# 1ac- civil war

## Advantage 1 is Yemeni Civil War

## Saleh’s new agreement is just a delay tactic- nothing has changed

Finn 2011 (Tom *freelance journalist based in Sanaa* Any way out for Yemen? Wednesday, September 14, 2011 http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/09/14/any\_way\_out\_for\_yemen)

But the sense of optimism rippling though the pages of western newspapers has been much harder to detect here on the grubby streets of the capital, Sana'a. "No deal, no maneuvering, the president should leave!" was the cry that rang out through the city on Tuesday as tens of thousands of men, women, and children spilled out onto the streets to decry the latest attempt by the country's president to evade pressure to step down. Yemen's beleaguered but tenacious demonstrators have endured months of bloody repression, tit for tat political negotiations, and hollow concessions. Now -- unsurprisingly -- they say that Saleh's agreement delegating "constitutional capabilities" to his deputy is nothing but a ploy by the embattled leader to buy himself more time.

The decree certainly has its shortfalls. While Hadi technically now has the ability to sign Saleh's premiership away, Saleh retains the right to reject the deal if he desires. Yemenis have learned over the years not to put much faith in Saleh's promises. More importantly, there is no reference to the fate of the institution currently propping up the regime in Saleh's absence: the armed forces, large portions of which remain under the control of Saleh's son, nephew, and cousins.

## Saleh’s overbearing rule is driving the country to a civil war

Barakat et al 2011 (Sultan, founding member and Director for the Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU) and a professor at the University of york on the edge of failure: Conflict and Crisis in Yemen, university of york june)

Indeed, weak governance may be the single most important driver of conflict and marginalization in Yemen today, fuelling a sense of exclusion and political and socieo-economic marginalization. There is also a growing frustration over corruption, poverty, and underdevelopment in both the northwestern governorates of Sa’ada, Amran, and Hajj, and the southern governorates (which once comprised the former southern socialist republic). This sense of deprivation has contributed to the escalation of conflict in both the north and the south. Although the conflict started from a narrow religious platform of Zaidi anger over growing Wahhabi influence and was triggered by a rejection of the government’s cooperation with the US in the ‘war on terror’, the central government’s response catalyzed growing frustration at the socio-economic deprivation of the northern and southern regions. The incursion by security forces into traditionally autonomous tribal territory and the increasingly violent military campaigns against the Houthis has also deepened the sense of a centreperiphery divide, increasing resistance to the government and fuelling a sense of injustice at the destruction and loss of human

## A civil war would create a breeding ground for Al Qa’ida and pirates

Alley and al-Iryani 2009(April Longley and Abdul Ghani Longley Alley holds a MA in Arab Studies and a PhD in Government from Georgetown University. Dr. Alley trav-eled to Yemen on a David L. Boren Fellowship during the summer of 2004, a Fulbright IIE Grant from September 2005 to September 2006, and independently during the summer of 2007. Abdul-Ghani Al-Iryani is a businessman and a political consultant based in Sana‘a. He received an MA from Portland State University and an MPH from Boston University.Southern Aspirations and Salih’s Exasperation: The Looming Threat of Secession in South Yemen The Middle East Institute Viewpoints No. 11 June 2009 www.mei.edu/Portals/0/Publications/Yemen.pdf)

A second area of concern is the strategic implications for the United States if Yemeni unity becomes imperiled through widespread, coordinated insurrection. In this scenario, the Salih regime would become completely focused on its survival at all costs. In the ensuing distraction, US interests would likely be neglected, if not ignored, by the Salih regime as it struggles to regain control of the south. In the unlikely event that the south were able to break away from the north, the ensuing economic collapse of the north’s economy would be difficult to halt. In the more likely event of a prolonged insurgency, the economic viability of the state would be threatened further, and internal unrest could provide additional space for al-Qa‘ida to expand its areas of influence. Finally, the maritime border could be used to facilitate movement of al-Qa‘ida supporters to/from the Horn of Africa and provide additional support nodes for piracy in the Gulf of Aden, a practice that is currently inhibited by US support for the nascent Yemeni Coast Guard. As such, the stability of a unified Yemen is in the best interests of the United States. Currently, the Salih regime remains both a hindrance to and a necessary partner in achieving this outcome.

## Even if Saleh does step down- Lack of a political framework in Yemen will cause a power vacuum that will cause 2 internal links. Oil shocks, increased al Qaeda operations. A transition policy needs to be established

Masiky, 11 - is a native of Kenitra, Morocco. He graduated from the University of the District of Columbia with a degree in political science in 1991. Upon graduation,Hassan joined the Washington DC based non governmental organization the Parliamentary Human Rights Foundation (PHRF) where he worked as a consultant for USAID funded democracy projects in Mexico, Haiti, Republic of Georgia and the European Parliament. (Hassan, “AN AMERICAN NIGHTMARE IN YEMEN; SALEH MUST REFORM AND STAY,” Morocco Board News Service, 2/15, <http://www.moroccoboard.com/viewpoint/68/5081>)

Some observers argue that the American margin of maneuver in Yemen is limited; others think that there is little America can do to prevent the collapse of Saleh regime. Regardless of the odds of keeping Saleh in power, the US and its allies must be proactive and aggressive in addressing the current crisis in Yemen. The alternative would be catastrophic, more expensive, unpredictable and volatile. A US involvement in Yemen is not a case of American adventurism but rather an instance of a good use of American power and influence.

Yemen of today, the union of a prosper North and an impoverished South, never grew as a unified nation. Yemenis outside the capital Sana’a never developed a sense of nationhood with most of them identifying with their tribes primarily. In short, their lack of allegiance to the central government will make it near impossible to control the tribes in the case of collapse of the current leadership. Under these circumstances, a power vacuum in Sana’a will be a security nightmare for the United States and  Saudi Arabia with a significant impact on oil prices and the world economy.

American security concerns in Yemen can be summarized in two words: Iran and Al-Qaeda. In the North West of the country, the Iran backed Zaidi Shiites, who revolted against the central government and declared war on the national army, will be the first entity to benefit from   a collapse of the central government. Eventhough Tehran has repeatedly denied involvements in Yemeni affairs during last year’s Zaidi insurgency, Iran is waiting around the corner to gain hold of a military strategic area and thus threatening the security of Saudi Arabia and the United states. An Iranian presence in the Ziadi region will have far-reaching consequences on the stability of the Arab Gulf Kingdoms.

