## Contention 1: Squo Aid Fails

### **Our evidence is comparative, Water outweighs any other concerns in Yemen**

Juneau 2010 (Thomas, Middle East Policy Council Journal Essay, “Yemen: Prospects for State Failure - Implications and Remedies” Volume 17, Issue 3, pages 134–152, Fall 2010)

Yemen is the poorest country in the Arab world with a per capita GDP of less than $900. By many socioeconomic indicators, it ranks alongside the most destitute countries in sub-Saharan Africa: 45 percent of the population lives on less than $2 per day, unemployment hovers around 35-40 percent, and child malnutrition rates are among the highest in the world.

Yemen’s water crisis may be its most fatal weakness. Freshwater availability is less than 200 cubic meters per capita per year, five times below the water-poverty line and 3 percent of the global average. Yemen has no major permanent river, and so relies on rainwater and underground water tables. But its aquifers are rapidly depleting, as extraction is about 30 percent above sustainable yields. Water management is inefficient and wasteful, with 40-50 percent of water in piped systems unaccounted for. This is especially the case in agriculture, which uses more than 90 percent of the country’s water. The situation is notably dire in cities and rural areas high in the western mountain range. Sanaa, where the population is growing at a rate of 7 percent per year, could run out of water as soon as 2017, and there is already talk of having to move it to a lower altitude.6 As a result, water prices have more than tripled in some cities since 2005. As water becomes scarcer and more expensive, agricultural yields suffer, while conflict over its possession and trade will increase.

### USAID ‘funding gaps’ breeds corruption and conflict

Barbara Bodine 2010, Retired Ambassador to Yemen 1997-2001, and Lecturer/Diplomat-in-Residence at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, “Yemen: Primer and Prescriptions” (<http://www.ndu.edu/press/yemen.html>)

The 2010–2012 USAID Country Strategy recognizes many of the core challenges and, as a 3-year program, attempts to address many in a coherent and systematic manner. It is a significant improvement over past approaches, but it is not nearly sufficient: Designed to be implemented over 3 years at increasing funding levels, it remains dependent upon annual congressional appropriations and thus vulnerable to the vagaries of our budget process, competing new demands, and abrupt disruptions due to non–development assistance policy disagreements between the United States and Yemen. It states that eight governorates are of greatest priority to USAID (and presumably the U.S. Government) but, citing resource limitations, targets only five—al-Jawf, Mareb, Sa’ada, Amran, and Shabwa—described as “most at risk.” This triaging risks perceptions of rewards for bad behavior and could fuel competition and rivalries from districts and governorates not selected, perceptions of corruption and cronyism, and thus disruptions in implementation. A broader distribution of smaller projects may not create as much “bang for the buck” but may avoid negative political fallout from an over-concentration in high risk areas. It is heavy on data collection that may be available through other sources, such as the World Bank or the Yemen Social Fund for Development (SFD). Data collection efforts delay project delivery. It is overly dependent upon Beltway contractors. The outcome should not be an increase in employment and the quality of life in Rockville, Maryland, or Tysons Corner, Virginia. There is insufficient coordination with the U.S. Special Operations Command Civil Affairs and community outreach. Yemen is difficult and can be dangerous, but it is not a war zone. Military-run programs must be supporting to, not parallel with, efforts by State and USAID. If we accept that a core goal is to develop effective, efficient, and self-sustaining local capacity, perhaps the greatest gap in the strategy is the underutilization of Yemeni partners. The strategy lauds the SFD as “a particularly strong and well-funded development agency [that] provides an example of an effective, efficient and transparent institutional mechanism for providing social services [that] empowers local communities [and] is considered one of the most effective branches of the Yemeni government in the areas of community development, capacity building, and small and micro-enterprise development.” But the strategy states that the SFD is not a partner institution. During my tenure as Ambassador, the U.S. Embassy worked closely with the SFD to design and implement many of our development assistance projects throughout Yemen—without a large official presence or overhead, with sufficient credit given to the United States, but a light American footprint and full transparency and accountability. There is a wheel in Yemen that is sufficiently round and rolling that we do not need to and should not seek to reinvent.

## Plan

The United States Federal Government should provide an ample and comprehensive aid package for Yemen for building civil society water user groups and requisite governance capacity at the local and national level for best utilizing water user groups.

## Advantage 1: US Aid Leadership

### **Agent counterplans can’t solve this advantage**

### **The US is key – failure to cooperate leads to instability**

Glass 2010 (Nicole Glass, Global Majority E-Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1 (June 2010), pp. 17-30

“The Water Crisis in Yemen: Causes, Consequences and Solutions”)

VII. Conclusion

The water crisis in Yemen has the potential to cause the destruction of the nation. The

water crisis was triggered by a sharp population increase, misguided agricultural policies promoting the use of water, the growing of qat, a lack of governmental regulation on using water, and a vulnerable climate to global warming. Due to inadequate water, Yemenis are suffering from lack-of-water-induced food shortages, and dehydrationrelated health problems. The water crisis has also triggered some local conflicts, which led to a decline in tourism and had therefore also negative implications on Yemen’s economy. Internal conflicts have also made it impossible for the Yemeni government to regulate water use in conflict-affected areas. For Yemen to survive as a nation, some believe it must cooperate with the United States to receive foreign aid, regulate water use and implement strict regulation policies, prohibit (or at least minimize) the cultivation of qat, import fruits and vegetables that require lots of water, prepare for climate change and use positive images (like the Rowyan cartoon) to encourage the population to participate in water conservation methods. Al-Asbahi (2005) recommended that Yemen uses rainfall water harvesting methods, improves its irrigation efficiency, investigates groundwater availability and studies the desalination of water to possibly use it as a future source. Today, Yemen is trying to make some changes, though only time will show if these attempts will be sufficient to avert an even more severe crisis.

### **Lack of USAID leadership in Yemen undermines international investment**

Bodine May 2010 (Barbara K., “Ambassador (Ret.) Barbara K. Bodine is Lecturer and Diplomat-in-Residence at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, “Yemen: Primer and Prescriptions” PRISM 1, no. 3 FEATURES | 43-58

To focus disproportionately on immedi- ate military and security capacity-building is shortsighted. If our concerns about the threats from Yemen are sufficient to fund $120 million in security assistance and an implicit under- standing that development of credible security structures is a long-term investment, then our interest in keeping Yemen on the good side of the failure curve (recognizing that it may never be wholly prosperous) warrants an equal commitment to civilian capacity-building over a similar long haul. We need to do more than invest in extending the authority of the state. We must invest as well in the legitimacy and capacity of the state and society. We cannot grant “legitimacy,” but we can assist in the development of those elements of the state that provide services to the citizens, and the development of a society strong enough to be partners to its state. The “we” here is the U.S. Government, the international com- munity, and the regional neighbors. The 2006 donors’ conference was generous, but its pledges remain unfulfilled. The 2010 London Conference made all the right noises about coordination and sustained engagement, but it will take more than a conference to con- vince the average Yemeni that there has been a credible shift in resources, philosophy, or commitment to governance and development, to a preconflict whole-of-government, and to governments plural. And Yemenis will have to be convinced that this will not all evaporate in the face of excuses and other priorities.

