheld by members of the Clariosophic Society who debated such questions as: • Is it not an infringement upon the inalienable rights of man for government to prohibit expatriation? (argued on February 7, 1846, and decided affirmatively) • Is our right to property natural or the gift of Government? (argued March 20, 1847, and decided affirmatively) • Is the right of making wills a natural right? (argued March 27, 1847, and decided affirmatively) • Is the free agency of man compatible with the necessary order of things? (argued on November 7, 1846, and decided affirmatively) Clariosophics routinely defend the white man’s “inalienable” rights to property and citizenship. Although championing freedoms and securing individuals’ rights may seem inconsistent with proslavery positions, these sentiments also acted, as Forbes explains, as “safeguards to slavery” (70): Man’s “natural right” to property implied that slavery was the white man’s natural right. Despite Clariosophics’ staunch defense of the white man’s right to property, Clariosophics paradoxically denied a father the right to will his estate to his daughter: On the question “Ought a man to have the right of entailing all his property on his daughter?” (argued on February 5, 1842), Clariosophics decided negatively. In fact, between 1842 and 1847, members upheld sexist ideologies in all four questions (including the one listed above) that considered women’s rights and liberties: • Have the sexes naturally equal minds? (debated on May 2, 1846, and decided negatively) • Do the duties of women in Society demand for her a college Education? (argued April 3, 1847, and decided negatively) • Is the female mind naturally inferior to that of man? (considered on December 4, 1847, and decided affirmatively) Time and again, society members denied women’s rights to property and education and defended a patriarchal social order. Furthermore, despite growing awareness of the masterful female orators of the day—like South Carolina’s own Grimké sisters—Clariosophics insisted on women’s intellectual inferiority. Racism and sexism in South Carolina were, Sinha posits, two sides of the same coin: “Just as belief in race and class inequality complemented each other in Carolinian proslavery discourse, the justification of racial slavery led slavery ideologues to champion gender inequality” (90). Sinha contends, in fact, that racial, gender, and class inequality formed the ideological foundation of antebellum South Carolina’s peculiarly antidemocratic political structure. Their vindication of slavery, argues Sinha, caused Carolinian planter politicians to question the democratic ideals of universal liberty and equality, a challenge to the Declaration of Independence and to natural-rights theory that Sinha calls “counterrevolutionary.” For instance, proslavery theorists like Alfred Huger, David Gavin, and Albert Taylor Bledsoe blamed democracy and “the cult of egalitarianism” for slaveholders’ troubles (Sinha 225). And some Carolina planter politicians like James Henry Hammond went so far as to describe South Carolina’s government as an aristocracy (Sinha 226). The antidemocratic, counterrevolutionary rhetoric that Sinha documents is also reflected in many of the Clariosophics’ decisions: • Had the National Convention of France the right to depose Louis XVI? (debated on January 1, 1843, and decided negatively) • Ought the terms of Judgeship to be limited to a certainage? (argued on January 8, 1843, and decided negatively) • Was Cromwell an honest politician? (argued on November 22, 1845, and decided negatively) • Was the execution of Charles I justifiable? (argued January 17, 1846, and decided negatively) • Is an elective or hereditary monarchy better calculated to advance national prosperity? (argued on March 21, 1846, and decided negatively) • Was Brutus justified in assassinating Caesar? (argued on May 15, 1846, and decided negatively) • Is the primogeniture system a beneficial one to a nation? (argued on May 23, 1846, and decided negatively) • Should the Governor of our State be elected by the Legislature or the people? (argued on May 30, 1846, and decided affirmatively) • Should our Congressmen be governed by their own sentiments or by those of their constituents? (argued on November 2, 1846, and decided affirmatively) • Are the people more easily corrupted than the Legislature? (argued on January 9, 1847, and decided negatively) • Was the administration of Cromwell beneficial to liberty? (argued on January 15, 1847, and decided negatively) Debating Both Sides 347 Downloaded by Clariosophics favored laws that would extend public figures’ terms in office. They also preferred rule by an elite rather than by the people, even though they felt that the public was less vulnerable to corruption. And although they voted against the primogeniture system, members preferred a hereditary monarchy to elected representatives. What’s more, they defended monarchs like Louis XVI and Charles I and emperors like Julius Caesar while criticizing Brutus and Cromwell. In short, then, even though society debates provided a forum for airing divisive political and social issues, members of the Clariosophic Society consistently voted to uphold Carolinian proslavery, antidemocratic, and separatist positions. Furthermore, though these debates were politically charged, they may have been regarded as purely academic exercises that were ultimately irrelevant in political spheres. Indeed, this is what Charleston planter Hugh Legare implied when he dismissed the question of whether to justify or condemn slavery on principles of natural law, calling it “a very good thesis for young casuists to discuss in the college moot-club,” but one that he and his fellow politicians would not undertake “for we have no taste for abstractions” (qtd. in Forbes 93).