A collapse of law and order in Sana’a will be a bonanza for Al-Qaeda and its affiliates around the world. Yemen with its tribal culture is a fertile land for extremists groups. The potential creation of Al-Qaeda safe heavens in Yemen will be a clear and present danger to the American national security with grave consequences on the security of the homeland.

Most of the protests in Yemen were in Sana’a in the North where mostly students went out to claim economic and political reform and in Eden in the South where protesters were demanding secession from the North. Unlike in Tunis and Egypt, most -and not all- protesters are demanding reforms or other political pleas more than an immediate departure of Saleh.   Washington, Riyadh and other friendly government must draw a clear transition map for Saleh to follow with all of the political and monetary help needed.

## Only decentralization solves - avoids a civil war and power vacuum

Longley et al 2008(april Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University. She holds a Masters Degree in Arab Studies from Georgetown’s Center for Contemporary Arab Studies Fighting Brushfires with Batons: An Analysis of the Political Crisis in South Yemen middle east institute policy brief No7 February 2008)

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The third and only policy option capable of achieving a long-term solution is to pursue an aggressive package of political and economic reform, which has as its cornerstone meaningful decentralization. Unlike the policy options above, this approach addresses the root cause of grievances throughout the country. The underlying malignancy of the Yemeni political system is the centralization of power around the President. Salih rules Yemen based on a complex web of patron-client relations. Democratic institutions, both local and national, are part of the political landscape, but they are not the locus of power. Instead, the transfer and production of power is highly personalized and directly related to an elite’s relationship with the main patron, the President. This authoritarian power structure has facilitated, encouraged, and perpetuated a cycle of corruption and abuse, which enriches a core group of elites, while leaving the majority of Yemenis politically marginalized and economically impoverished. The concentration of power has neutralized institutional checks and balances, making it possible for destructive patterns and policies to continue un-abated. The system has supported President Salih for nearly 30 years, but in light of the current crisis, it is becoming less tenable. At this juncture, Salih must relinquish some authority if he wishes to maintain control of the country.

The President cannot directly attenuate networks of patronage and privilege around the military-security complex. These networks are the lifeblood of his re- gime and tampering with them could result in a coup. However, Salih is capable of implementing an aggressive decentralization plan. Decentralization would certainly limit the President’s authority and access to material resources. As a consequence, it also would curtail networks of patronage for technocratic and political clients in the capital. However, the benefits far outweigh the costs. First, decentralization would directly address Southern grievances and in doing so it would prevent a spiraling decline into guerilla-style resistance and protracted conflict. In addition to stabilizing the South and preserving unity, decentralization would provide a mechanism for sharing the burden of economic and political reform. Sharing responsibility and, at the moment, blame for the dismal economic situation in the country should be a priority of the Salih regime. Finally, over the long term, decentralization would grow the economic pie for the country as a whole, providing lucrative benefits for the regime in Sana‘a while also benefiting average Yemenis

## Impact Module 1. Oil. oil shocks will collapse the economy- US isn’t prepared for it

Stakelbeck 2011 (Erick CBN News Terrorism Analyst Analysts Warn 'Arab Spring' May Trigger Oil Crisis June 27, 2011http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2011/June/Analysts-Warn-Arab-Spring-May-Trigger-Oil-Crisis/)

WASHINGTON -- The so-called "Arab Spring" spreading through the Middle East could have unintended consequences that some fear the U.S. is ill prepared for.

Specifically, analysts are concerned the following scenarios could unfold in the not-so-distant future:

- A nuclear armed Iran dominating its neighbors.

- Egypt controlled by the radical Muslim Brotherhood.

- Al Qaeda terrorists roaming free near Yemen's Aden coast, where 40 percent of the world's oil supplies pass through.

Edwin Black, author of the book British Petroleum and The Redline Agreement: The West's Secret Pact to Get Mideast Oil, warns the devastating effects of such occurrences could reach far beyond that troubled region.

"We are teetering on the brink of an oil interruption, and the United States has no plan for an oil interruption," Black told CBN News.

"If the oil is cut off and interrupted, as it is being threatened by Iran and its surrogates each and every hour of every day, we only have a month of two of a supply," he continued.

"The government has modeled this, and if we lose 10 percent of our oil -- not 20 percent but 10 percent -- for a protracted period of time, say 6 to 10 weeks, the country will devolve into chaos," Black predicted.

Al Qaeda has long threatened to attack oil tankers and facilities as a way to create economic chaos. There are also fears that Iran could provoke a global crisis by shutting down the strategic Strait of Hormuz.

## US economic decline causes global collapse

Sesit 2008 (Michael, Bloomberg News Columnist“The four myths of economic decoupling,” The Korea Herald, February 16, 2008, http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/returnTo.do?returnToKey=20\_T6876616661, AD: 6-30-9

The four myths of economic decoupling
I always thought that decoupling was a myth," U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson

told reporters last week after a Tokyo meeting of finance ministers and central bankers from the Group of Seven countries. He should have worked for Goldman Sachs Group Inc., one of the biggest proponents of the thesis that the rest of the world could weather a slowing U.S. economy. He probably could have saved investors a lot of money by advising them that if America's economy and financial markets slumped, Europe, Asia and the emerging world would follow. Oops. Paulson used to work for Goldman Sachs. In fact, before becoming treasury secretary in 2006, he headed the venerable investment bank. The notion that Europe, Japan and developing countries could break free of the dominating influence of the $13 trillion U.S. economy was one of the bolder theories put forward since World War I, from which the United States emerged as the preeminent global power. So what went wrong?