The perception of many Yemenis, includ- ing our friends, is that in recent years the U.S. policy aperture has narrowed to security only or security first—and to security as we define it. We need to reopen that aperture. We learned that lesson in Iraq late in the game. We are attempt- ing to apply those lessons in Afghanistan. We have progressed from conventional military to counterinsurgency to the “3Ds” (defense, diplo- macy, and development) to manage postconflict situations. We have the opportunity to apply the basics of those lessons preconflict and pre- failure in Yemen.

A sustained, comprehensive, and coordinated strategy must be based on civilian-led and civilian-focused diplomacy and development upfront, early, and long term. Our involvement in state and human capacity development needs to equal if not exceed our commitment to building a military and police capability.

### **US Leadership is key to international donor support**

Gude et al. 2011 (Ken is the Managing Director of the National Security and International Policy Program, Ken Sofer is the Special Assistant, and Aaron Gurley is an intern at American Progress. “Secretary Clinton Should Go to Yemen U.S. Should Openly Lend Diplomatic Support to Country’s Vice President” <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/07/secretary_clinton_yemen.html>)

The United States must also do a better job convincing Yemenis that our actions in Yemen are designed to help them and not simply protect our own interests. The political crisis has put one of the most water-poor countries on the planet on the brink of disaster. Most Yemenis don’t have access to running water, fuel prices have increased by 900 percent, 7 million of Yemen’s 21 million citizens go hungry every day, and rolling blackouts have kept many of the country’s hospitals from properly functioning. While the United States already provided $45 million in relief assistance this year, a vocal, public push by USAID head Raj Shah to mobilize the international community to address the humanitarian crisis in Yemen can have a real impact on the lives of perhaps millions of Yemenis and go a long way to achieving all U.S. objectives in that country. Security forces that were targeting AQAP were redeployed from the south to Sana’a to protect the Saleh family and regime since protesters became a threat to the regime in February. AQAP was thus given room to maneuver, and it capitalized on the opportunity by expanding activities in a number of key cities in southern Abyan province and exerting control over local populations. This is what prompted the uptick in American drone strikes trying to fill the void left by the departed Yemeni security forces. The problem is that drones are not a sustainable way to check AQAP’s advances—only a stable government that is capable of responding to the needs of its people can accomplish that. The world saw last Friday the impact U.S. officials can have when U.S. Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford visited Hama, the city at the heart of the uprising against Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, which bolstered the protest movement in the face of a government crackdown. Sending Hillary Clinton and Raj Shah to Sana’a could be a way to break the deadlock and push the various factions in Yemen toward the political settlement that is needed so that the next Yemeni government can tackle the multiple serious challenges it faces.

### **International coalitions are key to long-term yemen transition success**

Sanderson 2011 (Janet, Deputy Assistant Secretary Of State For Near Eastern Affairs, “Sen. Bob Casey Holds A Hearing On U.S. Policy In Yemen” July 19, 2011 Tuesday)

I have to, however, flag the fact that when there is this transition, this political transition, the needs of the Yemeni people, I think, are going to become much greater. And the international community, of which the United States is, obviously, a leading player, is going to have to step up and help the Yemenis in this new political environment move forward.

COONS: Thank you, (inaudible).

CAPOZZOLA: Thank you.

To reiterate what my colleague has said, our resources were stepped up last year in fiscal year 2010 quite significantly. In terms of development and humanitarian assistance, they more than doubled to -- compared to fiscal year 2009.

So we're stepping up our game and using, as was said, of variety of -- of creative mechanisms to extend our reach throughout the country, get into more communities in more areas, do more community level investments, the kinds of things we can do in this environment, where we -- we may not have the type of partnership we need at the central level to tackle some of the fundamental development challenges -- for example, water, OK?

So we're doing a lot of local level water with these increased resources and, I think, sending a very strong message to the Yemeni people about U.S. support for this situation. On the other hand, we can't address the long-term water challenges that Yemen faces right now until attention can be turned to that in the center on key policies and engagement with the broader international community to bring the kind of investment together that will -- will tackle those sorts of challenges.

### **International aid flight leads to Yemeni collapse**

Guardian September 19, 2011 (Simon Tisdall, is an assistant editor of the Guardian and a foreign affairs columnist. “Yemen is threatening to turn into another Somalia” http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/sep/19/yemen-saleh)

This may help explain why the US has been much more active bombing Yemen than reforming it in recent months. Obama administration officials told Karen DeYoung of the Washington Post this weekend that the US has "significantly increased" the number of Pakistan-style unmanned drone attacks on White House-approved al-Qaida targets, mostly in south Yemen. The CIA had been told to expand its Yemen operations and was building a new regional base, the officials said. Several drone attacks each week have been reported by local media. None of the attacks is publicly acknowledged.

In a speech at Harvard last week, John Brennan, Barack Obama's counter-terrorism adviser, indicated that Washington sees Yemen first and foremost as an important new battleground rather than a future bastion of Arab democracy. "The United States does not view our authority to use military force against al-Qaida as being restricted solely to 'hot' battlefields like Afghanistan," he said. "We reserve the right to take unilateral action if or when other governments are unwilling or unable to take the necessary actions themselves." Brennan maintained that this doctrine did not mean the US could use military force "whenever we want, wherever we want" – but it certainly points that way.

But instead of increasing humanitarian relief and other assistance to Yemen as the crisis deepens, the World Bank has cut back on aid, citing the uncertain political and security situation. The UN and other agencies have also been handicapped by funding shortfalls as recession-hit wealthy countries keep their hands in their pockets. A UN-administered emergency relief fund only has 57% of its required funding for 2011. With the political impasse continuing, and fighting flaring on all fronts, fears grow that Yemen may be reincarnated as Somalia II.