### Continuing

Another reason that societies may have failed to operate as forums for cultural and political critique is their emphasis on competition over inquiry. As Clariosophic Maxcy Gregg put it, students may have been “arguing for victory, instead of inquiring for truth.” Without much at stake in questioning the status quo, members could dramatize radical ideas while keeping a safe distance from the subversive politics they advocated. And after it all, they could slide back into their comfortable positions and even pat themselves on the back for having argued “the other side.” In today’s universities, where “diversity” is the watchword, few students could get away with the kind of blatant sexism and racism that the Clariosophics flaunted. Nevertheless, students today can still assume subversive positions for the sake of a grade, earn their mark, and then retreat to their former ideologies, feeling liberalized by the process. In fact, in “Community Service and Critical Teaching,” Bruce Herzberg shares his colleague’s experience of overhearing students admit to feigning exactly this kind of enlightenment in order to earn an “easy A” in a service-learning course (309). The critical question, then, is how to convince students—especially privileged ones—that more than their grades are at stake in classroom exercises that ask them to put their ideas and ideologies on the line.

## Framework

Our advocacy is a dissent against framework and a dissent against being forced to defend a resolution that was the product of a flawed selection process—The 1ac is a disad to their framework argument—They leverage the norms of switch side debate to force conformity to a particular form of debate and suppress our dissent—Their advocacy is to punish our act of dissent by voting against us to deter other debaters from dissenting against the switch side framework in other rounds

Their obsession with framework eliminates the pedagogical benefit of debate

A.) Switch-side debate-

We control the uniqueness- focus on which agency does the plan means the neg ignores the resolutional question in favor of certainty PIC’s, agent counterplans and politics DA’s- never really switch sides on the topic

### **Their authors advocate consistent moral advocacy, not switch side and open listening to the ideas of others**

Berkowitz 96

Peter Berkowitz, Professor of Government at Harvard The New Republic, NOVEMBER 25, 1996 Copyright 1996, The New Republic, Inc. p. 36 T HE DEBATING SOCIETY Review of Democracy and Disagreement: Why Moral Conflict Cannot Be Avoided In Politics, and What Should Be Done About It by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson http://www.peterberkowitz.com/debatingsociety.html

Gutmann and Thompson themselves argue that deliberative democracy depends upon what they variously refer to as the principles or virtues of "civic integrity" and "civic magnanimity." Civic integrity involves consistent affirmation of one's moral principles, honoring them in practice and embracing all their implications, the uncongenial ones included. Civic magnanimity calls for the readiness to recognize the moral principle underlying one's opponent's argument and the disposition to consider a rival's view with an open mind. But Gutmann and Thompson neither consider how rare these virtues are (even in the universities, the institution in our society especially dedicated to rational argument) nor the implications of their rarity for the organization of democratic politics.

Roberts-Miller

It says using rules to exclude voices leads to genocide—not that if Eichman had been a switch side debater he would not have committed genocide. It advocates open minded listening to the arguments of others not switch side arguing.

### Turn--Their author argues that genocide comes from enforcing procedural rules and the solution is to listen openly to the ideas of others.

Roberts-Miller 2

Patricia Roberts-Miller 2 is Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Texas Fighting Without Hatred: Hannah Arendt's Agonistic Rhetoric http://www.jaconlinejournal.com/archives/vol22.3/miller-fighting.pdf

Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorbing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slogans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful thoughtfulness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who mayor may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences--<>r, at least, resist the modem tendency toward totalitarianismby thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herselfto become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated contemplation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for representative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from 'all others. '" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers: they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed.

### Enforcing conformity through procedural framework rules leads to genocide—listening to others arguments is anti-authoritarian—excluding arguments is authoritarian

Roberts-Miller 2

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Arendt's own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how the system could be actively moral. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the evil of conformity-the fact that the modem bureaucratic state makes possible extraordinary evil carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill undermines the political force of conformity, so it is a force against the bureaucratizing of evil. If people think for themselves, they will resist dogma; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, they will resist totalitarianism. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another-that is, engage in rhetoric-then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action.

### **And, Eichmann is an example of the result of bureaucratic focus- we must challenge the limits of practicality**

Bohler-Muller, 2k9 (Narnia, Prof of Law @ Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, “The Justice of the Heart in *Little Brother*”, *Entertainment and Sports Law*, vol 7 no 2, http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/eslj/issues/volume7/number2/bohler\_muller/

So, in the light of the successful implementation of his plans, Eichmann fails to understand the legal and ethical implications of his actions: He was just a technician, he insisted, who found the most efficient solution to the problem assigned him. Wasn‟ t he doing what any good bureaucrat would do? So why was he being singled out and accused? (Murakami, 2005, p. 172) Just as the executioner in Kafka‟s *Penal Colony*, Eichmann is a technocrat who admires efficiency and 31 works towards ensuring the smooth running of the well-oiled Nazi Machine. He is a „practical guy‟. In a note written in the book read by Kafka Tamura, his friend, Oshima, reflects (as Arendt does) on the relationship between imagination and responsibility and surmises that Eichmann was capable of doing what he did due to his obvious lack of imagination and, therefore, his inability to take responsibility forso many deaths: It‟s all a question of imagination. Our responsibility begins with the power to imagine. It‟s just as Yeats said: In dreams begin responsibility. Turn this on its head and you can say that where there‟s no power to imagine, no responsibility can arise. Just as we see with Eichmann. (Marukami, 2005, pp. 171-172). These examples, both literary and real, found in *Little Brother’s* courtroom, Kafka‟s colony and 32 Eichmann‟s trial, illustrate that it is the *failure of imagination* that leads to the worship of the efficiencyof the machine. Where there is no power to imagine or to dream, no responsibility can arise. Frendon‟s pending death is depicted as part of a losing game against a machine, the penal colony executioner is so enamoured with the technical abilities of his machine that he is unable to imagine the pain it causes, and Eichmann sees himself as a cog in a machine and not as a man responsible for causing the suffering and death of millions of fellow human beings