Decoupling was founded on a set of suppositions relating to the depth of an American slowdown; European and Japanese economic power; the buoyancy of emerging-market consumers; the strength of intra-Asian trade; and Europe's dwindling export dependence on the United States. They didn't all pan out. " The falls in stock markets all over the world this year seem to have been triggered by the realization that U.S. weakness is likely to persist and that everybody will be affected in one way or another," says Gabriel Stein, a senior economist at Lombard Street Research Ltd. in London. Myth No. 1: Although the U.S. economy will slow, it will avoid a recession. Maybe so, but a recession over the next 12 months is now a 50 percent probability, according to a Bloomberg survey of economists, up from 40 percent in January. The United States is confronted with its worst housing crisis in a quarter century; GDP growth slowed to an annualized 0.6 percent in the fourth quarter last year, down from 4.9 percent in the third; and January payrolls tumbled by 17,000, the first decline since August 2003. A key gauge of non-manufacturing fell to its lowest reading in more than six years. Myth No. 2: The rest of the world can escape the clutches of a U.S. slowdown. Not according to history. The United States has had five recessions since 1970. Each time, other economies' GDP growth also declined. The U.S. economy fell an average of 3.8 percent during the recessions of 1974-75, 1980, 1982, 1991 and 2001, with other industrial countries slowing an average of 2 percent, Latin America falling 1.7 percent and emerging Asia declining 1.3 percent, according to the International Monetary Fund.

"Despite all the chatter about one region or another being immune from problems in the United States, the reality is that in a globalized economy characterized by rising cross-border flows of goods, services and capital, only hermit economies like North Korea are truly de-linked from planet Earth," says Joseph Quinlan, New York-based chief market strategist at Bank of America Capital Management. "Every one, more or less, sinks or swims in the global village." Myth No. 3: Rising demand in the developing world will compensate for the expected drop in U.S. consumer spending. Emerging-market countries are consuming more, yet growth in many of them is still mostly driven by exports, not domestic demand. Moreover, 2.55 billion people -- almost half the population of the developing world -- lived on less than $2 a day in 2004, the latest year of available data, according to the World Bank and Bank of America. U.S. consumers spent $9.27 trillion in 2006, or 3.5 times the aggregate $2.62 trillion personal-consumption expenditure of the so-called BRIC countries: Brazil, Russia, India and China. Myth No. 4: Growing intra-Asian trade -- especially that between China and other countries in the region -- will make up for lost exports caused by a steep U.S. slowdown. No doubt, intra-regional trade is growing rapidly, but much of it reflects shipments of intermediate goods. Still, 61 percent of emerging Asia's exports are ultimately consumed in the U.S., European Union and Japan, according to the Asian Development Bank, while Asian developing countries account for just 21 percent of final demand. "The U.S. is still more important to each Asian country's total output than demand from other ex-Japan Asian economies combined," the bank said in a recent report. Myth No. 5: Europe is becoming less dependent on the United States. True, America accounts for only 12 percent of EU exports to countries outside the 25-nation bloc, down from 18 percent in 2000. But exports aren't the whole story. Sales by U.S. affiliates of German companies totaled $352 billion in 2005, the last year of available data -- four times the $86 billion of German exports to America. Meanwhile, Dutch U.S. affiliate sales were 16 times exports, U.K.-affiliate sales 7.6 times British exports and French-affiliate sales 5.9 times. "If the U.S. economy heads south, so too will the earnings of many European firms," Quinlan says. What's more, Wall Street's pull on the world's financial markets is unrivaled.

" U.S. equity returns remain the single biggest driver of global equity returns," says David Woo, London-based head of global currency strategy at Barclays Capital. "A sizable U.S. equity correction, by precipitating a global equity correction, will likely lead to a synchronized global economic slowdown."

The lesson: When your broker starts spouting a new theory as to why you should make an investment, caveat emptor. Or call Paulson for his opinion. (Bloomberg)

## economic decline causes war

Lind 2010 (Michael Michael Lind is policy director of the Economic Growth Program at the New America Foundation and author of "The American Way of Strategy., http://www.salon.com/news/economics/index.html?story=/opinion/feature/2010/05/11/great\_recession\_world\_war\_iv May 11)

If history is any guide, an era of global economic stagnation will help the nationalist and populist right, at the expense of the neoliberal and cosmopolitan/multicultural left. During the Long Depression of the late 19th century, which some historians claim lasted from 1873 to 1896, the nations of the West adopted protectionist measures to promote their industries. Beginning with Bismarck’s Germany, many countries also adopted social reforms like government pensions and health insurance. These reforms were often favored by the nationalist right, as a way of luring the working class away from the temptations of Marxism and left-liberalism. By and large the strategy worked. When World War I broke out, the working classes and farmers in most countries rallied enthusiastically around their respective flags.

The Great Depression of the 1930s similarly led to the rise of one or another version of the authoritarian, nationalist right in Europe. Only in a few societies with deeply established liberal traditions, like the English-speaking countries and Scandinavia, did liberals or liberal conservatives hold on. And Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal Democratic Party, a coalition that included racist Southerners and traditionalist Catholic immigrants, was not particularly liberal by today’s standards.

In both eras of depression, great-power rivalry for resources and markets intensified and ultimately led to a world war. Following World War II, the U.S. sought to avert a repetition of that pattern, by creating a global market secured by a global great-power concert in the form of the Security Council. But the project of economic disarmament and security cooperation broke down almost immediately after 1945 and the split between the Soviets and the Anglo-Americans produced the Cold War. The second attempt at a global market that began after the Cold War may be breaking down now, as the most important economic powers pursue their conflicting national interests.

## Impact Module 2. Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is waiting for the perfect time to deal a game changing attack

[Mowatt-Larssen](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/experts/1961/rolf_mowattlarssen.html?back_url=%2Fpublication%2F20014%2Fproliferation_and_terrorism.html&back_text=Back%20to%20publication), 2010 (Rolf Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International AffairsProliferation and Terrorism: Big Hype or Biggest Threat Journal Article, [Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists](http://www.thebulletin.org/), volume 66, issue 2 March/April )

A further—and highly unsettling—explanation of Al Qaeda’s extraordinary patience is that group members think time is on their side. They probably believe they have drawn the United States into a deepening commitment to fight a protracted insurgency in Afghanistan. Moreover, Saddam Hussein was deposed, opening up long-term possibilities for an Islamic theocracy in Iraq. Gen. Per- vez Musharraf is out of power in Pakistan, and the domestic in- stability there is growing every day. These developments create opportunities to change the global status quo. In other words, Al Qaeda may be waiting for a perfect storm in the alignment of targets, opportunity, and timing to launch another game-changing attack. If they do so, it will certainly be based on a calculation that the moment is ripe to try to force Washington’s hand in ways that favor Al Qaeda’s long-term goals.