### **Yemeni instability causes Saudi Arabia-Iran proxy wars**

Bipartisan Policy Center 2011

Project Co-Chairs: Ambassador Paula Dobriansky, former Undersecretary of State

Admiral (Ret.) Gregory Johnson, former Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe

Fragility and Extremism in Yemen, Bipartisan Policy Center, January 2011 pg 3

Were the situation to deteriorate further, and Yemen to fail completely, the United States would likely witness a security vacuum on the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula. At best, this would mirror Somalia across the Red Sea; at worst the two could combine to destabilize the entire region. This would permit greater freedom of maneuver for al-Qaida and pirates astride a major chokepoint for international energy flows; exacerbate ongoing internal conflicts, potentially turning them into Saudi-Iranian proxy wars and/or spilling over into neighboring countries; and could trigger major humanitarian disasters among an extremely impoverished and underserviced population. The calls for excising this latest terrorist cancer—al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, the merger of Saudi and Yemeni al-Qaida militants—have been swift and all but unanimous. The need for action, however, ought not obscure the difficulty of the task. Instead, our response should be based on a thorough analysis of challenges facing Yemen and their underlying causes, including how state fragility and extremism are intricately interwoven. Terrorist threats continue to emanate from Yemen not because the government lacks the military strength to eradicate them, but because the regime has done little to resolve the myriad social, economic and political problems that beset the county. Extremist groups have persisted, indeed thrived, in Yemen by exploiting these weaknesses and the state’s resultant lack of legitimacy.

### That causes nuclear war

United Press International 09(“Saudi-Yemen conflict sharpens region's rivalries” <http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2009/12/01/Saudi-Yemen-conflict-sharpens-regions-rivalries/UPI-23441259705297/>) BAL

If the U.S. initiative to solve the nuclear issue founders, the prospect increases that Israel, jittery about the challenge to its regional nuclear monopoly and growing international criticism about alleged war crimes, could launch the pre-emptive strike it has threatened for so long against Iran. The Saudi-Iranian faceoff is heightened by Riyadh's fears of Iranian and Shiite expansion following the emergence of a Shiite-ruled Iraq. The deadlock in efforts to secure an Arab-Israeli peace, after a decade-and-a-half of futile negotiations, only makes things more fraught. But at the root of all this is the religious schism between the Sunnis, Islam's mainstream sect, and the breakaway Shiites that dates from Islam's early days in the 7th century over who should have succeeded the Prophet Mohammed. The prospect of a direct confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran over Yemen, fueled of course by the covert activities of both sides in Lebanon, Iraq and the Palestinian territories, will be heightened if the fighting in Yemen gets worse and drags in others.

## **Advantage 2: Yemeni COIN**

### **Water aid packages are key to maintain relations**

Boucek 2011 (Christopher, Associate Affiliation: Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, “Sen. Bob Casey holds a hearing on U.S. policy in yemen, July 19, 2011 LN)

Much of American policy towards Yemen has been focused on counterterrorism. And despite, I think, all of the efforts of our government and what we heard in the first panel, I think the perception in Yemen is still that counterterrorism and Al Qaida is what the United States cares about.

And while there's certainly a need for a robust counterterrorism program, there are also a number of other things that we can look at and we probably should look at.

And I would say that corruption and access to water are two of the most important issues that we can focus on. These are issues that affect every Yemeni. These are things that we can do to improve the situation, because security and stability will come when the situation and conditions in Yemen improve full stop for everyone in Yemen.

We need to make sure that our policy is geared towards addressing the Republic of Yemen, not the government. I think that's an important message that we need to maintain. And we need to make sure that we continue to focus our aid and assistance programs not only on areas where we're concerned about Al Qaida or radicalization, because, again, that sends the message that this is the only reason why we're interested in Yemen.

### Water policy stabilizes a post-Saleh Yemen – This is our last window of opportunity

Gude and Sofer 2011 (Ken and Ken, June 2011 “The Last Best Chance to Save Yemen,” Center for American Progress, June http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/06/pdf/yemen.pdf)

Clearly, the ongoing fighting makes the delivery of relief supplies difficult, but during the cease-fire while Saleh is out of the country it is possible for the nongovernmental organizations, with U.S. and GCC support, to deliver immediate critical aid to the Yemeni people. Additionally, Saleh’s absence from the country provides an opportunity to call for a temporary cease-fire to allow humanitarian relief to come in. The most important issue of concern is the growing water shortage throughout the nation. Yemen already faced water supply issues as the most water poor nation in the Middle East, but the loss of domestic oil, which powers the drills that pump water, has cut off large sections of the population to water supplies. Disaster relief organizations should immediately start supplying the population with water supplies, while the United States simultaneously works with Saudi Arabia to divert nearby diesel fuel to get the water pumps up and running again. The next priority will be to reconnect the country’s electrical grid, which has largely been shut down by rebel tribes, and give the population access to electricity again. Coming to the direct aid of the Yemeni people during this crisis is not only morally the right thing to do, but it would improve the standing of the United States with the population on the verge of a major political transition. The violence and political turmoil in Yemen has cost the country $5 billion—17 percent of its GDP—and put the poorest country in the Middle East on the verge of economic collapse. Whoever leads the next Yemeni government will need significant support far beyond military assistance to fight terrorism. As President Obama highlighted during his speech on the Middle East two weeks ago, the unrest across the region largely reflects a frustration with limited economic opportunity. The United States should make clear that it is prepared to assist a post-Saleh Yemen with a package of economic aid and development programs. Economic assistance in a post-Saleh Yemen should center around three key issues: establishing a postoil economy, developing the country’s agricultural sector, and implementing a smarter water strategy. The economic challenges of Yemen are not ones that the United States could or should help solve on its own, as the other Arab Gulf nations have significant interest in seeing a stable Yemen on its borders. President Obama should call on Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar to use their oil and natural gas wealth to develop a debt relief and investment program similar to what the president proposed for Egypt and Tunisia. At the very least, the money for tribal patronage paid for by Saudi Arabia should be diverted to strategic investment in the Yemeni economy. The details of what role the United States and regional partners will play in Yemen’s economic future will need to be addressed in close cooperation with the leaders of Yemen’s next government to ensure that economic policies and assistance are coordinated for effectiveness. There are genuine tradeoffs by promoting such active involvement by the Gulf nations, who have proven reluctant to allow an open, democratic nation to grow on their borders. Given our domestic fiscal restraints and limited ties to the future leaders of Yemen, however, coordinating our priorities for Yemen’s future with the capabilities of our regional partners will be essential to putting Yemen on the path toward stability. Conclusion The latest bout of political violence in Yemen threatens to push an already fractured country into a genuine failed state. While it is true we have limited capacity to end the violence and political unrest, the United States must take advantage of the last remaining window of opportunity—Saleh’s forced departure to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment—to help bring about a peaceful resolution to the crisis.

