## 1NC

### Brain drain and clientellism – governance aid projects make governments more accountable to donors than citizens and lure the best and brightest away from government jobs

Seppälä, Ruohomäki, Gould – 2001 (last cite)

(Dr. Pekka Seppälä and Dr. Olli Ruohomäki, advisors with the Unit for Sector Policy, Department for International Development Co-operation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finland and Dr. Jeremy Gould, affiliated with the Institute for Developing Studies, University of Helsinki), THINKING STRATEGICALLY ABOUT DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FINLAND

6.3. The risks of democratic governance intervention

6.3.1. Ineffective programmes

AND

 **difficult to find trained people to fill basic public sector positions such as those of local government magistrates**, schoolteachers, nurses, sanitation engineers and accountants.

### Renteirism – Governance funds decrease the government’s reliance on public approval for money – decreases accountability and increases corruption

Richard Nielson and Daniel Nielson – 2/1/10, Triage for Democracy: Selection Effects in Governance Aid, http://aiddata.s3.amazonaws.com/Nielson\_2010.pdf

(Daniel: Director of the Political Economy and Development Lab at Brigham Young University, where he is also Associate Professor of Political Science. He is a founder and principal investigator of AidData, the most comprehensive source for foreign aid information)

In contrast to the generally positive expectations of the effects of aid

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correlation. However, as noted above, Finkel et al. (2007) and Kalyvitis and Vlachaki (2007) find that democracy aid increases democracy.

### Externality – The aff increases external control – undermines legitimacy

Carothers, Director – Democracy Program – Carnegie, 09

(Revitalizing U.S. Democracy Assistance: The Challenge of USAID)

A second key problem for USAID’s democracy and

**AND**

**the legitimacy of such efforts will be questioned.**

## 2NC

### Prefer our ev

### Statistics - Our evidence uses a detailed analysis of governance assistance that take into account multiple countries with a variety of variables

Richard Nielson and Daniel Nielson – 2/1/10, Triage for Democracy: Selection Effects in Governance Aid, http://aiddata.s3.amazonaws.com/Nielson\_2010.pdf

(Daniel: Director of the Political Economy and Development Lab at Brigham Young University, where he is also Associate Professor of Political Science. He is a founder and principal investigator of AidData, the most comprehensive source for foreign aid information),

Foreign aid for improving governance may promote democracy because monitoring

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democracy scores only in the subset of observations most likely to receive the governance aid in the first place.

### Empirics prove – aff is net worse for governance

Bharat Pokharel - Executive Director of Centre for Economic Development and Administration (CEDA), Tribhuvan University – May 2011, Alliance FOR AID MONITOR NEPAL, “Making AID Better,” http://www.aidmonitor.org.np/publication/pub6.pdf

Some donors choose to “by-pass

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erodes the quality and effectiveness of government institutions.

### Turns the aff – Undermines every aspect of good governance – transparency, accountability, corruption

John Mackinnon – 2003, (Mackinnon is an independent researcher and advisor on development issues), report commissioned by the World Bank, How does aid affect the quality of public expenditure? What we know and what we do not know, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/10/31/000112742\_20031031171530/Rendered/PDF/269600Mackinno1d0public0expenditure.pdf

Government officials find themselves accountable to donors as

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into the hands of the corrupt or misguided.

### Aid is flowing to Libya now on their terms now – Local control and local talent are essential

Stephen Flanagan – Chair in Diplomacy and National Security @ CSIS – 11/1/11, International Assistance to the New Libya, http://csis.org/publication/international-assistance-new-libya

With the death of Muammar el-Qaddafi

AND

in military operations to protect the Libyan people.

### Good governance and talented technocrats will be essential – NTC has to show gains in the short term or it will lose credibility

Armstrong and Gurung – The Governance Network and Mercy Corps – August 11,

Dr. Jim Armstrong, President of The Governance Network, and Dr. Sanjay Gurung, Mercy Corps Senior Program Officer for Governance, Beyond Gaddafi: http://www.governancenet.com/Capacity%20to%20Govern-Libya\_26%20Aug%202011.pdfLibya’s Governance Context

Based on input from assessment participants themselves,

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 their credibility in the eyes of the citizenry.

### Libya can purchase assistance under it’s own schedule and control in the status quo – increasing external control derails the state building process

Lacher, Associate - German Institute for International and Security Affairs,11

(The International Role in Post-Qadhafi Libya? Withdraw, www.mepc.org/articles-commentary/commentary/international-role-post-qadhafi-libya-withdraw)

Planning is ongoing in Western capitals for a prominent international role in the state-building process that is to follow the demise of Qadhafi’s regime. But neither an international police force nor a UN-led state-building mission would help Libya master the daunting challenges to come.

AND

advice and technical assistance, but they should refrain from seeking to directly influence the political process to come.

### Governance assistance fails – the “technical” fixes offered by the aff can’t affect background political conditions and incentive structures that doom reform

Thomas Carothers and Diane de Gramont – VP, Carnegie – NOVEMBER 2011, Aiding Governance in Developing Countries: Progress Amid Uncertainties, Carnegie, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/aiding\_governance.pdf

Recognize That Governance Deficiencies Are Primarily Political

Governance assistance was initially shaped by what can

AND

factors constrain opportunities for far-reaching reform.

### Quantitative bias – Pressure to produce measurable results is distorts project design and undermines effectiveness

Thomas Carothers and Diane de Gramont – VP, Carnegie – NOVEMBER 2011, Aiding Governance in Developing Countries: Progress Amid Uncertainties, Carnegie, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/aiding\_governance.pdf

The uncertain empirical link between donor-preferred

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that are outside the purview of aid agencies.

### Even if the aff stumbled onto the right project, most of their money/time will be spend on evaluation – turns solvency

Thandika Mkandawire – director, UN Institute for Social Development - 2002

(formerly executive secretary of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, is director of the United Nations Institute for Social Development), Incentives, Governance, and Capacity Development in Africa, African Issues, Vol. 30, No. 1, The African "Brain Drain" to the North: Pitfalls andPossibilities (2002), pp. 15-20, JSTOR

Rather than focus on enhancing the effect of local development efforts,

**AND**

have been supply driven and geared toward satisfying internal institutional demands rather than the capacity-building needs of the countries themselves.'3