In this light, the group’s long-held intent and persistent efforts to acquire nuclear and biological weapons represent a unique means of potentially fulfilling its wildest hopes and aspirations. As bin Laden declared in 1998, it is his duty to obtain WMD. He apparently understood at this early juncture that using such weapons might become necessary at some stage of his confrontation with the United States and its allies. With this in mind, Al Qaeda feverishly pursued nuclear and biological weapons capabilities before 9/11. These efforts were managed by the group’s most senior leadership, with a sense of purpose and urgency that suggests it was important to make progress on possessing WMD prior to its 2001 attack on the United States. Yet in spite of bin Laden’s declaration and Al Qaeda’s subsequent efforts to acquire nuclear and biological weapons, the threat is not widely being treated as a clear-and-present danger that requires an urgent response.

## In the mean time they been developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons

IPT News 2011Documents Show Jihadists Seek Mass-Destruction Weapons The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT) is a non-profit research group founded by Steven Emerson in 1995. It is recognized as the world's most comprehensive data center on radical Islamic terrorist groups. February 18, http://www.investigativeproject.org/2608/documents-show-jihadists-seek-mass-destruction

Diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks provide another reminder that al-Qaida remains committed to obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD) - nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and "dirty bombs." Security briefing [cables](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8296956/WikiLeaks-al-Qaeda-is-planning-a-dirty-bomb.html) published by the London *Telegraph* – some as recent as 2009 – state that jihadists are close to making "workable and efficient biological and chemical weapons" capable of killing thousands of people if used to attack the West.

The cables indicate that Western officials are very concerned about the possibility that terrorists may obtain WMD material through Pakistan. During official talks in London in 2009, British officials raised "deep concerns" that a rogue scientist in that Pakistan's nuclear program "could gradually smuggle enough material out to make a weapon." British officials also believe that "extremists" could use Pakistani agricultural supplies of anthrax, avian flu and foot-and-mouth disease to develop biological weapons.

Much of Washington's effort to prevent biological agents from falling into terrorist hands occurs through the State Department's Biosecurity Engagement Program. One cable sent by a senior U.S. diplomat in Islamabad said that in 2007, "virtually no biosecurity measures" were observed during two visits to the Pakistan Agricultural Research Center, which houses anthrax, foot-and-mouth diseases, avian influenza and brucellosis. The cable says that by February 2008, security practices had improved and "dedicated safety officers" were in place, but provides no detail.

At a Jan. 28, 2009 meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO's top decision-making body, "Terrorist acquisition of WMD was the next topic of major concern," according to one cable. It said that although al-Qaida and other jihadists were thought have a limited capability to acquire WMD, "the intent was clearly present, and there were ongoing credible reports of attempts to recruit the needed expertise. A 'dirty' radiological IED [improvised explosive device] program was thought to be under active consideration by al-Qaeda."

Other cables [revealed](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/nuclear-wikileaks/8297103/TENTH-U.S.-JAPAN-COMMISSION-MEETING-ON-NOVEMBER-8-2007-TOKYO-00005492-001.2-OF-010.html) that documents found in Afghanistan in 2007 showed that the terror group had made greater progress in bioterrorism than was previously realized. A senior State Department official warned that the growth of the biotechnology industry, particularly in Indonesia, could make biological weapons more available to jihadists. In June 2008, India's national security adviser [told](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/nuclear-wikileaks/8297098/NARAYANAN-URGES-BETTER-BILATERAL-UNDERSTANDING-ON-TERRORISM-TO-SENATORS-FEINGOLD-AND-CASEY.html) two U.S. senators that terrorists had made a "manifest attempt to obtain fissile material" and "have the technical competence to manufacture an explosive device beyond a mere dirty bomb."

A Nuclear Terrorist attack will escalate to a global nuclear war

Speice, J.D. Candidate at the College of William and Mary, 2006

(Patrick F., “Negligence and Nuclear Nonproliferation: Eliminating the Current Liability Barrier to Bilateral U.S.-Russian Nonproliferation Assistance Programs,” William and Mary Law Review 47:4, Article 10, pg1427-1485) JDB

Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or fissile material from Russia as a result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of stringent Soviet-era nuclear security measures."9 Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods, including "steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways.'' 4 ' Equally threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on their own. Very little material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon. 41 Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not significant.42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear device into the United States makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it was built.4 ' Accordingly, supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first place are the most effective means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44 Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing.4 Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young to retire, 47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions.4" The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses.49 Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict.' In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons**.5'** This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States or its allies

**Bioweapons use causes extinction**

**Ochs 2** (Richard, Member – Chemical Weapons Working Group, “Biological Weapons Must be Abolished Immediately, 6-9, http://www.freefromterror.net/other\_articles/abolish.html)

Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to **the continued survival of life on earth.** Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE.

# Terrorism

## Advantage 2 is Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

## AQAP is gaining strength by co-opting festering political grievances- the status quo ensures the proliferation of violence

Harris 2010 (Alistair former diplomat and UN staff member Exploiting Grievances Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula YEMEN: ON THE BRINK A Carnegie Paper Series may)

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), an offshoot of Osama Bin Laden’s terrorist network and a group that has been operating in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, presents a growing regional and international security challenge. Analysis of AQAP conﬁrms that it has been adept at aligning the grievances of Yemeni communities with its own narrative of what is wrong and who is responsible. But AQAP’s limited membership shows this has not translated into widespread recruitment because of dissonance between the organization’s rec- ommended course of action—violent jihad—and traditional Yemeni methods of seeking redress.2 Failure to address such grievances, however, runs the risk of increasing receptivity to alternative frameworks that include the use of violence.

**AQAP Taking Advantage of Yemen’s Slide**

**AFP, 10/02/11**.  “Qaeda in Yemen remains threat: experts.”  Hammoud Mounassar.  Staff Writer for AFP in Sanaa.  2:30 p.m. 10.02.11. <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i4p3L7a36jKJf41fvxtDVxU23vIQ?docId=CNG.030caf27e8be634f66c49491799ddc99.41/> {M.e. 10.02.11}

SANAA — Al-Qaeda in Yemen remains a serious threat to the United States despite the death of Anwar al-Awlaqi, a prominent jihadist leader accused of planning attacks on US targets, experts say.

The killing in Yemen Friday of the US-born charismatic cleric in an air raid was hailed by US President Barack Obama as a "major blow" to terrorists, but analysts say Al-Qaeda's influence in Yemen will not be greatly affected.