### Plan wins the hearts and minds

Barbara Bodine 2010, Retired Ambassador to Yemen 1997-2001, and Lecturer/Diplomat-in-Residence at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, “Yemen: Primer and Prescriptions” (<http://www.ndu.edu/press/yemen.html>)

To the extent the Yemeni people see our presence and efforts in their country as an American Third Front against al Qaeda with Yemen little more than the battleground, and see no corresponding commitment to Yemen or its people, resentment toward the United States and its allies will increase. Anti-Americanism does exist, but it reflects frustration and disillusionment with American policy in and toward Yemen, including widely erratic assistance levels over the past few years, as much as general antipathy toward American military operations in the region. Our announced economic and development strategy is an improvement but is still woefully inadequate. To be effective and credible, it needs the profile, funding, and sustained commitment of the security package. It must work on governance, state, and human capacity at the national and local levels.

### Al-Qaeda can get nukes and they’ll use them

Arbuckle 8 (Larry J. Arbuckle, Lieutenant, United States Navy, June 2008, “THE DETERRENCE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM THROUGH AN ATTRIBUTION CAPABILITY,” <http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2008/Jun/08Jun_Arbuckle.pdf>)

However, there is evidence that a small number of terrorist organizations in recent history, and at least one presently, have nuclear ambitions. These groups include Al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo, and Chechen separatists (Bunn, Wier, and Friedman; 2005). Of these, Al Qaeda appears to have made the most serious attempts to obtain or otherwise develop a nuclear weapon. Demonstrating these intentions, in 2001 Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, and two other al Qaeda operatives met with two Pakistani scientists to discuss weapons of mass destruction development (Kokoshin, 2006). Additionally, Al Qaeda has made significant efforts to justify the use of mass violence to its supporters. Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, an al Qaeda spokesman has stated that al Qaeda, “has the right to kill 4 million Americans – 2 million of them children,” in retaliation for deaths that al Qaeda links to the U.S. and its support of Israel (as cited in Bunn, Wier, and Friedman; 2005). Indeed Bin Laden received a fatwa in May 2003 from an extreme Saudi cleric authorizing the use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. civilians (Bunn, Wier, and Friedman; 2005). Further evidence of intent is the following figure taken from al Qaeda documents seized in Afghanistan. It depicts a workable design for a nuclear weapon. Additionally, the text accompanying the design sketch includes some fairly advanced weapons design parameters (Boettcher & Arnesen, 2002). Clearly maximizing the loss of life is key among al Qaeda’s goals. Thus their use of conventional means of attack presently appears to be a result of their current capabilities and not a function of their pure preference (Western Europe, 2005). The intentions of the Chechen terrorists are less clear. However, it is clear that this organization has carried out reconnaissance operations at Russian nuclear warhead storage facilities. Additionally, there is evidence that Chechen terrorists considered seizing a Russian research institute in 2002 that contained enough HEU to construct dozens of nuclear weapons (Bunn, Wier, and Friedman; 2005). Some might argue that the decision not to attack the site indicates a lack of nuclear ambitions. However, the fact that the plan was seriously considered lends credence to the possibility that the organization does pose a serious potential nuclear threat. It is likely that few terrorist organizations seek to obtain a nuclear capability. However, as can be seen from above, such organizations do appear to exist. Sadly, the organizations that have demonstrated these intentions have also demonstrated that they have the capability of conducting complex planning, are well financed, and have an ideology that resonates with significant numbers of people.

### The impact is extinction

Sid-Ahmed ‘4

(Mohamed, Managing Editor for Al-Ahali, “Extinction!” August 26-September 1, Issue no. 705, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm)

A nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nagazaki, even if -- and this is far from certain -- the weapons used are less harmful than those used then, Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear technology, had no choice but to capitulate. Today, the technology is a secret for nobody. So far, except for the two bombs dropped on Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten. Now we are at a stage where they can be detonated. This completely changes the rules of the game. We have reached a point where anticipatory measures can determine the course of events. Allegations of a terrorist connection can be used to justify anticipatory measures, including the invasion of a sovereign state like Iraq. As it turned out, these allegations, as well as the allegation that Saddam was harbouring WMD, proved to be unfounded. What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

### **AQAP will strike Saudi oil and the royal family**

Juneau 2010 (Thomas, Middle East Policy Council Journal Essay, “Yemen: Prospects for State Failure - Implications and Remedies” Volume 17, Issue 3, pages 134–152, Fall 2010)

