# 1NC (Israeli Disad)

## US-Isreali relations are stable now due to security commitments, but Netanyahu is on the fence.

## AFP 7/28

(Agence France Press, “US voices commitment to Israel in defense talks”, accessed online p. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5geTNCvh7ob5Fjg1JK3gIkxvubSWg?docId=CNG.257ca886195e82c183202f64ad9ed6e5.1071)

WASHINGTON — The United States on Thursday reiterated its support for a strong military in Israel as Defense Minister Ehud Barak held talks with top leaders in Washington. Barak met separately with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and newly installed Defense Secretary Leon Panetta. Both meetings were closed to the press, with officials offering general statements. Panetta stressed his "strong commitment" to defense relations with Israel and to "ensuring that Israel maintains its qualitative military edge," Pentagon spokesman George Little said. State Department spokesman Mark Toner said the United States wanted to compare notes with Barak amid rapid changes in the region where street protesters have toppled authoritarian leaders. The talks with Barak, a former prime minister, were "an opportunity to reiterate our unshakable commitment to Israel's security," Toner said. The United States is Israel's main ally. But Israel's right-leaning Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has had an uneasy relationship with President Barack Obama, whose administration has sought progress in Middle East peace.

## History has established ideological barriers – Israel can never accept democratization of Arabic countries as anything \*but\* a threat to their security.

## Waxman ‘11

(Dov, associate professor in political science at Baruch College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York “Israel’s Demophobia”, Foreign Policy, Februrary 18, accessed online http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/18/israel\_s\_demophobia)

Israeli antipathy towards Arab democracy is not just a result of recent history. Arab masses - the so-called Arab street - have long been an object of widespread fear and mistrust among Israeli Jews. This goes all the way back to the popular protests and violent attacks that Palestinians carried out against Zionist settlers during the period of the British Mandate in Palestine. Although early Zionist ideologues hoped that the Zionist settlement project could gain the support of the Palestinian peasant masses, whom they claimed it would materially benefit, over the objections of the Arab landowning elite, this did not turn out to be the case. The vast majority of Palestinians were adamantly opposed to Zionism, eventually staging a popular uprising against British rulers and Zionist settlers in the late 1930s (in many ways, the first Palestinian ‘Intifada'). From that point on it was clear that the Arab masses were opponents of the Zionist project (a fact that led a small group of dovish Zionists such as Martin Buber and Judah Magnes to advocate a binational Jewish-Arab state as a means of gaining Arab support). As far as most Israeli Jews are concerned, Arabs - whether Palestinians, Egyptians, Jordanians, Lebanese, etc. - remain uncompromising enemies of the Jewish state. The peace agreements that Israel has signed with Egypt and Jordan are regarded as the decisions of individual rulers (Anwar Sadat and King Hussein) based upon the logic of realpolitik, not popular sentiment. In line with this view, Israelis assume that if the Egyptian and Jordanian publics had their way, the peace agreements would soon be shredded. Even worse, many Israelis fear that if Arab public opinion is allowed to determine the foreign policies of Arab states, then a resumption of Arab-Israeli hostilities is the likely outcome. Arab public opinion, according to this view, is bellicose and fanatically anti-Israeli, even anti-Semitic. Fundamentally, many Israelis continue to believe that Arabs want to destroy the Jewish state and will try to do so if given half a chance. In their eyes, what's happening in Egypt now might well give them that chance.

## That independently implicates and threatens US-Israeli relations.

## Byman ‘11

(Daniel, Prof. in Security Studies @ Georgetown, Research Director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy @ Brookings, “Israel’s Pessimistic View of the Arab Spring”, Washington Quarterly, Summer, Volume 34, Issue 3, accessed online p. http://www.twq.com/11summer/docs/11summer\_Byman.pdf)

These apocalyptic predictions and Israel’s doom-and-gloom mentality are easy, too easy, to dismiss. Israelis are always sensitive to their security. Indeed, their reaction to the spread of democracy so close to their borders seems churlish, as does their tendency to look on the dark side when so many of their Arab neighbors now have hopes for a better life. But dismissing Israeli concerns would be a mistake. Some of Israel’s fears are valid, and others that are less so will still drive Israeli policies. The new regimes and the chaotic regional situation pose security challenges to the Jewish state. These challenges, and the Israeli reactions to them, are likely to worsen the crisis in Gaza and make the prospects for peace between the Israelis and Palestinians even more remote. The new revolutions also have the potential to complicate the U.S.—Israel relationship further and make it harder for the United States to benefit from the Arab Spring. In the end, however, neither the United States nor Israel is behind the winds of change sweeping the Middle East. Egypt will have a new regime, and other Arab countries may too. Others may reform, while still others may become more reactionary, or even, as in Libya, collapse into civil war. Decrying this trend risks missing opportunities to nudge it in the right direction. It is in Israel’s interest, as well as Washington’s, that the regional transformation is peaceful and that democratization succeeds.