"Al-Qaeda was around before Awlaqi and his rise added little to the organisation except perhaps that he spoke fluent English and was able to communicate with Western audiences," Nabil al-Bakiri, a Yemen-based expert on Islamic militant groups, told AFP.

"Awlaqi's death will have no effect on the future of Al-Qaeda," Bakiri said adding that the American-born militant did not even hold an organisational position within the group.

In a commentary after Awlaqi's death, Bruce Riedel, senior fellow at the American think tank Brookings and a former CIA agent, said Awlaqi's death was a"significant setback for Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) but far from a fatal blow."

Riedel further pointed out that Awlaqi was neither a top ranking commander nor a bomb-maker.

"In short, AQAP's key players are still at large and very dangerous," commented Riedel on Brookings' website, adding that Yemen's slide into civil war will only benefit Al-Qaeda.

"Yemen is falling apart. The country is fragmenting into hostile blocks. The more broken Yemen becomes the more AQAP benefits because the break down in law and order allows it to operate and recruit more easily," said Riedel.

AQAP has taken advantage of the weakening of central authority by nearly nine months of deadly protests against veteran President Ali Abdullah Saleh to bolster its presence in several southern provinces as well as Marib province, where Awlaqi was killed.

Meanwhile, in the US, officials have issued a worldwide travel alert warning its nationals of the "potential for retaliation" after Awlaqi's death.

"Awlaqi's standing as a preeminent English-language advocate of violence could potentially trigger anti-American acts worldwide to avenge his death," the State Department said in its alert.

US intelligence officials believe he was linked to a US army major charged with shooting dead 13 people in Fort Hood, Texas, and to a Nigerian student accused of trying to blow up a US airliner on December 25, 2009.

Former California congresswoman Jane Harman, now head of the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, said on CNN's "State of the Union" programme on Sunday she believed Awlaqi's death to be both psychological and operational blows to AQAP.

"I think AQAP had emerged as the more potent Al-Qaeda faction in terms of mounting attacks against us," she said, adding that even though Awlaqi was not the titular head of AQAP, his involvement with the Fort Hood and US airliner incidents had made him particularly dangerous.

His death, Harman added, along with those of two other militants reportedly killed with him, "has enormous reach in terms of reducing -- degrading the capability of Al-Qaeda to attack us."

## reforming the government to better address grievances is key to eradicating AQAP

Harris 2010 (Alistair former diplomat and UN staff member Exploiting Grievances Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula YEMEN: ON THE BRINK A Carnegie Paper Series may)

Military and law enforcement responses to the threat posed by AQAP clearly have a role to play. Such responses must be proportionate, exclusively Yemeni- led, and minimize the risk of civilian casualties, which would only serve to alienate communities that are the vital ground in governmental efforts to close down AQAP’s operating space. The large number of civilian casualties fol- lowing the al-Ma’ajalah airstrikes in Abyan simply reinforced the extremist narrative that the West is using its apostate government proxy to kill innocent Muslims. While there are concrete security measures that can and must be taken to address the AQAP threat, these cannot be considered in isolation. Given the considerable resonance between AQAP’s diagnostic frame of reference and Yemeni grievances, there is a real risk this resonance will produce an increased receptivity or willingness to consider alternatives to traditional Yemeni ways of seeking redress, including violence. A comprehensive counterterrorism approach therefore goes beyond the application of hard power. Addressing the phenomenon of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, Norman Cigar offers an analysis that applies equally to Yemen:

 The challenge of the socioeconomic grievances and opening up the system to greater participation, which might appeal to the pool of potential AQAP [al- Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula] sympathizers, remains to be dealt with, and that alone can ensure victory in the longer term over the AQAP.

Yemenis are focused on improving governmental responsiveness, accountability, service provision (particularly in relation to employment), and development. These are the keys to inoculating communities against al-Qaeda’s violent prescriptions. The limited base of empirical evidence indicates that among many young people, support for armed groups—be they Houthi rebels in the North or AQAP—may be based more on economic considerations than deeply held ideological commitments. A developmental approach to countering the threat of terrorism in Yemen must focus on effective local participation, responsiveness, credibility and, crucially, service delivery. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is currently a localized threat with increasingly globalized ambitions. Addressing such a threat entails not simply kinetic counterterrorist initiatives but also a greater understanding of and attempt to address the points of resonance between the organization and local Yemeni communities, as well as the promotion of dissonance in relation to the means of seeking redress for actual and perceived grievances.

## AQAP is developing chemical weapons to attack the US

SCHMITT and SHANKER 2011 (ERIC and THOM writers for the new york times 8/13/2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/13/world/middleeast/13terror.html?\_r=1)

WASHINGTON — American counterterrorism officials are increasingly concerned that the most dangerous regional arm of Al Qaeda is trying to produce the lethal poison ricin, to be packed around small explosives for attacks against the United States.

For more than a year, according to classified intelligence reports, Al Qaeda's affiliate in Yemen has been making efforts to acquire large quantities of castor beans, which are required to produce ricin, a white, powdery toxin that is so deadly that just a speck can kill if it is inhaled or reaches the bloodstream.

Intelligence officials say they have collected evidence that Qaeda operatives are trying to move castor beans and processing agents to a hideaway in Shabwa Province, in one of Yemen’s rugged tribal areas controlled by insurgents. The officials say the evidence points to efforts to secretly concoct batches of the poison, pack them around small explosives, and then try to explode them in contained spaces, like a shopping mall, an airport or a subway station.

President Obama and his top national security aides were first briefed on the threat last year and have received periodic updates since then, top aides said. Senior American officials say there is no indication that a ricin attack is imminent, and some experts say the Qaeda affiliate is still struggling with how to deploy ricin as an effective weapon.

These officials also note that ricin's utility as a weapon is limited because the substance loses its potency in dry, sunny conditions, and unlike many nerve agents, it is not easily absorbed through the skin. Yemen is a hot, dry country, posing an additional challenge to militants trying to produce ricin there.

But senior American officials say they are tracking the possibility of a threat very closely, given the Yemeni affiliate’s proven ability to devise plots, including some thwarted only at the last minute: a bomb sewn into the underwear of a Nigerian man aboard a commercial jetliner to Detroit in December 2009, and printer cartridges packed with powerful explosives in cargo bound for Chicago 10 months later.