Implications of Failure

The convergence of multiple and intensifying challenges raises the strong possibility that Yemen will continue its slide towards failure. Under such a scenario, as the central government’s authority further erodes, it will exert less and less control over increasing swaths of the countryside and smaller cities, and eventually over larger cities and certain neighborhoods of cities it will still control. Those areas will fall under the partial or complete control of a wide array of well-armed tribes, warlords and, to a much smaller extent, AQAP. Terrorism The possibility of AQAP’s increasingly using its safe haven as a launching pad for terrorist operations is the most worrying potential implication of a failed Yemen. Low and decreasing government authority provides a base for the group to organize itself, recruit and train operatives, and launch operations. The country is strategically located, bordering on Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil producer and host of Islam’s two holiest sites, and in close proximity to Somalia, a failed state and terrorist haven. Yemen’s tribal culture, plentiful access to weapons and criminal networks, and large recruiting pool of young men also converge to make it an ideal base. A key question concerns AQAP’s ambitions: does the group intend to focus on Yemen, the Arabian Peninsula, or the United States? Evidence suggests that, having consolidated the organization in 2008 and 2009 by merging its Saudi and Yemeni branches and by establishing a more durable foundation, AQAP rapidly leapt from targeting governmental and foreign interests in Yemen, to having regional and global ambitions. At the local level, AQAP has shown a keen strategic and tactical sense with a dual strategy of choosing mostly foreign (embassies and tourists) and government targets (security services and oil installations), while avoiding civilian casualties and improving its relations with tribes that either host it or could eventually do so (especially in the southern and central governorates of Abyan, Marib, Shabwa and al-Jawf).37 This gradually entrenches AQAP in Yemen and makes future efforts to tackle it more difficult, as this would imply also taking on its tribal allies. AQAP has learned lessons from al-Qaeda’s mistakes in Iraq and Somalia and its successes in Pakistan and Afghanistan: terrorist groups are best served not by Hobbesian anarchy but by making deals with hosts in areas of tribal self-government.38 As part of this approach, AQAP has adopted a narrative integrating traditional Yemeni grievances against corruption and poverty.39 Despite recent successes, it is not a given that AQAP will succeed in establishing long-term mutually beneficial relationships with tribes. Both do share some common interests: tribes can offer AQAP shelter and an operational base, while AQAP can offer money and fighters. Potential conflicts, however, are numerous. Tribes, above all, prize local autonomy, which could conflict with al-Qaeda’s objectives of establishing an Islamic caliphate and launching operations against distant enemies. Repeated attacks by central forces against AQAP could, on the one hand, inflame local feelings against Sanaa and drive tribes closer to AQAP. At the same time, it is not inconceivable that, as happened in Iraq, some tribes could eventually assess that they have more to lose from hosting AQAP. Whether AQAP succeeds in avoiding the latter scenario is key to its future in Yemen. It should be remembered, however, that this has little or no bearing on the inexorable erosion of state authority in Yemen, though it will considerably influence the implications. AQAP demonstrated its regional ambitions with two failed attacks on Saudi Arabia in 2009, including an aborted assassination attempt against a deputy minister of the interior. AQAP, which has been vociferous in its opposition to the Saudi regime, is highly likely to continue targeting the kingdom, chiefly its oil installations and members of the royal family. That said, though a successful attack on a member of the royal family would undoubtedly have an important psychological impact, it would be unlikely to cause major instability. There have been no reported attacks thus far in 2010, but in March, Riyadh announced the arrest of over 100 suspected AQAP militants, who were allegedly planning suicide attacks on oil installations.40 Finally, an important unknown in AQAP’s regional ambitions is whether it intends to strike other states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC);41 though this is plausible, there is no hard evidence of the group’s plans. The failed December 25, 2009, attack against an airliner near Detroit, rapidly claimed by AQAP, spectacularly brought to the world’s attention the group’s growing international ambitions — and the fact that it has the capabilities and will to act. The group’s trajectory and statements in past months suggest that more attacks on U.S. soil or against U.S. interests in Yemen or the Middle East are likely. One potential vector for AQAP’s global ambitions could be the three dozen or so American former convicts who converted to Islam in U.S. prisons and reportedly joined extremist groups in Yemen after their release.42 The possibility of a nexus forming between AQAP and al-Shabab, an al-Qaeda-linked group in Somalia, has attracted some attention.43 Though there has been little evidence so far of cooperation beyond rhetorical promises of support,44 there is potential for future association on the basis of proximity (at its narrowest, the Gulf of Aden is only 150 km wide), existing personal ties,45 and the strong criminal and smuggling networks linking the two countries. AQAP’s growing presence in the southern governorate of Abyan, giving it access to the waters of the Gulf of Aden, could eventually facilitate such contacts. The large presence of Somali refugees in Yemen also provides a tool for networking and a potential recruiting basin. There were, for example, media reports in early 2010 of Yemeni security forces raiding Somali refugee communities and detaining al-Shabab loyalists.46 Humanitarian Consequences State failure in Yemen would have dire humanitarian consequences. The combination of insecurity and difficult geography would render the delivery of assistance to some regions impossible. The result could well include a significant refugee crisis, with hundreds of thousands trying to cross the Saudi or (in smaller numbers) Omani borders. Some might also try to cross the Red Sea to Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan, or even Egypt. As areas of the country suffer from insecurity and growing water and food scarcity and lose what little government services they have, hundreds of thousands and possibly millions are also at risk of becoming internally displaced. The current humanitarian situation in the North, where around 200,000 live in dire conditions in makeshift camps, could provide a foretaste of things to come.

### Oil shocks collapse growth

Roubini & Setser 4 (Nouriel Roubini, Professor of Business, Brad Setser, Research Associate, Global Economic Governance Programme, University College, Oxford, August 2004, online)

Oil prices shocks have a stagflationary effect on the macroeconomy of an oil importing country: they slow down the rate of growth (and may even reduce the level of output – i.e. cause a recession) and they lead to an increase in the price level and potentially an increase in the inflation rate. An oil price hike acts like a tax on consumption and, for a net oil importer like the United States, the benefits of the tax go to major oil producers rather than the U.S. government. The impact on growth and prices of an oil shock depends on many factors: - The size of the shock, both in terms of the new real price of oil and the percentage increase in oil prices. At its close of $43 a barrel on July 30, 2004, the current real price of oil is high – well above the levels during the 1990 and 2000 oil minishocks, but it remains well below the peak real oil price of $82 in 1980, and equal to the post 73 real price of $43. The recent 65% increase in oil prices (since the 2002 average price) 3 is comparable to the increase in 2000 (60%, but from a very low starting point, as oil prices had fallen to a low of around $15 in 1999), higher than the increase in 1990 (40%), but much smaller than the increases in 1973 (210%) and 1979-80 (135%). - The shock’s persistence. This will depend on many things, many as much political as economic, since the current high oil price reflects both booming Asian demand (China alone is expected to account for roughly 40% of the increase in demand for oil in 2004) and geopolitical risk in the Middle East (the “fear premium” estimated to add between $4 and $8 to current prices). - The dependency of the economy on oil and energy. The U.S. economy is much less energy intensive than it was in the 1970s, but it also much bigger and produces comparatively less domestic oil. Net oil imports of 1.2% of GDP in 2003 are higher than net oil imports of 0.9% of GDP in 1970. - The policy response of monetary and fiscal authorities These effects are not trivial: oil shocks have caused and/or contributed to each one of the US and global recessions of the last thirty years. Yet while recent recessions have all been linked to an increase in the price of oil, not all oil price spikes lead to a recession. The 2003 spike associated with the invasion of Iraq is a good example.

### Extinction

Bearden 2000(Lt. Col Thomas E. Bearden, PhD, MS, BSCo-inventor - the 2002 Motionless Electromagnetic Generator - a replicated overunity EM generator Listed in Marquis' Who'sWho in America, 2004)

Just **prior to the** terrible **collapse of the World economy**, with the crumbling well underway and rising, **it is inevitable that** some of the **weapons of mass destruction will be used** by one or more nations **on others**. An interesting result then—as all the old strategic studies used to show—is that **everyone will fire everything as fast as possible against their perceived enemies**. The reason is simple: When the mass destruction weapons are unleashed at all, **the only chance a nation has to survive is to** desperately try to **destroy its perceived enemies** before they destroy it. So **there will erupt a spasmodic unleashing of the long range missiles, nuclear arsenals, and biological warfare arsenals of the nations as they feel the economic collapse**, poverty, death, misery, etc. a bit earlier. **The ensuing holocaust is certain to immediately draw in the major nations also,** and literally a **hell on earth will result**. In short, **we will get the great Armageddon** we have been fearing since the advent of the nuclear genie. Right now, my personal estimate is that **we have** about **a 99% chance of that scenario** or some modified version of it, **resulting**.