B.) Agency- converts politics into a game the privileged play- people acting at a local level aren’t allowed to participate in politics beyond the ballot box- this makes civic engagement unattractive and turns debaters into handmaidens of powerful interests

Walt 11 – Stephen M. Walt, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, July 21, 2011, “International Affairs and the Public Sphere,” online: <http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/>

While there is an obvious problem with the “cult of irrelevance,” in short, there is also a danger that academic scholars can become little more than hired guns; handmaidens to powerful interests instead of pursuers and proclaimers of truth. And if that happens, then academia’s unique ability to serve as an independent and critical source of authoritative knowledge will be impaired. In short, no matter how much we may want academics to be more fully engaged in the public sphere, we should also acknowledge that it is hard to have the best of both worlds.[[17]](http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/%22%20%5Cl%20%22foot_17)

C.) Democracy- only our democratic classroom allows us to craft effective policy- focus on hypertechnical details of implementation divorces the debate from questions that allow us to create international coalitions.

### D.) Dissent- the aff takes the role of cultural critic- allows us to criticize existing policy and the debate community to expose their shortcomings- that’s critical to raise awareness of issues that have been silenced- it’s not a question of solvency- dissent allows us to build solidarity and create agency

### We control the internal link to portable skills- dissent skills are essential

Stitzlein 12

SARAH M. STITZLEIN is Assistant Professor of Philosophy of Education and a core faculty member of the Women’s Studies Department at the University of New Hampshire THE RIGHT TO DISSENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOOLING Educational TheoryVolume 62, Issue 1, Article first published online: 16 JAN 2012

Unfortunately, history has shown us that the well-being of oppressed groups is often not elevated until a strong dissenter or a multitude of dissenters working together attract attention. Learning the skills of dissent — including the arts of verbal persuasion, consciousness-raising, coalition building, and others — is necessary for students to be able to secure their own justice and equality or that of others. For, if they do not know how to articulate their needs or do not know how to express dissatisfaction with policies and practices, then they cannot fully invoke democracy or pursue happiness.

### Our dissent turn turns all of their offense—Dissent against normative rules leads to better switch side thinking

Feinberg & Nemeth 08

Matthew Feinberg and Charlan J. Nemeth Department of Psychology University of California, Berkeley Institute for Research on Labor and Employment The “Rules” of Brainstorming: An Impediment to Creativity? http://www.irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/167-08.pdf

In contrast to such literature, there is some theoretical reasons and recent evidence to suggest that these rules and, in particular, the rule “not to criticize” may actually inhibit creativity. Rather, there is evidence of the value of debate even criticism in the stimulation of creative thought. A variety of studies demonstrates that exposure to a persistent minority dissenter sparks more flexible, open-minded, and multi-perspective thinking which, in turn, produces less conformist and more creative outcomes (e.g., Peterson & Nemeth, 1996; Nemeth & Chiles, 1988; Nemeth & Kwan, 1985). This line of research maintains that the benefits of dissent stem from the cognitive conflict it generates; the dissent compels those in the majority to search for possible explanations as to why the dissenter is willing to openly disagree and suffer the rejection that often accompanies such disagreement. This search for explanations then fosters thinking on all sides of the issue (Nemeth, 2003). People search for information on all sides of the issue, use multiple strategies in problem solving and detect solutions that otherwise would have gone undetected (Nemeth, 1995).

### Switch Side debating undermines advocacy skills- teaches us to be too ambivalent to advocate

Lammenranta 08

Markus Lammenranta Prof Department of Philosophy University of Helsinki The Pyrrhonian Problematic http://www.helsinki.fi/teoretiskfilosofi/personal/Lammenranta/Lammenranta\_The+Pyrrhonian+Problematic.pdf

There is another common way of understanding the Pyrrhonian problematic. As scholars of Hellenistic philosophy emphasize, ancient skeptics used to argue both for and against a proposition. Because the arguments are of equal force, we are unable to decide whether the proposition is true or false. Here the problem is seen to be practical or psychological rather than theoretical. We are unable to decide between the alternatives because they are equally plausible. It is the skeptics’ ability to find such equipollent oppositions that leads them to suspend all belief.