"The potential threat of weapons of mass destruction, likely in a simpler form than what people might imagine but still a form that would have a significant psychological impact, from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, is very, very real," Michael E. Leiter, who retired recently as director of the National Counterterrorism Center, said at a security conference last month. "It’s not hard to develop ricin."

A range of administration officials have stated that the threat of a major attack from Al Qaeda’s main leadership in Pakistan has waned after Osama bin Laden’s death in May, on top of the Central Intelligence Agency's increasing drone assaults on Qaeda targets in Pakistan's tribal areas over the past three years.

But the continuing concern over a ricin plot underscores the menace that regional Qaeda affiliates, especially Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, now pose to the United States and American interests overseas.

"That line of threat has never abated," said a senior American official, who referred to the terrorist group by its initials. "That’s been taken seriously by this government. What we know about A.Q.A.P. is that they do what they say."

**'Basic scientific knowledge'**Al Qaeda’s arm in Yemen has openly discussed deploying ricin and other deadly poisons against the United States. "Brothers with less experience in the fields of microbiology or chemistry, as long as they possess basic scientific knowledge, would be able to develop other poisons such as ricin or cyanide," the organization posted to its online English-language journal, Inspire, last fall, in an article titled "Tips for Our Brothers in the United States of America."

Senior administration officials say ricin is among the threats focused on by a secret government task force created after the printer-cartridge plot. The task force is working closely with Saudi intelligence officials and the remnants of Yemen's intelligence agencies, and it is using information gleaned from the shipboard interrogation of a Somali terrorist leader with ties to the Yemeni branch of Al Qaeda, who was captured by Navy Seal commandos in April.

The intelligence reports indicating ricin plots by Al Qaeda's Yemeni affiliate were first uncovered during reporting for a book, “Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America’s Secret Campaign Against Al Qaeda.” It will be published next week by Times Books, an imprint of Henry Holt & Company.

American officials now say that Al Qaeda’s most direct threat to the United States comes from the Yemeni affiliate. These officials have also expressed growing alarm at the way the affiliate is capitalizing on the virtual collapse of Yemen’s government to widen its area of control inside the country, and is strengthening its operational ties to the Shabab, the Islamic militancy in Somalia, to exploit the chaos in both countries.

"It continues to demonstrate its growing ambitions and strong desire to carry out attacks outside its region," Daniel Benjamin, the State Department’s counterterrorism coordinator, said in a speech last month, referring to Al Qaeda’s Yemeni branch.

The affiliate has also become a magnet for terrorists fleeing the increasing pressure from drone strikes in Pakistan, and is recruiting specialists in bomb-making and other skills. "These guys have got some notoriety," said a senior United States official who follows Al Qaeda and its affiliates closely. "They have a natural, charismatic attraction value for people who want to be jihadists and plot against the West."

"A.Q.A.P.'s senior leaders are a lot like an organization that's largely a brain that exists on its own and has to recruit its arms and legs to actually execute things," the official continued.

Largely because of the Americans in the Yemeni affiliate's top leadership, including Anwar al-Awlaki, a cleric born in New Mexico who is in hiding in Yemen, American counterterrorism and intelligence officials fear the affiliate’s innovative agility. "The fastest-learning enemy we have is A.Q.A.P.," said the senior United States official.

### The US will respond to a chemical attack with nuclear retalitation

Scott D. Sagan International Security 25.4 (2001) ( Associate Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Center for International Security aAnd Cooperation at Stanford University.) “Responding to Chemical and Biological Treast” http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international\_security/v025/25.4sagan.html#FOOT1a

The official U.S. government policy is to maintain "calculated ambiguity" about whether the United States would retaliate with nuclear weapons in response to an adversary's use of chemical weapons (CW) or biological weapons (BW) against U.S. allies, U.S. armed forces overseas, or the U.S. homeland. Since the 1991 Gulf War, numerous civilian and military leaders have stated that the United States might use nuclear weapons in response to CW and BW threats or attacks, and some have even stated that the United States will use nuclear weapons in such circumstances.1 The central argument in my spring 2000 International Security article was that this policy has created a dangerous "commitment trap" problem.2 The benefit of making such nuclear threats, whether stated ambiguously or clearly, is that they can increase an adversary's estimate of the probability that the U.S. president would order nuclear retaliation, which should therefore decrease the likelihood of chemical or biological weapons attacks. But there is a serious cost attached to this obvious benefit: If deterrence fails despite nuclear threats, the statements will also increase the likelihood that the United States will actually use nuclear weapons, because the president's personal and the U.S. government's institutional reputations for following through on threats would be perceived to be at stake. I argued that current U.S. nuclear doctrine has therefore created a subtle dilemma that has not been recognized, much less debated, in both policy and academic circles: Is the improvement in the U.S. ability to deter CW and BW threats worth the increased likelihood of a U.S. nuclear response if deterrence fails?

## If AQAP carries out a successful attack the US will invade yemen

[Strategic Studies Institute](http://www.defencetalk.com/author/strategicstudies/) 2011 [The Conflicts in Yemen and US National Security](http://www.defencetalk.com/the-conflicts-in-yemen-and-us-national-security-32049/)

February 15th, 2011<http://www.defencetalk.com/the-conflicts-in-yemen-and-us-national-security-32049/#ixzz1VPTJJWH2>

The difficulties associated with managing Yemen policy should nevertheless not be allowed to obfuscate the high stakes of the current situation in Yemen. There are important reasons for defeating al-Qaeda in Yemen, even if this does not destroy the organization and instead leads it to move operations to more hospitable sanctuaries in remote parts of the world. Yemen is central in the struggle against al-Qaeda due to its key strategic location, including a 700-mile border with Saudi Arabia. It also dominates one of the region’s key waterways, the Bab al-Mandeb strait, which controls access to the southern Red Sea. Furthermore, the problem of Yemen-based terrorism remains an important international threat which cannot be ignored. The U.S. leadership may have narrowly escaped unmanageable domestic pressure for an additional war in the Middle East when the Christmas bomber plot was thwarted in late 2009. If this incompetent enemy had actually been able to detonate his explosives, the call for a hard-line military response would have been difficult to resist. Yet, an actual invasion of Yemen would have produced a vicious indigenous response that would have been difficult to contain. Moreover, any effort to rebuild, modernize, and democratize Yemen in the aftermath of such an intervention would make the problems of Afghanistan and Iraq look simple by comparison. While paying special attention to Yemeni sensitivities about foreign influence, the United States must do what it can to prevent Yemen from falling into a cauldron of radicalism before the subject of intervention even arises.