## **Advantage 3: Quality of Life**

### **Water shortages undermine quality of life and systematically kill 4,000 a year**

Hales 2010 (Gavin, lead researcher of the YAVA, an independent research project of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. D “Under pressure Social violence over land and water in Yemen, october http://www.yemen-ava.org/pdfs/Yemen-Armed-Violence-IB2-Social-violence-over-land-and-water-in-Yemen.pdf)

Yemen suffers from severe and increasing water scarcity and, as a result, competition for water resources is common. This is often manifested as armed violence, particularly given the importance of agriculture to the economy of Yemeni civil society. 31 The annual per capita availability of freshwater is 120 m3 for the whole country, which is only 10 per cent of the regional average and less than 2 per cent of the global average. 32 In the western part of the highlands, where 90 per cent of the population is located, the average is only 90 m3 per person per year. 33 There are no permanent rivers. 34 With extremely low levels of rainfall across most of the country, 35 conflict over water is intimately connected to land issues in Yemen. This is due to territorial (upstream) control over the flow of surface water to downstream users and, increasingly over the last three decades, access to groundwater through the digging of (ever deeper) tube wells, predominantly on private land. 36 With the exception of direct rainfall, all water sources are subject to the potential for unequal access and control, key factors that lead competition to develop into conflict and armed violence. Human-made interventions such as dam construction 37 and spate channel ‘improvements’, 38 and natural changes such as to wadi (seasonal river) morphology and spate events, can all serve to interfere with delicate social balances and catalyse conflicts. 39 Conflict over rainwater tends to be seasonal and is most common during the rainy seasons (approximately April–May and August–September). 40 Until comparatively recently, 41 rural areas were overwhelmingly irrigated by surface water, including rainfall and spate water, typically managed through locally negotiated customary approaches. Starting in the 1970s, Yemenis working in Saudi Arabia became aware of the possibilities of groundwater extraction and were soon buying tube well drilling equipment, starting in areas such as Sa’dah. 42 Between 1970 and 2003 the percentage of total cultivable land irrigated by wells rose from 3 to 37 per cent. 43 Groundwater resources are now being exploited at a rate that far exceeds natural recharge 44 and water levels have plummeted in areas such as Sana’a, Sa’dah, and Taiz. 45 Predictions suggest that ‘the majority of aquifers [will] run dry in a period of 15 to 50 years’, 46 with potentially devastating consequences for social stability. 47 Conflict over access to underground water takes a number of forms. Competition among well owners drawing water from the same aquifer can lead to a ‘race to the bottom’ 48 of the aquifer. Conflict can also arise between rural and urban users where water is taken from rural areas for urban use. This has occurred in Taiz, where rural users saw their water sources dry up from being used to supply urban areas. 49 This has also taken place in Abyan, where extracted water is piped to Aden and locals destroyed well-field pipelines in protest. 50 It also occurs between citizens and the state, where grievances accumulate relating to failures in public service provision. In June 2009, for example, protesters took to the streets in Lahj to protest the month-long disconnection of the municipal water supply. 51 Then in August 2009 one person was killed and three injured in Aden in clashes between police and protesters over the same issue. 52 These incidents should be seen in the context of widespread political unrest in the south of Yemen. In many cases water disputes may be the trigger for conflict against a background of other grievances. 53 Ward has usefully identified five factors that can transform competition for scarce water into conflict, while al-Amry provides a sixth (see Table 1). Land and water disputes are a chronic, debilitating reality for a great many Yemenis. While mortality data is extremely limited, a recent internal Interior Ministry report estimated some 4,000 violent deaths annually due to land and related disputes. 55 These deaths are over and above the roughly 1,000 criminal homicides that are publicly reported (see Box 2). Separately, it was reported that in Ibb governorate alone, where high rainfall means that the land is very productive and social conflict is said to be especially severe, 800 people were sent to prison for homicide offences between January and August 2009 alone, most related to land disputes. 56 Individual documented accounts support the extent of land- and waterrelated violence. As part of a five-year cycle of revenge killings, a land dispute between the Hajerah and Annis tribes in Ibb and Dhamar governorates, south of Sana’a, claimed the lives of more than 30 and wounded 100 in early July 2005 alone. 57 Elsewhere, conflict reduction specialists working for the Yemeni quasi-governmental Social Fund for Development (SFD) described an area in Sana’a governorate where land (and water) conflicts were resulting in around two armed violence deaths per week, including while conflict reduction training was being carried out. Violent land disputes are a frequent occurrence in areas such as the newer parts of Sana’a city where new construction is widespread and land values are rising rapidly. In all cases the majority of victims are men and the associated effects of their deaths and injuries on family earnings and wider productivity are devastating. In addition to mortality and morbidity, violent land disputes—and associated revenge norms—result in potentially productive land remaining unused, the destruction of valuable crops, and the delay or cancellation of new investments. Research on Yemen’s coffee industry, for example, highlights the way that ‘multiple rights to the same piece of land’ have served to limit investment and have even resulted in resource destruction such as tree cutting. Water disputes can lead to water supplies being impeded or even cut.

### **Water crisis will kill millions of Yemenis**

Pipes 2011 (Daniel, director of the Middle East

 Forum and a visiting fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution. “PIPES: The emptying of Yemen Crises triggered by a water shortage could lead to modern-day exodus” <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jun/6/the-emptying-of-yemen/>)