Limits-

### The “minimal restriction” Glover endorses is treating opponents with civility, not procedural framework rules to eliminate their arguments

### And specifically concludes that agonism cannot allow us to procedurally exclude the aff

Same Glover 12

Robert Glover is Professor of Political Science Univ of Maine Games without frontiers? Democratic engagement, agonistic pluralism and the question of exclusion Philosophy Social Criticism January 2012 vol. 38 no. 1 81-104

Before examining the how agonistic pluralism responds to these reconceptualizations of democratic engagement, let us first examine the characteristics agonistic pluralist thinkers share. First, agonistic thinkers are hesitant to place any aspect of our shared political lives beyond the contentious terrain of a radically democratic politics, and are equally wary of the invocation of under-scrutinized notions of 'public interest' and the "common good'. Like interest group pluralists before them, agonists seek to harness the discord and tumult of social and political life. Agonism calls upon us to resist, '...confin|ingl politics (conceptually and territorially) to the juridical, administrative, or regulative tasks of stabilizing moral and political subjects, building consensus, maintaining agreements, or consolidating communities and identities.\*52 Similarly, nearly all agonists advance 'the recovery of a strong participatory idea of citizenship\*, albeit one that does not abandon the liberal emphasis on individual liberty, as the antidote to citizenship's reduction to a stable, fixed, and uncontested status.53 This view is based upon an understanding of politics that recognizes the consructive role of contentious democratic engagement while remaining acutely attentive to the social and cultural interdependence of identities/14 From an agonistic perspective, much within the attempts to revitalize democratic engagement examined is incomplete ordetlcient. As was noted, participatory democratic projects seek to uncover latent sources of unity and commonality, yet an agonistic lens reveals this as a subtly hegemonic undertaking which seeks the taming of democratic energies rather than the re-vitalization of democracy. A post-conflictual politics of the community constitutes an illusion, rooted in the idea that a universally shared conception of the good exists, carrying the desire for a 'reconciled society where pluralism would have been superceded...\*. Such unity blunts the diversity necessary to sustain a vibrant and contentious democratic community.56 Thus, the founding moment of such a democracy would also be the moment of its disintegration. The participatory conceptions of democracy insofar as they promote allegedly shared characteristics of community, actually negate the possibility of a politics receptive to modern pluralism—responsive to the claims of hitherto unrecognized and marginalized identities. Furthermore, from the standpoint of agonistic pluralism, our contemporary condition of deep pluralism is not simply a problem to be 'dealt with' or 'overcome' via the proper deliberative or discursive set of procedures. This stands in stark opposition to the overriding concern which animates many deliberative democratic theories. Agonism views difference as an axiological principle of our collective lives without which we could not speak of "the political'— defined by Mouffe as an inherently conflictual confrontation between a "we' and a 'they'.57 Agonism shifts the focus, from arriving at a concrete decision, to 'allowing] participants to express their own terms, albeit within the boundaries of civility. Within such a setting, democratic compromise remains possible, yet this should be viewed as a temporary respite in an ongoing confrontation, rather than a post-conflictual consensus/ Agonists generally agree that the goal of democratic spaces should not be the reduction of our democratic discourse to that upon which we could all agree, or in less restrictive deliberative variants, that which is accorded universal respect. Rather, the political is conceived of in terms of performative spaces in which potentially threatening confrontations between conflicting parties persist, yet are channeled in accordance with liberal democratic values of equality and liberty.60 In light of this, agonism 'allows dissent to remain open by reconfirming the provisionality of all political decisions and judgments...thereby implicating diverse adversaries in an ongoing need to pay attention to each other and the world they have in common/ The task becomes to embrace and welcome the contemporary eruption of difference, and to expand the register by which claims on behalf of difference can be voiced.62 In an agonistic conception of democratic engagement, Goi notes that, by appearing before one another on their own terms—using self-description and modes of expression that are not limited by the bounds of public reason, actors can be heard and seen and therefore can feel that they are recognized in the specificity of their identity as members of the polity.63 Thus, from an agonistic perspective there are reasons to be wary' of deliberative democracy's tendency to view deep pluralism as 'problematic', as well as the goal of designing deliberative institutions, and placing restrictions on democratic discourse which, \*to the extent that they were successful, | would| make any further political struggle, contestation or engagement unnecessary'.64 Agonism, to the extent that it represents a unified endeavor, is an attempt to 'pluralize\* modern pluralism, and bring such difference to the forefront of a radically engaged and contentious democratic discourse.65 Approaches designed to revitalize democratic engagement such as those discussed above are said to '[remainl too stingy, cramped, and defensive for the world we now inhabit.'66

All their theory arguments are silly- frameworks are inevitably arbitrary and not grounded in the resolution- simulation has no definitional foundation.

Shively

### The Shively evidence is over claimed—It only says we need to have an agreed vocabulary to have a debate—They know what we mean by the topic selection process—The idea that debate is impossible is nonsense—The Shively evidence is not support for a particular view of the resolution for debate to happen

### Lundberg

### Their impact evidence from Lundberg is about the benefits of debating in general – not from forced switch side debating

### Quotes from debate coaches on the value of switch side debate are meaningless—it is biased advocacy for a form of debate they prefer—there is no substantive research to support assertions that switch side debating creates better advocacy skills

Portable Skills

### There is no impact to their argument in this round—We have been doing switch side for 8 years and this round won’t undermine our portable skills—There is no spillover out of this round to other debaters

### Our arguments do not preclude switch side debate—They are the ones refusing to switch sides on our affirmative—They are choosing to make the debate only a framework debate.