## Stable US-Israel relations key to Middle East stability.

## Kramer ‘6

(Dr. Martin, fellow at The Washington Institute and senior fellow at the Olin Institute @ Harvard, “The American Interest,” Fall 2006, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=980)

My answer, to anticipate my conclusion, is this: United States support for Israel is not primarily the result of Holocaust guilt or shared democratic values; nor is it produced by the machinations of the “Israel Lobby.” American support for Israel -- indeed, the illusion of its unconditionality – underpins the pax Americana in the eastern Mediterranean. It has compelled Israel’s key Arab neighbors to reach peace with Israel and to enter the American orbit. The fact that there has not been a general Arab-Israeli war since 1973 is proof that this pax Americana, based on the United States-Israel alliance, has been a success. From a realist point of view, supporting Israel has been a low-cost way of keeping order in part of the Middle East, managed by the United States from offshore and without the commitment of any force. It is, simply, the ideal realist alliance. In contrast, the problems the United States faces in the Persian Gulf stem from the fact that it does not have an Israel equivalent there, and so it must massively deploy its own force at tremendous cost. Since no one in the Gulf is sure that the United States has the staying power to maintain such a presence over time, the Gulf keeps producing defiers of America, from Khomeini to Saddam to Bin Laden to Ahmadinejad. The United States has to counter them, not in the interests of Israel, but to keep the world’s great reserves of oil out of the grip of the West’s sworn enemies.

## These wars escalate globally – culminate in extinction.

## Moore ‘9

(Carol, BA in Polisci @ Wane State, “Six Escalation Scenarios to Nuclear World War III, 16 February,http://pakalert.wordpress.com/2009/02/16/six-escalation-scenarios-to-nuclear-world-war-iii/)

Israel is especially dangerous because its leaders and supporters have made clear for years that if Israel was every devastated by any kind of war or attack it would retaliate in indiscriminate “Samson Option” attacks against not just on Muslim cities, but against European and even Russian targets. (See “Israeli Nuclear Threats and Blackmail ” .) Russia, of course, would retaliate with thousands of nuclear bombs against the United States. Given suspected U.S. nuclear primacy plans, Russia could feel compelled to attack the United States for acts like a U.S. nuclear attack on Iran, which is just a few hundred miles from its border. On January 25, 1995 Boris Yeltsin, then President of Russia, came within three minutes of initiating a full nuclear strike on the United States because of one Norwegian scientific rocket Russians could not identify. (Details ) And U.S. leaders also could be spooked by a nuclear incident, as the 2002 movie “Sum of All Fears” illustrates. Once there is any use of nuclear weapons, it will be like giving permission for anyone to use them. Compare it to a room full of people embarrassed to cough, but once one does, everyone else feels free to do so. Any use of nuclear weapons probably will lead to a rapid escalation, “out of control spiral,” to nuclear war among most or all nuclear nations–”world nuclear war.” The U.N. cannot stop it.  U.S. imperialism and pre-emptive strikes cannot stop it.  Only a worldwide disarmament movement can stop it.

**Iran Disad**

US can no longer contain Iran in the Middle East

Caroline Glick March 5 2011 "Iran wins no matter how the 'Arab Spring' Turns Out" originally printed in the Jerusalem Post http://bigpeace.com/cglick/2011/03/05/iran-wins-no-matter-how-the-arab-spring-turns-out/

THIS MEANS that Iran’s mullahs win no matter how the revolts pan out. If weakened regimes maintain power by appeasing Iran’s allies in the opposition – as they are trying to do in Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Algeria, Bahrain, Oman and Yemen — then Iranian influence over the weakened regimes will grow substantially. And if Iran’s allies topple the regimes, then Iran’s influence will increase even more steeply. Moreover, Iran’s preference for proxy wars and asymmetric battles is served well by the current instability. Iran’s proxies – from Hizbullah to al Qaida to Hamas – operate best in weak states. From Hizbullah’s operations in South Lebanon in the 1980s and 1990s, to the Iranian-sponsored Iraqi insurgents in recent years and beyond, Iran has exploited weak central authorities to undermine pro-Western governments, weaken Israel and diminish US regional influence. In the midst of Egypt’s revolutionary violence, Iran quickly deployed its Hamas proxies to the Sinai. Since Mubarak’s fall, Iran has worked intensively to expand its proxy forces’ capacity to operate freely in the Sinai. Recognition of Iran’s expanded power is fast altering the international community’s perception of the regional balance of forces. Russia’s announcement last Saturday that it will sell Syria the supersonic Yakhont anti-ship cruise missile was a testament to Iran’s rising regional power and the US’s loss of power. Russia signed a deal to provide the missiles to Syria in 2007. But Moscow abstained from supplying them until now – just after Iran sailed its naval ships unmolested to Syria through the Suez Canal and signed a naval treaty with Syria effectively fusing the Iranian and Syrian navies. So too, Russia’s announcement that it sides with Iran’s ally Turkey in its support for reducing UN Security Council sanctions against Iran indicates that the US no longer has the regional posture necessary to contain Iran on the international stage.