## Military intervention in Yemen kills any hope of a negotiated end to Iranian proliferation

Tisdall 2010 (Simon assistant editor of the Guardian and a foreign affairs columnistYemen intervention risks ripple effect If the US blunders into Yemen the whole region could suffer unintended consequences, from Israel to the Horn of Africa jan 04 http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jan/04/yemen-intervention-ripple-effect)

The wider implications of direct US involvement in these murky regional intrigues are potentially damaging. Jousting with Iran over Yemen will not assist the arguably more important western objective of securing a nuclear deal with Tehran. Similarly, deepening Saudi involvement in a polarising conflict in Yemen may undercut Riyadh's current efforts to reconcile Fatah and Hamas and thereby facilitate an Arab-Israeli peace deal – a prime Obama objective. It could also weaken the Saudi regime, by creating a rallying point for internal opposition.

The negative impact of internationalising Yemen's multiple conflicts on neighbouring Horn of Africa countries should also give Washington pause. Both the Yemeni and Somali governments complain about the mutual support systems between rebel groups in the two countries. Somalia's al-Shabaab Islamist militia said last week that it would send reinforcements to Yemen should the US carry out attacks there. As usual, Eritrea's dysfunctional anti-western government is also in on the act, smuggling arms to insurgents of every hue.

An estimated 200,000 Somali refugees from the country's civil war are in Yemen. An unknown number have since joined al-Qaida, staying there or returning home. Expected, renewed US and British efforts to mandate a UN-led peacekeeping mission in Somalia are unlikely to be successful. That means an anarchic, largely ungoverned, largely hostile Somalia would provide the disruptive backdrop to any attempt to "secure" Yemen.

What the US does next in terms of opening a new Arabian front in the "war on terror", possibly centred on its military base in Djibouti, will be influenced, to a degree, by the London conference on Yemen on 28 January called by Gordon Brown. Despite Republican barbs about supposed weakness, Obama may yet opt for a low-profile, partly covert approach. But the decision is balanced on a knife's edge. As matters stand, it would not take much to trigger muscular American intervention and with it, a new desert storm.

## A nuclearized Iran causes proliferation across the middle east

Eric S. Edelman et al 2011 (ERIC S. EDELMAN is a Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; he was U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in 2005-9. ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH is President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. EVAN BRADEN MONTGOMERY is a Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Foreign Affairs The Dangers of NATO a Nuclear Iran Andrew F. Krepinevich, and Evan Braden Montgomery Subtitle: The Limits of Containment January 2011 - February 2011 SECTION: Pg. 66 Vol. 90 No. 1 )

The reports of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, as well as other analyses, have highlighted the risk that a nuclear-armed Iran could trigger additional nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, even if Israel does not declare its own nuclear arsenal. Notably, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates -- all signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) -- have recently announced or initiated nuclear energy programs. Although some of these states have legitimate economic rationales for pursuing nuclear power and although the low-enriched fuel used for power reactors cannot be used in nuclear weapons, these moves have been widely interpreted as hedges against a nuclear-armed Iran**.** The NPT does not bar states from developing the sensitive technology required to produce nuclear fuel on their own, that is, the capability to enrich natural uranium and separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. Yet enrichment and reprocessing can also be used to accumulate weapons-grade enriched uranium and plutonium -- the very loophole that Iran has apparently exploited in pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.

## A nuclearized middle east will spiral into nuclear war

Eric S. Edelman et al 2011 (ERIC S. EDELMAN is a Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; he was U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in 2005-9. ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH is President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. EVAN BRADEN MONTGOMERY is a Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Foreign Affairs The Dangers of NATO a Nuclear Iran Andrew F. Krepinevich, and Evan Braden Montgomery Subtitle: The Limits of Containment January 2011 - February 2011 SECTION: Pg. 66 Vol. 90 No. 1 )

More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents' forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine-based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, **the close proximity** of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to "launch on warning" of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with **the pressure to respond quickly**, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war.

## Thus Cari and I stand resolved that the United States Federal Government, through USAID, should substantially increase its democratic decentralization assistance for Yemen by fostering:

1. **A favorable environment for decentralization, primarily through support for decentralizing legal reforms**
2. **Democratic local governance**
3. **Local government capacity**

# Solvency

## Decentralization empowers citizens

DININIO 2000 (PHYLLIS DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE SPECIALIST, WORKING WITH USAID, THE WORLD BANK, THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS. SHE HOLDS A PH.D. IN POLITICAL SCIENCE FROM YALE UNIVERSITY, AN M.A. IN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FROM THE FLETCHER SCHOOL, AND A B.A. IN ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY FROM HARVARD UNIVERSITY. USAID􏰽S EXPERIENCE IN DECENTRALIZATION AND DEMOCRATIC LOCAL GOVERNANCE, September 2000 )

Based on lessons learned and given the proliferation of newly emerging democracies, the Agency revised its approach to local government assistance in the late 1980s. Most importantly, it began to emphasize the democratic aspects of local government programs. Decentralization became a means to empower citizens locally and to disperse power from the central government to localities, as well as a means to improve local administration. Indeed, the Agency has realized that the active participation of an informed citizenry significantly enhances the effectiveness and the sustainability of development efforts at the local level. In pursuing decentralization in tandem with democratic local governance, USAID supports not just the improved functioning of local governments, but also the increased autonomy of localities, election of local officials, and participation of community groups in decision-making. USAID programming in decentralization and democratic local governance incorporates mechanisms that promote participatory and accountable governance, such as town meetings, public hearings on major issues, participatory planning and budgeting, and opinion surveys.

## Creating a mechanism for power transition coalesces support and ensures a smooth transition

Al Muwaddah1 2011 (President – Center for Civic Development, CDDRL Yemen

Yemen between Regime Survival and Systemic Change Abdul Nasser 23 number 122)

 The presence of a mechanism for the transfer of power, would work to prepare the public and political forces for the phases to come, and would reassure those who are fearful of change, which contributes to easing the transition. In addition, the presence of a road map would make the outside world that is concerned about the change in Yemen involved and likely to support the change and to work to support it and ensure its implementation.