### This is switch side for us—We have switched sides on the framework debate

### Their offense has no uniqueness—publicly arguing opposite positions in a debate round is not required to engage in two sided thinking, Their offense comes from two sided thinking, not from two sided arguing

### No solvency for their impact, anyone who is so far gone that they can’t think of opposing argument without being forced to publicly debate for them won’t benefit from being forced to play devils advocate against their beliefs

Yudkowsky 08

Eliezer Yudkowsky Research Fellow at the Singularity Institute June 2008 Against Devils Advocacy http://lesswrong.com/lw/r3/against\_devils\_advocacy/

Believe me, I understand the Traditional argument behind Devil's Advocacy. By arguing the opposing position, you increase your mental flexibility. You shake yourself out of your old shoes. You get a chance to gather evidence against your position, instead of arguing for it. You rotate things around, see them from a different viewpoint. Turnabout is fair play, so you turn about, to play fair. Perhaps this is what Michael Rose was thinking, when he accused Richard Dawkins of "moral rigidity". I surely don't mean to teach people to say: "Since I believe in fairies, I ought not to expect to find any good arguments against their existence, therefore I will not search because the mental effort has a low expected utility." That comes under the heading of: If you want to shoot your foot off, it is never the least bit difficult to do so. Maybe there are some stages of life, or some states of mind, in which you can be helped by trying to play Devil's Advocate. Students who have genuinely never thought of trying to search for arguments on both sides of an issue, may be helped by the notion of "Devil's Advocate". But with anyone in this state of mind, I would sooner begin by teaching them that policy debates should not appear one-sided. There is no expectation against having strong arguments on both sides of a policy debate; single actions have multiple consequences. If you can't think of strong arguments against your most precious favored policies, or strong arguments for policies that you hate but which other people endorse, then indeed, you very likely have a problem that could be described as "failing to see the other points of view". You, dear reader, are probably a sophisticated enough reasoner that if you manage to get yourself stuck in an advanced rut, dutifully playing Devil's Advocate won't get you out of it. You'll just subconsciously avoid any Devil's arguments that make you genuinely nervous, and then congratulate yourself for doing your duty. People at this level need stronger medicine. (So far I've only covered medium-strength medicine.) If you can bring yourself to a state of real doubt and genuine curiosity, there is no need for Devil's Advocacy. You can investigate the contrary position because you think it might be really genuinely true, not because you are playing games with time-traveling chocolate cakes. If you cannot find this trace of true doubt within yourself, can merely playing Devil's Advocate help you? I have no trouble thinking of arguments for why the Singularity won't happen for another 50 years. With some effort, I can make a case for why it might not happen in 100 years. I can also think of plausible-sounding scenarios in which the Singularity happens in two minutes, i.e., someone ran a covert research project and it is finishing right now. I can think of plausible arguments for 10-year, 20-year, 30-year, and 40-year timeframes. This is not because I am good at playing Devil's Advocate and coming up with clever arguments. It's because I really don't know. A true doubt exists in each case, and I can follow my doubt to find the source of a genuine argument. Or if you prefer: I really don't know, because I can come up with all these plausible arguments. On the other hand, it is really hard for me to visualize the proposition that there is no kind of mind substantially stronger than a human one. I have trouble believing that the human brain, which just barely suffices to run a technological civilization that can build a computer, is also the theoretical upper limit of effective intelligence. I cannot argue effectively for that, because I do not believe it. Or if you prefer, I do not believe it, because I cannot argue effectively for it. If you want that idea argued, find someone who really believes it. Since a very young age, I've been endeavoring to get away from those modes of thought where you can argue for just anything. In the state of mind and stage of life where you are trying to distinguish rationality from rationalization, and trying to tell the difference between weak arguments and strong arguments, Devil's Advocate cannot lead you to unfake modes of reasoning. Its only power is that it may perhaps show you the fake modes which operate equally well on any side, and tell you when you are uncertain. There is no chess grandmaster who can play only black, or only white; but in the battles of Reason, a soldier who fights with equal strength on any side has zero force. That's what Richard Dawkins understands that Michael Ruse doesn't - that Reason is not a game. Added: Brandon argues that Devil's Advocacy is most importantly a social rather than individual process, which aspect I confess I wasn't thinking about.

### Switch side debate does not develop portable analytic skills—it promotes overly simplistic understanding of arguments

Westbrook 02

B. Evelyn Westbrook- PhD Rhetoric University of Texas

Debating Both Sides: What Nineteenth-Century College Literary Societies Can Teach Us about Critical Pedagogies,

Rhetoric Review, 21:4, 339-356 Taylor Francis

Ted Lardner, Margaret Marshall, and Michael McClure have argued that pro–con argumentation reduces the complexity of social and political arguments. Similarly, Dennis Lynch, Diana George, and Marilyn Cooper worry that overemphasis on conflict and pro–con argumentation urges students to adopt simplified positions and encourages eristic debate at the expense of inquiry. The historical example of college literary societies may therefore help us to assess how well some kinds of agonism, specifically pro–con debate that compels students to argue from contrarian positions, serve the goals of critical pedagogies.