US engagement ensures containment of Iran- Gulf states are looking for US leadership

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Reviving Gulf defense. Over the past several years, fears of a rising Tehran have begun to drive many Arab Gulf countries toward accommodation with Iran. For example, such concerns led Oman to establish a modus vivendi with the Islamic Republic through the codification of a sweeping agreement on military cooperation in 2000 (albeit one that has since been denied by Oman).[27] Kuwait subsequently followed suit, striking a similar bargain in October 2002.[28] Even Saudi Arabia, previously a strategic competitor of Iran, capitulated on a long-discussed framework accord with Tehran in late 2001, in the wake of two multi-billion-dollar Russo-Iranian defense accords.[29] But for many of these countries, such bilateral partnerships are a product of necessity—a function of the inadequacy of national defenses and regional alliances in addressing Iran's rising expansionism. The distrust of Iran still runs very deep. As a recent editorial in London's influential Arab-language Ash-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper emphasized, Iran now poses a threat to "Saudi Arabia, Oman, Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan, which share with Iran a land border of 5,400 kilometers and a sea border of 2,400 kilometers … The Iranian nuclear danger threatens us, first and foremost, more than it threatens the Israelis and the Americans."[30] Such worries have prompted the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), comprised of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, to initiate a feasibility study for an alliance-wide anti-missile system. At the same time, individual countries in the Arab Gulf (most notably Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) have initiated efforts to upgrade their individual missile defense capabilities.[31] Recently uncovered nuclear contacts between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan suggest that at least one of Iran's neighbors has begun to actively contemplate the need for a strategic deterrent against the Islamic Republic.[32] All this suggests that a U.S. strategic initiative toward the Arab Gulf may find ready customers. On the one hand, a deepening of Washington's bilateral military dialogue and defense contacts with individual Gulf nations might lessen regional dependence not only on Iran but on an increasingly volatile and unpredictable Saudi Arabia as well.[33] On the other hand, the creation of a formalized American security architecture over the region could reinvigorate Washington's regional partnerships while excluding and isolating Iran.[34] Common to all of these efforts is the need to provide Tehran's neighbors with the tools to counter its growing potential for nuclear and ballistic missile blackmail.

Containment strategy is inherently uncredible- triggers wildfire prolif

David Sanger March 13, 2010 "Debate Grows on Nuclear Containment of Iran" New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/14/weekinreview/14sanger.html

Yet another argument against containment comes from Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser under Presidents Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush. “The ultimate consequence of trying to contain Iran has little to do with Iran itself,” he argues. “The biggest risk is that it will start an eruption of proliferation” around the Gulf, starting with Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. They would doubt the American deterrent capability, he said, and the problem would spread to Japan and South Korea.

Extinction

 Victor A. Utgoff, pub. date: 2002, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses. In 1998–99, he established the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, former senior member of the National Security Council Staff, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Survival, “Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions”

 ‘If I don’t hit them back really hard, I am going to be driven from office, if not killed’. Whether right or wrong, in the stressful atmosphere of a nuclear crisis or war, such words from others, or silently from within, might resonate too readily with a harried leader. Thus, both history and human nature suggest that nuclear deterrence can be expected to fail from time to time, and we are fortunate it has not happened yet. But the threat of nuclear war is not just a matter of a few weapons being used. It could get much worse. Once a conflict reaches the point where nuclear weapons are employed, the stresses felt by the leaderships would rise enormously. These stresses can be expected to further degrade their decision-making. The pressures to force the enemy to stop fighting or to surrender could argue for more forceful and decisive military action, which might be the right thing to do in the circumstances, but maybe not. And the horrors of the carnage already suffered may be seen as justification for visiting the most devastating punishment possible on the enemy.7 Again, history demonstrates how intense conflict can lead the combatants to escalate violence to the maximum possible levels. In the Second World War, early promises not to bomb cities soon gave way to essentially indiscriminate bombing of civilians. The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and exchanges of missiles against each other’s cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East escalated in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other. Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants beforehand.8 Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible. In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear ‘six-shooters’ on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations. This kind of world is in no nation’s interest. The means for preventing it must be pursued vigorously. And, as argued above, a most powerful way to prevent it or slow its emergence is to encourage the more capable states to provide reliable protection to others against aggression, even when that aggression could be backed with nuclear weapons. In other words, the world needs at least one state, preferably several, willing and able to play the role of sheriff, or to be members of a sheriff’s posse, even in the face of nuclear threats.