## Saleh has expressed desire to decentralize- needs foreign encouragement to ensure meaningful change

Day 2010 (Stephen Carnegie endowment for international peace The Political Challenge of Yemen’s Southern Movement Stephen Day Middle East Program Number 108 ■ March 2010 )

The Yemeni state is more likely to survive if power devolves from the central government, perhaps in a federal or even confederal system. All international organizations providing aid to Yemen—the World Bank, United Nations Development Programme, United States Agency for International Development, and the UK’s Department For International Development—have talked about the need for decentralization, but government resistance to the idea has meant little improvement. In the past year, President Saleh has promised to deepen the process of decentralization by allowing “directly elected local government with broad political powers,” a formulation earlier used by the Southern Movement. The international community should seize this opportunity to encourage him to widen the power structure, and it should encourage southern leaders now talking of independence to tone down their rhetoric.

## USaid is key to effective decentralization policies

DININIO 2000 (PHYLLIS DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE SPECIALIST, WORKING WITH USAID, THE WORLD BANK, THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS. SHE HOLDS A PH.D. IN POLITICAL SCIENCE FROM YALE UNIVERSITY, AN M.A. IN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FROM THE FLETCHER SCHOOL, AND A B.A. IN ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY FROM HARVARD UNIVERSITY. USAID􏰽S EXPERIENCE IN DECENTRALIZATION AND DEMOCRATIC LOCAL GOVERNANCE, September 2000 )

As government officials and citizens around the world embrace the challenge of decentralization and democratic local governance, USAID stands ready to help. Drawing on its experience in working with local governments over the past four decades and its ongoing dialogue with a variety of other organizations, USAID provides cutting-edge guidance for local efforts to establish democratic and effective government. Through a variety of partnerships in some 50 countries today, the Agency has committed important resources to this endeavor. USAID intends to build on early successes and continue the hard work of strengthening democracy and improving the welfare of local communities.

Only USAID solves – long term, comprehensive studies prove

Seligson, et al. 6 – Mitchell, Centennial professor of political science, Vanderbilt University

[EFFECTS OF U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ON DEMOCRACY BUILDING: Results of a Cross-National Quantitative Study, http://www.usaid.gov/our\_work/democracy\_and\_governance/publications/pdfs/impact\_of\_democracy\_assistance.pdf]cs

First, our descriptive review determined first, that among eligible countries, democracy has been increasing steadily since 1990, but that the gap between the advanced democracies and the developing democracies is still large. Second, U.S. foreign assistance in the area of democracy has also been increasing. Third, the total portfolio of democracy assistance, despite its growth, remains a relatively small proportion of total U.S. development assistance, which in turn is a relatively small portion of its GNP when compared to almost all other advanced industrial democracies**.** How much of this growth in democracy world-wide has been the result of U.S. foreign assistance? We found consistent and clear positive impacts of foreign assistance on democratization. Using the most widely used measures of democracy (Freedom House and Polity IV), we determined that USAID Democracy and Governance obligations have a significant positive impact on democracy, while all other U.S. and non-U.S. assistance variables are statistically insignificant. Specifically, for every 10 million additional dollars of U.S. democracy assistance in 1995 dollars (roughly the equivalent of 11.8 million in 2004 dollars), a country is predicted to be .25 units, or one-quarter of a point higher on the Freedom House general democracy index in a given year. In the Polity IV model, ten million dollars in DG obligations raises the index by about 4/10 of a point. This effect occurs over and above the “normal” pattern of democratization dynamics of the country, and occurs controlling for a host of time-varying and country-level invariant economic, social and political attributes. This is a strong initial affirmative answer to the study’s core research question. Our statistical tests attempted to challenge this initial finding in many ways. But what we found is that AID DG obligations are significant, regardless of whether they are treated in raw or per capita terms. We also found significant lagged effects of DG obligations, suggesting first, that democracy and governance programs may often take several years to “mature” to generate full outcomes, and second, that the effects of DG assistance to some degree are cumulative, with the immediate impact augmented by an additional increment on the country’s level of democracy the following year. Moreover, when we treat DG assistance as potentially endogenous (i.e., that democracy “causes” great DG assistance rather than the other way around) it does not eliminate the effect found in the study; on the contrary, the finding is strengthened. Furthermore, although there may be unmeasured variables that lead to both DG assistance and Freedom House democracy levels, our tests show that they do not appear to account for the observed positive relationship we have estimated in the study. All of the models that we have estimated to control for both omitted variable bias as well as for the potential endogeneity of AID obligations only strengthened the original finding.

## Foreign aid is key to effective decentralization policies

USAID 2010 (2010-2012 Yemen Country Strategy pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\_docs/PDACP572.pdf)

Capacity building and limited institutional development at selected levels of government will be necessary to increase the responsiveness of the Yemeni government to local needs. As governorates gain increasing responsibilities to manage the services through decentralization, they need assistance to improve resource allocation and administrative functions that impact communities. USAID will strengthen the technical capacity of sub-national government entities through training and hands-on mentoring experience in the context of community-government collaboration. Additional training for government officials will be provided on participatory development planning and implementation.

# USaid is the best actor- review process

## USaid’s uniqe review process towards yemen aid prevents corruption and ensures responsiveness

USAID 2010 (2010-2012 Yemen Country Strategy pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\_docs/PDACP572.pdf)

The USAID-ROYG relationship is strong. Ministers are approachable and available to meet with USAID. Ministerial and other senior level officials are generally cognizant of USAID’s efforts in the various sectors and appreciate USAID programming to date. During the strategy period, USAID and MoPIC agreed to hold quarterly coordination meetings and “performance reviews”, which will allow the ROYG to maintain a level of oversight of USAID initiatives and to ensure that USAID and its implementers maintain close ties with the ROYG's donor coordination body. Since the USAID Strategy for Yemen will be implemented principally at the local level, this high level review process can help raise the awareness of the national government to local needs and to successful approaches contributing to USAID’s intent of making the national government more responsive to the people’s needs. USAID will continue to look for ways to strengthen those relationships and find new ways to coordinate USG and other donor assistance to the Yemeni people while helping the ROYG to build accountability, transparency, and technical capacity within their own institutions. The monitoring and evaluation effort that will support USAID’s strategy will contribute to accountability and partnership with the ROYG and to coordination and leveraging with other development partners.