### Debating politics both sides and trying to be the team with the most links to extinction does not teach anything about how the political system works in the real world or how decisions should be made

### Debate switch side arguments which emphasize winning and losing are not a good model for teaching potable skills.

Herreid 96

Clyde F. Herreid is a Distinguished Teaching Professor in the department of biological sciences, State University of New York Structured Controversy: A Case Study Strategy DNA Fingerprinting in the Courts http://sciencecases.lib.buffalo.edu/cs/pdfs/Structured%20Controversy-XXVI-2.pdf

Formal debate technique is part of a lawyer’s arsenal. The seeds of the adversarial approach to problems are sewn in law school classrooms, nurtured in moot courtrooms, and reach full bloom in the criminal and civil courthouses of America. Whatever else it does, the adversarial system hones the wits of the participants and brings the issues of any problem into sharp focus. However, it leaves little room for compromise. Indeed, it seems the debaters are often more interested in winning the argument than seeking justice or truth. Furthermore, much of life is not a zero-sum game where there is a winner and a loser. Many would argue that cooperation and negotiation towards a compromise is a better model for life. In fact, many of the great debates in science ended with a compromise solution, which brings us to the technique at hand.

Voting Issue Debate

And, not extra-topical- begs the question of the purpose of debate- if debate is a search for the most effective methods of political engagement, then using the resolution as an arena to ground our examples rather than the sole focus of our politics is the only direct affirmation of the resolution. Plus, our plan text is explicitly topical.

And, framework is not a voting issue- we’ve met our topical burden of proof- its only a question of the framework for engagement with that topical plan

Debating about debate is inevitable- theory is substance, its just substance with local, competition-based impacts- framework discussions inevitable- there is no presumed framework for judging a debate, they lead to substantive confusion

### Breaking normative rules is key to creativity

Feinberg & Nemeth 08

Matthew Feinberg and Charlan J. Nemeth Department of Psychology University of California, Berkeley Institute for Research on Labor and Employment The “Rules” of Brainstorming: An Impediment to Creativity? http://www.irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/167-08.pdf

Nemeth et al. (2004) theorized that the “criticize” condition outperformed the “do not criticize” and the control conditions because the instructions to criticize liberated participants to more freely generate ideas. These instructions allowed for discussion that would otherwise have been kept in check, and such discussion led to more ideas and improvements on ideas. In addition, Nemeth et al. speculated that an atmosphere where criticism and debate are allowed, even expected, may also be liberating since such behavior is usually perceived as socially inappropriate and undesirable. Thus, such instructions may parallel rule-breaking or deviance which in and of itself may be liberating, stimulating, and creativity enhancing. One might infer from such an analysis that there is clear discord between rules and creative thinking, because rules may inhibit freedom of thought. Regarding brainstorming, one could then argue that the rules of brainstorming, being rules, may even impede group creativity.. In fact, rules for how to think creatively may be contradictory to the free and unbounded thinking that many argue are the foundations of creativity (Amabile 1988; Hill & Amabile, 1993; Kanter, 1988; Mednick, 1962; Sternberg & Lubart, 1993). Some research specifically shows the importance of freedom and liberty for creativity. Hill and Amabile (1993), for example, found that the most commonly cited stimulus for creativity was freedom among research and development scientists. By contrast, individuals who perceived their work environment as confining and constraining were less likely to manifest high levels of creativity (Amabile, Conti, Coon, Lazenby, & Herron, 1996. In fact, one might argue that rules are confining and constraining by definition and as such are obstacles to creativity because they promote standardization, reduced variation, and norm following (Olin & Wickenberg, 2001; Perrow, 1979.

### Even if in theory rules could increase creativity- Normative rules create pressure for conformity that unconsciously crush creativity

Feinberg & Nemeth 08

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Rules may also impair creativity at an unconscious level. As many cognitive psychologists have shown, subtle cues from the environment can prime specific goals, motivations, behaviors, and mental frameworks (for a review, see Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). If priming affects brainstorming cognitions, there is a strong likelihood that providing rules to follow might trigger a “rule-following” schema, or more generally, a “conventionality” or “conformity” schema which would be antithetical to creativity.

### Creativity is key to survival

Surrat 09

Olivier Serrat, Head of the Knowledge Management Center, Regional and Sustainable Development Department, Asian Development Bank http://www.adb.org/documents/information/knowledge-solutions/harnessing-creativity-and-innovation-in-the-workplace.pdf

Creativity has always been at the heart of human endeavor. Allied to innovation, which creates unexpected value, it is now recognized as central to organizational performance. (Some hold that the capacity to harness intellectual and social capital—and to convert that into novel and appropriate things—has become the critical organizational requirement of the age.) The shift to knowledge economies has been abrupt and there is a flurry of interest in creativity and innovation in the workplace. Innovation is considered, quite simply, an imperative for organizational survival. It may even be the key to some of the biggest challenges facing the world, such as global warming and sustainable development. Notwithstanding, we are still far from a theory of organizational creativity: the avenues for promising research that might contribute to its emergence are innumerable because of the increasing use of systems approaches and the growing number of agents involved in knowledge flows.2