For the first time in its exceedingly long history, Yemen now threatens the outside world. It does so in two principal ways. First, even before the current political upheaval began there on Jan. 15, violence out of Yemen already impinged on Westerners. As President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s weak government controlled only a small part of the country, violence had emerged both near to Yemen, such as attacks on American and French ships, and distant from it, like Anwar al-Awlaki’s incitement to terrorism in Texas, Michigan and New York. With Mr. Saleh’s apparent abdication on June 4, when he traveled to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment, the central government’s writ will further diminish, leading to yet more attacks being planned inside Yemen for execution outside the country. But it’s the second danger that staggers my mind: An unprecedented emptying out of Yemen, with millions of unskilled and uninvited refugees, first in the Middle East, then in the West - many of them Islamist - demanding economic asylum. The problem begins with an increasingly cataclysmic water shortfall. Gerhard Lichtenthaeler, a specialist on this topic, wrote in 2010 how in many of the country’s mountainous areas, available drinking water - usually drawn from a spring or a cistern - is down to less than one quart per person per day. Its aquifers are being mined at such a rate that groundwater levels have been falling by 10 to 20 feet annually, threatening agriculture and leaving major cities without adequate safe drinking water. Sanaa could be the first capital city in the world to run dry. And not just Sanaa: As a London Times headline put it, Yemen “could become first nation to run out of water.” Nothing this extreme has happened in modern times, although similar patterns of drought have developed in Syria and Iraq. Scarce food resources, columnist David Goldman points out, threaten to leave large numbers of Middle Easterners hungry and one-third of Yemenis faced chronic hunger before the unrest. That number is growing quickly. The prospect of economic collapse looms larger by the day. Oil supplies are reduced to the point that “Trucks and buses at petrol stations queue for hours, while water supply shortages and power blackouts are a daily norm,” according to Reuters. Productive activity is proportionately in decline. If water and food were not worrisome enough, Yemen has one of the highest birthrates in the world, exacerbating the resource problem. With an average of 6.5 children per woman, almost one in six women is pregnant at any given time. Today’s population of 24 million is predicted to double in about 30 years. Politics exacerbate the problem. If Mr. Saleh is history (too many forces have arrayed against him for him to return to power, plus the Saudis may not let him leave), his successor will have difficulty ruling even the meager portion of the country that he controlled. Because many factions with diverse aims are competing for power - Mr. Saleh’s allies, Houthi rebels in the north, a secessionist movement in the south, al Qaeda-style forces, a youth movement, the military, certain tribes and the Ahmar family - they will not coalesce into a neat two-way conflict. Anarchy, in other words, looks more probable than civil war; Somalia and Afghanistan could be models. Yemeni Islamists range from members of the Islah Party, which competes in parliamentary elections, to the Houthi rebels fighting Saudi forces, to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Their growing power boosts the Iranian-backed “resistance bloc” of states and organizations. If Shiites prevail over Sunnis in Yemen, Tehran will gain all the more. In combination, these several crises - ecological, economic, political, ideological - could prompt a mass, unprecedented and tragic exodus from Yemen, leading to an epic anti-Yemeni backlash. On a personal note: I was fascinated by Yemen on a visit as a student in 1972. A land so difficult of access that colonial powers only lapped at its edges, it managed to keep its customs, including a spectacular style of architecture and a distinctive culture of dagger-wearing men and most adults chewing qat. Can the outside world prevent catastrophe? No. Yemen’s terrain, culture and politics all render a military intervention untenable; and who at this time of deficits and austerity will subsidize its dismal and failing economy? No states will volunteer to take in millions of refugees. In this darkest hour, Yemenis are on their own.

### **Children, especially girls, are the most at risk**

Yemen Today 2010, “Already Thirsty and Drying Fast: The Yemeni Water Crisis”, (<http://www.yemen-today.com/go/general/3619.html>)

But it is children, not qat farmers, that are the biggest victims of water scarcity, according to Johan Kuylenstierna, the chief technical advisor for UN Water. Efforts to educate girls in the countryside are crippled by water scarcity, he said. They often spend their time collecting water for their families, and if they do have time to go to school, they are likely to have frequent absences caused by drinking dirty water and inadequate sanitation. About 2 million children die every year from water-related diseases. When girls reach puberty in water-scarce areas, they often drop out, because schools don’t have special toilets for girls, or any toilets at all. And efforts to spread awareness about the impact of sanitation on education are often thwarted, he said. “There is a lot of stigma around sanitation,” he said. But for families in Sana’a that live without running water or sewers, the stigma is not nearly as painful as the toil of living in a water-scarce country. Mohammad Ali, who lives in a massive shantytown in Sana’a with his six children, said he left his village in Mahweet because he couldn’t find water. Now he carries water in plastic jugs from a public spigot to his single-room dwelling, because he can’t afford to buy water. “It’s a hard life here,” he said. “We are suffering so much.”

## Solvency

### **Water user groups solve regulations and end conflict**

CEDARE 2006 (“Water Conflicts and Conflict Management Mechanisms in the Middle East and North Africa Region Centre for Environment and Development for the Arab Region and Europe (CEDARE),” March 2006)

User participation in project planning, implementation, management and operation proved to be a successful tool for preventing or minimising conflicts. This will hold true only if the beneficiary participants consider the benefit of the wider public, being a community or a whole nation, from the projects. Seeking personal interests and benefits by beneficiary participants can in many cases at least seriously hinder the progress of important projects if not halt them completely. Education and public awareness campaigns are important tools for stopping such a behaviour. The inability of the water users to resolve conflicts over shared resources forces them to search for individual solutions (e.g. dig their own wells). The individual solutions might appear appropriate in the short term, however, they could lead to more adverse consequences on the long term (e.g. competition between too many and close wells). It is in the interest of whole communities that disputes and conflicts over shared resources, especially water, be resolved in an efficient and timely manner in order to maintain the solidarity and cohesion of the communities, thus ensure sustainable use of the resources. • Conflicts in countries with sufficient water resources Water conflicts are not entirely associated with water scarcity: even in countries with generous water resources such as Iran, disputes and conflicts over water arise at the national level as water is transferred from regions with surplus resources to those in shortage. Unfortunately, such disputes are not based on sound technical or socio-economic reasons, but on political and personal interests that do not serve the overall benefits of the countries. 6. RECOMMENDATIONS ß Water user organisations, whether formal or informal, are and can be very effective means of conflict minimisation and resolution. Although formal water user organisations have had some relatively long history now in MENA, they are generally not mature yet and need continuous institutional support until they become efficient, sustainable and independent. The models of formal water user organisations should not be necessarily copied every where as a move towards modernisation and sustainability of the water sector. Informal water user organisations in indigenous irrigation schemes in MENA have proved to be equally, if not more, efficient. ß Adopting the participatory approach in water resources planning, management and utilisation is very important in minimising water conflicts. User participation in the formulation of solutions to existing and potential problems as well as reaching agreements on water allocation and utilisation ensures the acceptance of the wider communities to the reached decisions and secures their sustainability thus minimising water conflicts . However, it is essential for such an approach to succeed that public institutions be willing and learn to give room to user participation. ß It is essential that the water legislation be continuously updated in order to keep pace with the dynamic nature and continuous challenges of the water sector and its demands. In particular, updating the legislation should close all the gaps and clear any ambiguities. ß The judicial system should be freed from the bureaucratic procedures that hinder its activities. Special simple procedures for dealing with water conflicts and disputes can be introduced in the system in order to simplify and speed up the process, thus making this tool effective in water conflict resolution. ß Water-service charges are not necessarily efficient means of water rationalisation; however, they are important for protecting the investments made in the water services and maintaining their sustainability. Realising these objectives requires that water-service charges be based on actual water consumption not on flat rates. In order to avoid dealing with very large numbers of water users in the agricultural sector, water-service charges can be applied at high levels in the system and the responsibility of dividing those charges among the individual users be given to the water user organisations. ß The water tariffing system should take into account the financial viability of the organizations operating in the water sector and the user’s capacity to pay in order to maintain its sustainability and to avoid conflicts. ß Education and public awareness campaigns are important means of changing people’s behaviour and way of thinking, thus minimising or preventing certain types of conflicts and disputes. Similarly, training of government staff within the water sector is essential in order to continuously upgrade their skills and build their capacity in dealing with the new challenges they face during their everyday business. ß The out of basin transfer reduces conflicts and helps overcome water shortages at places where water is transferred to, nevertheless, it creates conflicts, or increases the severity of conflicts if they already exist, at the supply side, from where the water is transferred.