### Fairness is a bad way to resolve the debate and it is a tool to mask the inherent unfairness of the system that exists- the aff is a prior question

Olson 02

Gary A. Olson is provost and vice president for academic affairs at Idaho State University

Justifying belief: Stanley Fish and the work of rhetoric

Central to liberal political philosophy is the notion that a just society is based on such principles as "fairness," principles that supposedly exist in the abstract, independent of any specific situation or context. We are all urged to pledge allegiance not to specific persons or desired outcomes but to abstract norms that remain detached from and neutral toward particular persons and that are indifferent to outcomes. A high premium is put on such abstractions as fairness, impartiality, merit, mutual respect, neutrality, and reasonableness. Such abstractions are thought to be capable of being defined in ways that allow them to remain free from partisan agendas and, thus, are thought to be capable of serving as the foundation of legal and political policies that favor no one person or group in particular but that respect all people and groups in general. While such efforts are well intentioned, they are doomed to fail, in Fish's estimation: The problem is that any attempt to define one of these abstractions—to give it content—will always and necessarily proceed from the vantage point of some currently unexamined assumptions about the way life is or should be, and it is those assumptions, contestable in fact but at the moment not contested or even acknowledged, that will really be generating the conclusions that are supposedly being generated by the logic of principle. (3) That is, whoever is attempting to define "fairness" or "mutual respect" or any other such principle will necessarily be doing so from a particular context, which includes one's personal system of values. It is impossible to rise above one's context in order to fill in the content of so-called neutral principles. Fairness, for example, will be defined differently by different people, and this abstraction will not be intelligible unless and until it is anchored in a specific standpoint. One person may feel that fairness means admitting someone to college solely of the basis of test scores, whereas another may feel that fairness means also taking into account the fact that a student comes from a context of poverty and disadvantage. No definition of fairness exists independent of the kind of conditions or substance that must be supplied by necessarily interested parties (since all parties are necessarily interested). Once some kind of substance is supplied, however, neutral principles by definition lose their neutrality. That is, the oft-touted virtue of neutral principles is that they are supposedly devoid of substantive commitments; they purportedly afford a space within which "substantive agendas can make their case without prior advantage or disadvantage" (3). Yet, some substance must be supplied in order to make the principle—fairness, in this example—intelligible. Hence, there really is no such thing as a neutral principle; there is no such thing as a principle not already informed by the substantive content of the person appealing to the principle. While questions of fairness are central to intractable policy debates, invoking the principle of fairness will not advance these debates because at a certain level such debates are about "what fairness (or neutrality or impartiality) really is" (3). In effect, a contest over the content of a particular issue is also a contest over two or more contending notions of fairness (or impartiality or whatever principle is being invoked). Even if it were possible to produce a general principle devoid of specific content—a notion of fairness, say, untethered to any specific perspective or ideological orientation—it would be of no use, says Fish, because it would by empty. That is, appealing to it would not point you in any specific direction in relation to other possible directions. Its very emptiness renders it useless as a moral compass. In effect, a neutral principle is a floating signifier, an "unoccupied vessel waiting to be filled by whoever gets to it first or with the most persuasive force" (7). In fact, it is exactly this condition of emptiness, its status as a floating signifier available for people to invest with substance, that makes neutral principles so politically useful—and even potentially dangerous, since they can be employed to further evil (as defined by you) ends just as easily as more positive (as defined by you) goals: It is because they don't have the constraining power claimed for them (they neither rule out nor mandate anything) and yet have the name of constraints (people think that when you invoke fairness you call for something determinate and determinable) that neutral principles can make an argument look as though it has a support higher or deeper than the support provided by its own substantive thrust. Indeed, the vocabulary of neutral principle can be used to disguise substance so that it appears to be the inevitable and nonengineered product of an impersonal logic. (4) In other words, a general principle such as fairness is deployed as a weapon in political, legal, and ethical struggles precisely because it masks the interestedness of those appealing to it and cloaks the fact that the actual policy, law, or proposal being advanced in the name of the principle is embedded in specific historical circumstances and furthers the interests and objectives of one set of individuals over and against the interests and objectives of others.

## \*\*\*\*1AR\*\*\*\*

## Rhetoric K

### Their use of the “f” word is an independent reason to vote aff—it normalizes sexual violence and makes a culture of domination inevitable

Schwyzer ‘9

Schwyzer, Prof of Gender Studies, 9 [community college history and gender studies professor, DPhil, Berkley (Hugo,  “Penetrate” v. “Engulf” and the multiple meanings of the “f” word: a note on feminist language, 4 November 2009, http://hugoschwyzer.net/2009/11/04/penetrate-v-engulf-and-the-multiple-meanings-of-the-f-word-a-note-on-feminist-language/]