### Weak water civil society groups results in bad governance that breads corruption

ZEITOUN et al. 3 JUNE 2011 (ZEITOUN1, TONY ALLAN2, NASSER AL AULAQI3, AMER JABARIN4, HAMMOU LAAMRANI5, “Water demand management in Yemen and Jordan: addressing power and interests,” *The Geographic Journal* )

Abstract

This paper investigates the extent to which entrenched interests of stakeholder groups both maintain water use practice, and may be confronted. The focus is on the agricultural sectors of Yemen and Jordan, where water resource policymakers face resistance in their attempts to reduce water use to environmentally sustainable levels through implementation of water demand management (WDM) activities. Some farmers in both countries that have invested in irrigated production of high-value crops (such as qat and bananas) benefit from a political economy that encourages increased rather than reduced water consumption. The resultant over-exploitation of water resources affects groups in unequal measures. Stakeholder analysis demonstrates that the more ‘powerful’ groups (chiefly the large landowners and the political elites, as well as the ministries of irrigation over which they exert influence) are generally opposed to reform in water use, while the proponents of WDM (e.g. water resource managers, environmental ministries and NGOs, and the international donor community) are found to have minimal influence over water use policy and decisionmaking. Efforts and ideas attempted by this latter group to challenge the status quo are classified here as either (a) influencing or (b) challenging the power asymmetry, and the merits and limits of both approaches are discussed. The interpretation of evidence suggests current practice is likely to endure, but may be more effectively challenged if a long-term approach is taken with an awareness of opportunities generated by windows of opportunity and the participation of ‘overlap groups’. Greening deserts

Water resource managers throughout most of the world are concerned with meeting demand through new sources, or through more efficient use of existing sources. This is certainly true of the Middle East, where the application of physically scarce water resources to parched land is a common sight. The modern wave of ‘desert bloom syndrome’ (Molle et al. 2009) may have originated with Israeli diversions of the Lake of Tiberias (George 1979), and spread to the Toshka depression in Egypt (Wichelns 2003), and to the Disi Aquifer between Saudi Arabia and Jordan (Ferragina and Greco 2008). Middle Eastern governments on the whole have gone to remarkable lengths to meet demand for water by building diversion structures, canals, deep tubewells, and desalination plants. The extent to which they have attempted or been able to manage rather than to meet water demand, however, is less impressive.

This dominant. ‘supply-side’ approach to water resources management is entirely rational in the political economies where it occurs It is politically rational (and economically rewarding) when water use policy is set in a ‘shadow state’ (see Allan and Mirumachi 2010), where decisionmakers respond to the pressures from influential industrial agricultural interests and other politically influential water-users benefitting from agricultural water subsidies.

Implementing policy to manage water demand in these circumstances is, by contrast, economically irrational and politically suicidal. Efforts to reduce water use directly challenge the interests invested in the established political economy. Yet managing water demand remains the single most effective way of ensuring environmentally sustainable water use, and reconsidering the obstacles to water demand management (WDM) takes on a new imperative.

This paper sheds light on the forces that sustain the rationale for supply-side management, and prevent the uptake of WDM principles and practice, in the agricultural sectors of Yemen and Jordan. Previous research into failures of WDM policy uptake has found that the established order typically favours male-dominated structures (Arafa et al. 2007a), or the wealthy (Tyler 2007), and is perpetuated by the fact that water resource management institutions also lack much of the ability and legitimacy required to implement change that some in local communities – and external donors – would like to see (Brooks and Wolfe 2007). This paper complements these studies, to find that the problem lies partly with the concept of WDM itself, but is mainly attributable to the power asymmetry and entrenched interests of water stakeholder groups.

### **Bottom up oversight checks corruption and poor management**

Yemen Times 2008 “Corruption in the water sector is an overlooked threat for development and sustainability”, (http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Corruption+in+the+water+sector+is+an+overlooked+threat+for...-a0185346263)

Participation by marginalised groups in water budgeting and policy development can provide a means for adding a pro-poor focus to spending. Community involvement in selecting the site of rural wells and managing irrigation systems helps to make certain that small landholders are not last in line when it comes to accessing water. Civil society participation in auditing, water pollution mapping and performance monitoring of water utilities creates important additional checks and balances. Transparency and participation build the very trust and confidence that accountable water governance demands and civil society plays a critical role in turning information and opportunities for participation into effective public oversight. Creating momentum for change: a global coalition against corruption in water Implementing these recommendations requires a strategic vision. The global challenge of corruption in the water sector needs a global response, local expertise and adaptation and buy-in from a wide range of stakeholders. Transparency International, with its network of corruption experts and advocates in more than ninety countries, is well positioned to make a significant contribution. Efforts to bring more transparency to the water sector, for example, can benefit from TI's long-standing research and advocacy on raising the standard of freedom of information and transparency in governance systems around the world.

### **US has the best working relations with NGO’s and civil society groups**

Burke 10 (Edward, Researcher at FRIDE “*Assessing Democracy Assistance:* Yemen” Fride, http://www.fride.org/download/IP\_WMD\_Yemen\_ENG\_jul10.pdf)

However, given the threat of a resurgent al-Qaeda in Yemen, the US government has recently begun to prioritise its relations with Yemen, labelling its new strategy as one of ‘stabilisation’ and in late 2009 announced two ‘flagship’ programmes, the Community Livelihood Project and the Responsive Governance Project which have been allocated USD $121 million from 2010 to 2013 and will be implemented by USAID. It is envisaged that both of these programmes will not only involve capacity building at the national and local levels but will also be underpinned by a democratisation approach that will aim to improve oversight of development by Yemen’s democratic institutions and civil society. USAID has also been allocated funding of just over USD $1.2 million over two years to undertake ‘conflict mitigation’ projects to address mounting protests and violence directed against the Yemeni government. Such an approach goes some way towards addressing local concerns that the US government is committed to strengthening Yemen’s security forces without consideration of the consequences for democratic reform. The US will also continue to provide core support to NDI activities in Yemen. Among NGOs, the US is regarded as the most flexible external donor, unafraid of working with or funding NGOs that have frequently incurred the wrath of the government through their persistence in arguing against government policies. Contrary to their European counterparts, the US MEPI programme established good working relations with Islamist civil society networks, including those firmly opposed to broader US foreign policy in the region. Generally, despite widespread criticism of other aspects of US foreign policy in the region, US democracy assistance has won the respect of most political parties and NGOs in Yemen. The US has also been praised for taking a more unequivocal stance on human rights violations against political and civil society activists in Yemen than European donors.