In every women’s studies class I’ve taught here at PCC, and in many guest lectures about feminism I’ve given elsewhere, I use the “penetrate” versus “engulf” image to illustrate a basic point about the way in which our language constructs and maintains male aggression and female passivity. Even those who haven’t had heterosexual intercourse can, with only a small degree of imagination required, see how “envelop” might be just as accurate as “enter”. “A woman’s vagina engulfs a man’s penis during intercourse” captures reality as well as “A man’s penis penetrates a woman’s vagina.” Of course, most het folks who have intercourse are well aware that power is fluid; each partner can temporarily assert a more active role (frequently by being on top) — as a result, the language used to describe what’s actually happening could shift. Except, of course, in our sex ed textbooks and elsewhere, that shift never happens. **If the goal of sex education is to provide accurate information to young people before they become sexually active, we do a tremendous disservice to both boys and girls through our refusal to use language that honors the reality of women’s sexual agency.** We set young women up to be afraid; we set young men up to think of women’s bodies as passive receptacles. While changing our language isn’t a panacea for the problem of sexual violence (and joyless, obligatory intercourse), it’s certainly a promising start. As another part of my introductory lecture on language, I talk about “fuck”. I first dispell the urban legends that it’s an acronym (I’m amazed at how persistent the belief is that the word stands for “for unlawful carnal knowledge” or “fornication under the consent of the king”; I have students every damn year who are convinced the word is derived from one of those two sources.) I then ask at what age young people in English-speaking culture first encounter the word. Most of my students had heard the word by age five or six; many had started using it not long thereafter. I then ask how old they were when they realized that “fuck” has multiple meanings, and that its two most common uses are to describe intercourse and to express rage. There’s a pause at this point. Here’s the problem: long before most kids in our culture become sexually active, the most common slang word in the American idiom has knit together two things in their consciousness: sex and rage. If “fucking” is the most common slang term for intercourse, and “fuck you” or “fuck off” the most common terms to express contempt or rage, what’s the end result? A culture that has difficulty distinguishing sex from violence. In a world where a heartbreakingly high percentage of women will be victims of rape, it’s not implausible to suggest that at least in part, the language itself normalizes sexual violence**.** I challenge my students. I don’t ask them to give up all the satisfactions of profanity; rather I challenge them to think about words like “fuck” or “screw” and then make a commitment to confine the use of those words to *either* a description of sex (“We fucked last night”) *or* to express anger or extreme exasperation (“I’m so fucking furious with you right now!”) but not, not, not, both. Rage and lust are both normal human experiences; we will get angry and we will be sexual (or want to be) over and over again over the course of our lives. But we have a responsibility, I think, to make a clear and bright line between the language of sexual desire and the language of contempt and indignation. Pick one arena of human experience where that most flexible term in the English vernacular will be used, and confine it there. Words matter, I tell my students. **We’re told over and over again that “a picture is worth a thousand words” — but** we forget that words have the power to paint pictures in our minds of how the world is and how it ought to be. The language we use for sexuality, the words we use for rage and longing — these words construct images in our heads, in our culture, and in our lives. We have an obligation to rethink how we speak as part of building a more pleasurable, safe, just and egalitarian world.

## Creativity

### Breaking normative rules is key to creativity

Feinberg & Nemeth 08

Matthew Feinberg and Charlan J. Nemeth Department of Psychology University of California, Berkeley Institute for Research on Labor and Employment The “Rules” of Brainstorming: An Impediment to Creativity? http://www.irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/167-08.pdf

Nemeth et al. (2004) theorized that the “criticize” condition outperformed the “do not criticize” and the control conditions because the instructions to criticize liberated participants to more freely generate ideas. These instructions allowed for discussion that would otherwise have been kept in check, and such discussion led to more ideas and improvements on ideas. In addition, Nemeth et al. speculated that an atmosphere where criticism and debate are allowed, even expected, may also be liberating since such behavior is usually perceived as socially inappropriate and undesirable. Thus, such instructions may parallel rule-breaking or deviance which in and of itself may be liberating, stimulating, and creativity enhancing. One might infer from such an analysis that there is clear discord between rules and creative thinking, because rules may inhibit freedom of thought. Regarding brainstorming, one could then argue that the rules of brainstorming, being rules, may even impede group creativity.. In fact, rules for how to think creatively may be contradictory to the free and unbounded thinking that many argue are the foundations of creativity (Amabile 1988; Hill & Amabile, 1993; Kanter, 1988; Mednick, 1962; Sternberg & Lubart, 1993). Some research specifically shows the importance of freedom and liberty for creativity. Hill and Amabile (1993), for example, found that the most commonly cited stimulus for creativity was freedom among research and development scientists. By contrast, individuals who perceived their work environment as confining and constraining were less likely to manifest high levels of creativity (Amabile, Conti, Coon, Lazenby, & Herron, 1996. In fact, one might argue that rules are confining and constraining by definition and as such are obstacles to creativity because they promote standardization, reduced variation, and norm following (Olin & Wickenberg, 2001; Perrow, 1979.

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Rules may also impair creativity at an unconscious level. As many cognitive psychologists have shown, subtle cues from the environment can prime specific goals, motivations, behaviors, and mental frameworks (for a review, see Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). If priming affects brainstorming cognitions, there is a strong likelihood that providing rules to follow might trigger a “rule-following” schema, or more generally, a “conventionality” or “conformity” schema which would be antithetical to creativity.